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DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE’S AGING 
BURDEN 
Sam Kalen* 
Stare decisis means little in a changing society when for every 
new case the number of possible precedents is practically 
unwieldy.  Without principles as guides, the body of 
precedents becomes an uncharted sea; and reliance on 
principles is worse than useless unless these principles receive 
critical scientific attention.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional dogma occasionally changes with the passage of time, 
but sometimes not swiftly enough.2  Citizens United v. FEC poignantly 
illustrates how doctrines can morph within a few decades; the same 
occurred not long ago when the Tenth Amendment quickly surfaced as a 
potentially significant constitutional barrier only to depart shortly 
thereafter.3  It occurred again when the Court reversed its position on 
                                                 
* Winston S. Howard Distinguished Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law. 
The author would like to thank Stephen Feldman for his helpful comments and 
suggestions, as well as the editorial board of the Valparaiso University Law Review. 
1 MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER 197 (1933) (emphasis omitted). 
2 Thomas R. Powell, Commerce, Pensions, and Codes, 49 HARV. L. REV. 193, 238 (1935) 
(“Dogmas derived from conditions that have long since changed or vanished may persist 
as eternal truths in the minds of men trained to regard legal precedents with something 
approaching veneration.”). 
3 Compare Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913, 916–17 (2010) 
(holding that under the First Amendment the government may not suppress political 
speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity and that it was unconstitutional for 
federal statues to bar corporate expenditures for electioneering communications), with 
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003) (affirming “the District Court’s 
judgment finding the plaintiffs’ challenges to BCRA § 305, § 307, and the millionaire 
provisions non justiciable, striking down as unconstitutional BCRA § 318, and upholding 
BCRA § 311”), and Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668–69 (1990) 
(holding that “[b]y requiring corporations to make all independent political expenditures 
through a separate fund made up of money solicited expressly for political purposes, the 
Michigan Campaign Finance Act reduces the threat that huge corporate treasuries amassed 
with the aid of favorable state laws will be used to influence unfairly the outcome of 
elections”); compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985) 
(explaining that Congress’s authority is limited to that under the Commerce Clause and 
that these limits are built within the restrains of the governmental system), with The Nat’l 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976) (reaffirming that states and individuals 
and corporations have different challenges to Congress’ power to regulate commerce; and 
that “Congress may not exercise that power so as to force directly upon the States it choices 
as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are 
to be made”). 
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state sodomy laws, and in other less significant areas as well.4  Propitious 
circumstances might propel change, or too slowly evolving social 
conditions might impede necessary reform.  Either way, the past—often 
cloaked under the lawyer’s rubric of stare decisis—cannot cabin the 
future.  But discerning precisely when following past constitutional 
doctrine becomes too inimical to progress tests the judiciary’s 
conscience.5  Such moments, therefore, neither occur lightly nor often 
prior to a robust debate.6  For roughly thirty years, voices have 
encouraged the Court to revisit either all or part of the inherent restraint 
on state action embedded in theory of the Commerce Clause, 
“universally regarded as the great unifying clause of the Constitution.”7 
After all, the Court’s vacillating approach toward the Dormant 
Commerce Clause (“DCC”) reflects, perhaps as much as any other 
particular constitutional provision, the tension between dynamic and 
static constitutionalism when confronting societal transition.  “The law, it 
is often said, reflects the climate of social, political, and economic 
                                                 
4 Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that individual private 
rights have liberties under the Due Process Clause and that the State cannot hold private 
sexual conduct as a crime), with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that 
there are no constitutional protection under rational basis review for acts of sodomy and 
that states were free to outlaw those practices); compare Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 
U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (holding that the “substantially advances” formula is not a valid 
takings test (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 
263 (1980) (holding that because a taking had not occurred the Court could not apply 
remedies such as a mandamus or declaratory judgment to recover damages).  The Court 
reaffirmed that, because Chevron argued a “substantially advances” formula instead of the 
“Lucas-type total regulatory taking, a Penn Central taking, or a land-use exaction,” the Court 
found Chevron was not entitled to summary judgment on that claim.  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
5 See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 2–3 (2006) 
(explaining how legal consciousness reflects a “body of ideas through which lawyers 
experience legal issues); see also Karl E. Klare, Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-Year 
Casebook, 54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 876, 876 & n.2 (1979) (referring to legal consciousness); Karl E. 
Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 
1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268 (1978) (portraying how legal consciousness influenced 
the Court’s approach toward the Wagner Act and labor).  See generally MICHAEL KAMMEN, 
A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF:  THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 29, 38–
39, 399 (1986) (referencing how Michael Kammen implicitly places this notion under the 
umbrella of “constitutionalism” as a consensus oriented mechanism for achieving both 
progress and stability in a changing cultural community). 
6 See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 723, 724 (1988) (arguing whether stare decisis can provide an acceptable ground for 
preserving the existing constitutional edifice without simultaneously licensing further 
departures from original understanding); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional 
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879–80 (1996) (discussing various components of the 
common law approach to constitutional interpretation). 
7 Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 
1335, 1337 (1934). 
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opinion, the Zeitgeist of any given period in history.”8  Perhaps more 
than any other jurist, the German philosopher Friederick Karl von 
Savigny explained how law mirrors aspects of the Volksgeist (shared 
assumptions or spirit of the people) or prevailing “dominant” national 
conscience.9  But spirits evolve slowly, pushing and pulling between the 
past and present—and possibly the future.  The Court moderates these 
forces, and in the process reflects the cultural changes occurring in 
society.10  When caught in this tug of war between outmoded principles 
and precedents and modern circumstances, the Court naturally must 
push the law forward in a manner that maintains a dialogue with the 
past.  Bruce Ackerman describes such periods as “jurisgenerative 
events.”11  These events occur iteratively in a dynamic process along 
with economic change, and explaining when and how the judiciary 
accomplishes this is the “heart of legal history.”12  The difficulty, as 
Roscoe Pound warned, is that such events could reflect a rational 
dialogue or perhaps they are “equally likely to be a contingent product 
of whatever analogy happened to be available during the formative 
stages of a particular institution or doctrine” and later followed with 
“irrational persistence, though it may become ineffective in practice and 
inconsistent with the developing experience of the community.”13 
And so it has with the DCC.  During the transitory period of the 
1940s, Justice Rutledge wrote: 
                                                 
8 BENJAMIN R. TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION:  HOW LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO 
THE SUPREME COURT 3 (Greenwood Press, 1974). 
9 JULIUS STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 421–22 (Harvard University 
Press, 1950) (stating “Friedrich Karl von Savigny, the unchallenged founder of historical 
jurisprudence, and the study of the relation between social and legal development” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see Mitchell Franklin, Legal Method in the Philosophies of 
Hegel and Savigny, 44 TUL. L. REV. 766, 776 (1970) (arguing the law according to Savigny 
became the expression of the Volksgeist). 
10 See JOHN E. SEMONCHE, KEEPING FAITH:  A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT 11 (1998) (stating the Court engages in a “dialogue with the past,” inquiring into 
what has changed and whether new problems warrant “reevaluating and reconstituting” 
prior decisions). 
11 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS 41 (1991).  It is at these moments, 
he posits, that the Court can employ rhetorical devices to achieve intergenerational synthesis.  
Id. at 122–23 (discussing Carolene Products). 
12  Max Lerner, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism, 42 YALE L.J. 668, 684 (1933) 
(discussing the economic and range of problems brought before the Supreme Court);  see 
ANTHONY CHASE, LAW & HISTORY:  THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 45 
(1997) (“It is the legal system’s constant efforts both to remain consistent with the past and 
to reflect the dominant interests of the present—or perhaps even to anticipate a revolution 
just around the corner—which lies at the heart of legal history.”). 
13 DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY:  AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE 
TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY 444 (2013). 
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The continuing adjustment of the clause has filled many 
of the great constitutional gaps of Marshall’s time and 
later.  But not all of the filling has been lasting.  Great 
emphases of national policy swinging between nation 
and states in historic conflicts have been reflected, 
variously and from time to time, in premise and 
therefore in conclusion of particular dispositions.14 
He continued by observing “their sum has shifted and reshifted the 
general balance of authority, inevitably producing some anomaly of logic 
and of result in the decisions.”15  Suggesting that the Commerce Clause 
and its negative implication had finally reached stasis by 1946, he 
acknowledged that, “in its prohibitive, as in its affirmative or enabling, 
effects the history of the commerce clause has been one of very 
considerable judicial oscillation.”16 
The dialectic surrounding the DCC has produced a cascading fugue 
of commentary, seemingly evading why the modern DCC analysis is the 
way it is.17  At the cusp of the resurgence of the DCC jurisprudence, 
                                                 
14 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 413 (1946). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 420. 
17 See, e.g., Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping:  Congressional Acquiescence and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1764–65 (2004) (deflecting some of the criticism 
that has fallen on the DDC).  Jim Chen writes: 
Its many opponents characterize the dormant Commerce Clause as the 
Voldermort of American constitutional law, a dastardly doctrine with 
no basis in the text of the Constitution. . . .  Justice Scalia and Thomas 
stand far taller than other critics of the dormant Commerce 
Clause. . . .  [They] call it the “negative” Commerce Clause. 
Id.; Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 44 
(1988) (“academic criticism continues unabated on one front:  the dormant commerce 
power doctrine and its expansive influence on the interpretation of federal commercial 
statutes”); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1468, 1475 (2007) (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause is a constitutional default 
rule because its enforceability is contingent on the absence of congressional authorization 
of interstate discrimination); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the 
Commerce Clause:  Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations But 
Preserve State Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8 (1999) (arguing that the existing 
approaches to the Commerce Clause are inadequate and instead the authors push for a 
“Neo-Federalist” methodology, which examines the meaning of the Commerce Clause 
through originalism and applies that understanding in light of modern challenges); Donald 
H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:  Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092–93 (1986) (arguing in support of how the Court has 
applied the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and that the Court should primarily 
be concerned with preventing purposeful protectionism); Robert A. Sedler, The Negative 
Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation:  An Analysis in Terms of 
Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885, 893–94 (1985) (“the commerce clause may be 
viewed as embodying the nondiscrimination principle . . . the affirmative grant of the 
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Julian Eule argued that the interests sought to be protected by the DCC 
could be better served through the privileges and immunities clause of 
article IV, section 2 of the Constitution.  Martin Redish and Shane 
Nugent too argued that neither the structure nor language of the 
Constitution warranted continued adherence to DCC dogma.18  
Emerging scholarship aptly explores the jurisprudential justification for 
the doctrine, with many scholars illustrating the implicit and erroneous 
assumptions animating DCC jurisprudence.19  Perhaps, the best of these 
                                                                                                             
commerce power to Congress was to prevent discrimination by the states against interstate 
commerce and out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce and in-state interests”).  See 
generally Steven Breker-Cooper, The Commerce Clause:  The Case for Judicial Non-Intervention, 
69 OR. L. REV. 895, 896 (1990) (examining the issues arising from the rubric of the dormant 
Commerce Clause); Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 
1097 (1988) (“It is a maxim of constitutional law that states may not discriminate against 
citizens of other states to enrich their own citizens.  But like many supposed truths, this 
maxim is subject to exception.”); Earl Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too Much—An 
Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47, 47–49 (1981) 
(providing information on how the current approach and opposition within the court on 
state regulation of interstate commerce by comparing his model to what is used by the 
courts); see also Michael E. Smith, State Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1203, 1205 (1986) (concentrating on the current era, arguing that the “Supreme 
Court’s rules concerning state discrimination against interstate commerce are reasonably 
clear; that they fit together and rest on tenable reasons; and that they have produced 
reasonably uniform results”); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 
WIS. L. REV. 125, 126 (1979) (attempting to “return the dormant commerce clause from its 
position of isolation and incoherence to be reintegrated with the rest of the Constitution”); 
Jonathan D. Varat, State “Citizenship” and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 493 
(1981) (defining the proper scope of state authority to favor state residents in the 
distribution of public resources).  See generally DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  THE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE 212 (2004) (explaining “five reasons rooted in economic theory suggest 
why the ‘national common market,’ safeguarded by the dormant [c]ommerce [c]lause 
principle, has had these wealth-maximizing effects” (citations omitted)). 
18 See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the 
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 599 (1987) (arguing that the implicit 
structural argument for the dormant Commerce Clause does not have textual authorization 
but the implicit principle is valid); Richard D. Friedman, Putting Dormancy Out of its Misery, 
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745, 1745 (1991) (suggesting that the doctrine is “an historical 
anomaly” that “has long outlived its usefulness”). 
19 See generally Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend:  A Game Theoretical Analysis of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 11–13 (2003) (arguing against 
jurists and legal scholars who condemn the dormant Commerce Clause).  Rather, Stearns 
believes that the dormant Commerce Clause has two important dimensions, state laws, 
tariffs and subsidies, and laws through which “individual states undermine other states in 
their efforts to adopt common pro-commerce strategies that represent one of two or more 
stable, pure Nash equilibrium outcomes.”  Id. at 11; see also Leslie Meltzer Henry & 
Maxwell L. Stearns, Commerce Games and the Individual Mandate, 100 GEO. L.J. 1117, 1117, 
1120 (2012) (applying the constitutionality of the Commerce Clause jurisprudence through 
the lenses of game theory and identifying common features of cases where “the Court has 
limited state powers on the dormant side, and has sustained or restricted congressional 
powers on the affirmative side of its jurisprudence.”); Maxwell L. Stearns, The New 
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is Brannon Denning, who rejects any balancing under the DCC and 
offers a decision rule model capable of addressing the perceived interests 
being served by the DCC.20  Others suggest that the DCC’s anti-
discrimination principle is economically flawed, nestled erroneously 
upon an unstated economic assumption that the relevant actors are 
competing in the same market.21  More recently, I along with others, 
have questioned the extra-territorial appendage to the modern DCC 
analysis.22  Previously, I explained how the concept emerged from a 
long-since eroded paradigm imbued with spherical connotations and 
defined conceptually by dual federalism and geographically by 
simplistic notions of territoriality.23  And finally the DCC continues to 
influence Commerce Clause scholarship as well, with inquiries exploring 
hidden meanings in the Court’s struggle with the reciprocal affirmative 
                                                                                                             
Commerce Clause Doctrine in Game Theoretical Perspective, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007) 
(offering a new framework to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine that attempts to 
resolve insights that remain in tension by offering a normative account of the doctrine and 
a framework for implementing the policy based on decided case law). 
20 See Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 417, 516 (2008) (“[T]he Court . . . should explicitly abandon ‘balancing’ as 
part of the DCCD, a step it appears to have already taken sub silentio.”); see also Brannon P. 
Denning, Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce and the Legitimacy of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37, 93 (2006) (“[S]uch balancing had long 
been criticized as an improper arrogation of legislative duties.  Such criticisms continue 
among the DCCD’s vocal critics.” (footnote omitted)); Norman R. Williams, The Foundations 
of the American Common Market, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 409, 409 (2008) (engaging critically 
with existing DCC theories, suggesting an overriding commitment to deliberative 
equality). 
21 Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 217, 217–23 (1995) 
(questioning the Court’s nondiscrimination formulation); Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed 
Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1196 (1998) (“[T]he 
Court implicitly has adopted a neoclassical view of economics—that free competition 
among rational economic actors will necessarily improve the national economy.” (footnote 
omitted)).  Cf. Michael S. Greve, The Dormant Commerce Clause as an Ex Ante Rule, 3 J. L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 241, 241–42 (2007) (favoring anti-discrimination principle as sensible 
option). 
22 See Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause:  A 
Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 979 (2013) (explaining how since 2003, the Court 
limited extraterritoriality principles); Mark P. Gergen, Territoriality and the Perils of 
Formalism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (1988) (arguing that the extraterritoriality principles 
are too formal and that these theories work poorly on the regulations of states); Sam Kalen, 
Dormancy Versus Innovation:  A Next Generation Dormant Commerce Clause, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 
381, 384 (2013) (analyzing the judicially construed doctrine and how the modern DCC 
approach does not warrant strict adherence to precedent); see also Mark D. Rosen, 
Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 920 
(2002) (advocating a narrow reading of the cases). 
23 See Sam Kalen, Reawakening the Dormant Commerce Clause in Its First Century, 13 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 417, 424 (1988) (examining the twofold impact of dual federalism and its 
ancillary theory of territorial sovereignty). 
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and negative implications.24  Stephen Calabresi, for instance, argues that 
Congress’ Commerce Clause power is exclusive, effectively questioning 
the last 100 years of DCC jurisprudence premised upon the notion that 
Congress can sanction state actions that otherwise would violate the 
DCC.25  The issue, though, necessarily resuscitates the omnipresent 
dialogue about federalism overall, whether courts must police spheres of 
jurisdiction, protecting the states and Congress from one another.26 
The urgency of exploring how the DCC should respond to the 
politics, language, and circumstances of the present moment is critical.  
We live in global economy, with consumers purchasing products as 
easily from China as from a neighboring city.  Typically, cities, more 
than states, sometimes compete in the international financial arena, 
generally leaving the economic marketplace both localized and 
globalized.  And with gridlock at the federal level “inhibiting or 
impeding progress, allowing entrenched interests to maintain their 
privileged status,” it has become incumbent upon state and local 
governments to experiment with programs for addressing our modern 
challenges.27  But experimental efforts in several areas, including natural 
resources and climate, product bans and food systems, as well as land 
use planning, become unnecessarily inhibited or chilled by past DCC 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 101, 101 (2001) (arguing that despite various interpretations of the Constitutional 
Convention, the ratification debates, and the Federalist Papers, commerce cannot be used 
in a broad sense, rather should be interpreted by a narrow viewpoint); Thomas B. Colby, 
Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249, 
254–56 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court has not interpreted this standard under a 
narrow originalistic reasoning and suggesting that the clause inhibits Congress from acting 
in a manner not affording uniformity in treatment among the states); Richard A. Epstein, 
The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1388 (1987) (arguing that the 
expansive construction of the Commerce clause is wrong and inconsistent with proper 
interpretation); Barry Friedman and Genevieve Lakier, “To Regulate,” Not “To Prohibit”:  
Limiting the Commerce Power, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 256, 258–59 (2012) (exploring the 
power to regulate); Thomas W. Merrill, Toward a Principled Interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 33–38 (1998) (explaining the interpretational 
development by various justices on the Commerce Clause). 
25 See Steven G. Calabresi, The Right to Buy Health Insurance Across State Lines:  Crony 
Capitalism and the Supreme Court, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1447, 1513 (2013) (cautioning that under 
the Commerce Clause, Congress cannot delegate certain powers because it is 
unconstitutional). 
26 See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 215 (2000) (affirming the concept articulated by Herbert Wechsler, 
but on different grounds); Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the American Economic Order, 
1780–1910, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 57, 57–58 (1975) (exploring how federalism operated in an 
economic realm for allocating power between the states and national government). 
27 Michael J. Gerhardt, Why Gridlock Matters, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2120 (2013). 
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jurisprudence.28  This is all because the Court avoided the sublime 
current transcending the development of the Commerce Clause, 
                                                 
28 Ethan S. Williams, Comment, Last Call for the Pike Test?  The Constitutionality of State 
Unique-Mark Requirements on Beverage Containers Under the Commerce Clause, 6 J. MARSHALL 
L.J. 283, 287 (2012) (arguing that the state’s Bottle Bill is constitutional under the Commerce 
Clause because it provides a public benefit and promotes the prevention of fraudulent 
redemption of out-of-state beverage containers).  See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Rachel M. 
Lary, Retail Store Size-Capping Ordinances and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 37 URB. 
LAW. 907, 908–09 (2005) (analyzing the conflict between local business and large retail store 
size cap ordinances to DCCD challenges); Justin Shoemake, Note, The Smalling of America?:  
Growth Management Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 48 DUKE L.J. 891, 895 (1999) 
(analyzing the dormant Commence Clause challenge to the fiscal criteria of Vermont’s Act 
250).  See generally Michael H. Abbey, Note, State Plant Closing Legislation:  A Modern 
Justification for the Use of the Dormant Commerce Clause as a Bulwark of National Free Trade, 75 
VA. L. REV. 845, 848 (1989) (analyzing the constitutional jurisprudence and how its current 
interpretation has been left open for judicial manipulation); Erwin Chemerinsky et al., 
California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 25 ENVTL. F. 50, 55 (July/Aug. 2008) 
(applying the dormant Commerce Clause principles to the leakage issue in California).  See 
also Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 
969, 970 (1998) (analyzing the superstructure for evaluating monetary subsidies in the post-
West Lynn Creamery era); Robin Kundis Craig, Constitutional Contours for the Design and 
Implementation of Multistate Renewable Energy Programs and Projects, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 771, 
792–95 (2010) (addressing the multistate constitutional ambiguities on the regulation of 
energy production and how courts uphold state regulations of energy issues when there 
are not overt economic protections); Brannon P. Denning, Smokey and the Bandit in 
Cyberspace:  The Dormant Commerce Clause, the Twenty-First Amendment, and State Regulation 
of Internet Alcohol Sales, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 297, 299–300 (2002) (arguing that by striking 
down state regulations, courts have ignored constitutional text by indulging in broad 
applications of the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment, 
and by construing narrowly state power); Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and 
the Constitution, U. OF ARIZ. 1, 3 (2008), available at http://www.rehnquistcenter.org/ 
Climate%20Change%20and%20Federalism%20REV.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
DGV8-CCFG (considering “the constitutional authority of states to pursue climate change 
mitigation measures when Congress has not acted or has legislated but without clearly 
addressing the validity of state measures.” (footnote omitted)).  Others too question 
conventional wisdom.  See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 787 (2001) (discussing the flaws of the conventional 
wisdom to the dormant Commerce clause).  The authors argue to deviate from the 
emerging constitutional wisdom and show that the dormant Commerce Clause allows 
states to have more flexibility with internet transactions than previously regarded.  Id.; 
Ward A. Greenberg, Note, Liquor Price Affirmation Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
86 MICH. L. REV. 186, 188 (1987) (explaining how the “Constitution does not recognize a 
distinction between retrospective and prospective affirmation statutes[]” but that all 
affirmation statutes hinder interstate commerce and are “an unconstitutional 
extraterritorial exercise of state legislative power”); Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, 
Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 
792 (1996) (analyzing the restraint that the Commerce Clause imposes on state tax 
incentives and subsides); Christine A. Klein, The Dormant Commerce Clause and Water Export:  
Toward a New Analytical Paradigm, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 131, 131 (2011) (examining the 
dormant Commerce Clause as it pertains to water export); Michael J. Ruttinger, Note, Is 
There a Dormant Extraterritoriality Principle?:  Commerce Clause Limits on State Antitrust Laws, 
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reconciling how to limit some state and local programs once the Court 
extricated linguistic masks and dual federalism from Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence. 
Contemporary scholarship generally portrays how the DCC, 
originated first with Chief Justice Marshall, became tempered by the 
local/national distinction announced by Justice Curtis in Cooley v. Board 
of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, only to be replaced shortly thereafter 
by distinguishing between direct and indirect effects, with the 
succeeding period between 1937 and the 1940s marking a transformative 
shift toward the Court’s modern approach toward the Commerce 
Clause.29  This is when the Court ostensibly abandoned a pretense of 
spheres of jurisdiction and attendant dual federalism paradigm.30  The 
Court then subsequently “firmed up” the “current framework” with its 
“1970 . . . decision in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.”31  The Pike Court 
succinctly suggested that even-handed state or local regulations affecting 
interstate commerce would be subjected to a balancing of the asserted 
local interests against the interest of nationally uniformity.32  Of course, 
state or local regulations that discriminate against interstate commerce, 
                                                                                                             
106 MICH. L. REV. 545, 545 (2007) (advocating an “‘Inconsistency Principle’ as the best way 
to understand the Court’s concern with extraterritorial regulation”). 
29 Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 312–14, 321 (1851) (holding that the 
provisions regarding state pilotage law was not in contention with the second and third 
clauses of the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution, rather that the state had 
authority to legislate the law).  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2010) (“Roughly between 1937 and 1942, the Supreme Court significantly altered the law 
of federal-state relations, including the federal power to regulate commerce and to tax and 
spend for the general welfare.”); Denning, supra note 20, at 437–40 (drawing on the analysis 
of Barry Cushman’s survey on the application of the direct-indirect distinction); Michael L. 
Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause:  A Proposed Unitary Framework, 
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 409–10 (1998) (discussing the Court’s action in Cooley).  
Lawrence states that: 
[T]he Court attempted to merge its previous dormant-commerce-
clause holdings into a single doctrine standing for the proposition that, 
in the absence of conflicting congressional action, States may regulate 
those aspects of interstate commerce that are so local as to require 
diverse treatment, whereas Congress alone may regulate those aspects 
of the same that require a single, uniform rule. 
Id. at 409 (footnote omitted). 
30 See Garrick B. Pursley, Federalism Compatibilists, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1365, 1371 (2011) 
(discussing the change from the old dual federalism view between national and state 
government and exclusive spheres of authority). 
31 Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg & Anne F. Peterson, Forum, Federalism, and Free Markets:  
An Empirical Study of Judicial Behavior Under the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 80 
UMKC L. REV. 139, 142 (2012) (referring to Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)). 
32 See infra notes 409–10 and accompanying text (explaining how Pike was a foundational 
case for DCC balancing analysis). 
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on their face, in purpose, or effect, would be subjected to a strict scrutiny 
analysis.33 
Constitutional development, unfortunately, is not so simple.  The 
Court is an institutional actor, comprising transitory personnel, reacting 
to advocates, operating within a changing economic, social, political, and 
cultural milieu, and struggling to adjust past rhetoric to current 
challenges.34  And yet, when modern scholars purportedly examine the 
historical account of the DCC, they often do so through shaded lenses.  
They search for utilitarian theories, occasionally scouring cases for 
hidden decisional rules, but often relegate the importance of exploring 
why the DCC doctrine developed the way it did.35  The overly—yet too 
often parroted—simplistic mosaic of the negative aspect of the 
Commerce Clause obscures how horizontal federalism, the unresolved 
background debate over exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction, impeded 
the next phase in developing an analytically sound DCC doctrine and 
accompanying decisional rules.  This next stage likely would have 
interred any pretense of “balancing” in DCC analysis.  Balancing merely 
served as a temporary rhetorical device for the Progressives’ attack 
against formalism, one that avoided outright any debate over federalism 
and ostensibly maintained a cloak of having a dialogue with the past.36  
It achieved, therefore, an intergenerational synthesis. 
This Article mines the evolution of the DCC and the Court’s constant 
dialogue with its past, illustrating the Court’s struggle with the 
Constitution’s framers’ acceptance of imperium in imperio and how it 
                                                 
33 See United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
343 (2007) (“[W]hen a law favors in-state business over out-of-state competition, rigorous 
scrutiny is appropriate because the law is often the product of ‘simple economic 
protectionism.’  Laws favoring local government, by contrast, may be directed toward any 
number of legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism.” (citations omitted)); Hunt v. Wash. 
State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353–54 (1977) (“When discrimination against 
commerce of the type [the Court has] found . . . the burden falls on the State to justify it 
both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of 
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.”); Pike, 397 
U.S. at 142 (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local 
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld 
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
punitive local benefits.”); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) 
(holding that a State cannot discriminate by erecting an economic barrier to protect against 
competition, even if reasonable and adequate to conserve legitimate local interests). 
34 See generally G. Edward White, Constitutional Change and the New Deal:  The 
Internalist/Externalist Debate, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1094, 1098 (2005) (explaining the change of 
the Court during the New Deal era). 
35 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 29 at 399–40 (searching for the hidden order). 
36 See infra Part III.B (discussing how Progressives rejected classical formalism and 
instead promoted active governmental guidance). 
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impeded embracing concurrent federal/state jurisdiction over interstate 
commerce—or, at least, an internally consistent coherent theory 
justifying the converse.  Understanding this dialogue requires, at the 
outset, an appreciation of how the doctrine emerged during the nation’s 
formative years.  Part II of the Article, therefore, examines the pre-Civil 
War period, focusing first on the framers and then on how the Court left 
unresolved whether the Commerce Clause vests Congress with exclusive 
jurisdiction.  The DCC became trapped in an unstable vortex between 
nationalism and a desire to maintain diversity and experimentation at 
the local level.  The Court in Cooley responded by mirroring President 
Jackson’s political solution by attempting to appease both factions.37 
Next, Part III explores how the country’s changing political, 
economic, and social landscape merged with Fourteenth Amendment 
principles to foster judicial rhetoric premised upon distinct spheres of 
jurisdiction, including a constitutional right to engage in interstate 
commerce.38  William Nelson explains how judges during the post-Civil 
War period mirrored anti-slavery language when employing a 
formalistic approach toward deciding cases, where they would reason 
from perceived objectively determined rules of structure and principle.39  
Yet, once this rhetoric confronted the progressive subservience toward 
facts and deference to the legislative body, the product was an optically 
palatable judicial rhetoric purportedly tying the past to the present, but 
glossing over the undeniable reality that the DCC had no clothes.40 
Parts IV and V then review how the progressive tendency toward 
nationalism and emphasis on empirical information merged with the 
doctrine from Cooley to produce the foundation for a balancing test in 
DCC dogma.41  Recent scholarship amply explores how the New Deal 
Court’s approach toward the Constitution reflects an evolving legal 
consciousness rather than any discrete transformative occurrence.42  
Barry Cushman, in particular, portrays how the Justices struggled with 
                                                 
37 Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 321 (1851) (holding that the State law 
did not conflict with any law of Congress). 
38 See infra Part II (discussing the early factors that influenced the Commerce Clause). 
39 William E. Nelson, The Impact of Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning 
in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 554–58 (1974). 
40 See generally MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA:  THE REVOLT AGAINST 
FORMALISM 11 (1947) (describing intellectual response to formalism). 
41 See infra Parts IV–V (establishing a foundation for a balancing test). 
42 See generally Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the 
States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 484 (1997) (finding that the New Deal era should be looked at 
as one that was a revolution of federalism).  Gardbaum opines that the New Deal Court 
employed concurrent jurisdiction to vest states with greater authority, arguably 
downplaying how the rise of progressivism and focus on nationalism impeded the 
adoption of actual concurrent jurisdiction.  Id. at 496–97. 
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jurisprudential continuity.43  And G. Edward White masterfully dispels 
some contemporary myths by explaining how the New Deal era reflects 
a particular constitutional moment defined by the social, economic, and 
political circumstances, and how modern constitutional dogma did not 
simply arrive quickly on the New Deal stage and usher in modernism.44  
But neither analysis explains the persistence of an admittedly narrower, 
yet still present, federal exclusive power over certain activities affecting 
interstate commerce.  The Court may have “dramatic[ally] shift[ed]” its 
“methodological approach in constitutional cases from the 1920s to the 
1940s[,]” but not so dramatically because it retained aspects of 
“boundary tracing” under the guise of a balancing test whose genesis 
was a boundary case itself—Cooley.45 
In Part III, I describe how the Court maintained a dialogue with its 
past but engaged in an internal conversation over its role in supervising 
spheres of jurisdiction—acknowledging the dilemma its tests posed, yet 
accepting an exclusivity paradigm.46  And Part IV explains how the 
progressive embrace of Cooley favored nationalist tendencies by 
maintaining exclusivity for matters warranting national uniformity.47  In 
lieu of justifying such an approach under a dual federalism paradigm, 
however, the progressives, and in particular Professor Thomas Reed 
Powell and his correspondence colleague Chief Justice Stone, could tout 
how prior cases conformed to this approach if one examined the facts—
another progressive creed.48  This left the roots of DCC dogma in place, 
as if the law itself remained stable; and all this could be accomplished 
under the rubric of balancing local and national interests.  And here, the 
Article reviews in detail how Professor Powell and the Chief Justice 
combined to produce the Southern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Arizona 
decision.49  Part V then picks up with Pike and how the litigants 
continued to reflect uncertainty surrounding DCC dogma and how the 
Court uncritically accepted balancing without addressing why the 
                                                 
43 See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT:  THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 208–25 (1998) (noting the difficulty Justices encountered in 
keeping continuity in their decisions). 
44 See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 15 (2000) (finding that 
changes in the constitutional jurisprudence in relation to the New Deal was largely affected 
by policy judgments relating to human experience). 
45 White, supra note 34, at 1098, 1110. 
46 See infra Part III (discussing the Court’s evolution). 
47 See infra Part IV (exploring the influence of Cooley). 
48 See infra Part IV (expanding on Professor Thomas Reed Powell’s and Chief Justice 
Stone’s progressive approach). 
49 See infra notes 344–415 and accompanying text (elaborating on Southern Pacific Railroad 
Co.). 
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Commerce Clause mandated certain spheres beyond state control in an 
age where dual federalism had long since faded.50 
II.  EARLY FOUNDATIONS 
A. The Federalist Agenda 
The tapestry woven by pre-Civil War era circumstances provides 
limited insight into the nature and scope of the negative aspect of the 
Commerce Clause.  Two hundred years of academic and judicial 
commentary have yet to produce even marginal consensus into what the 
framers expected about the Commerce Clause’s role in restricting the 
rights of the states and local communities.  In Covington & Cincinnati 
Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, the Court identified how the Commerce Clause 
serves as the fulcrum for deciding when matters rest:  (1) exclusively 
within the states’ jurisdiction; (2) exclusively within Congress’ 
jurisdiction, except when Congress affirmatively allows otherwise; or (3) 
may be concurrently exercised by Congress and the States.51  While the 
concept of “commerce” naturally transforms with a changing society, 
how the Court ultimately drifted toward the third but remained 
encumbered by the second is the story of the DCC.52 
                                                 
50 See infra Part V (expounding on Pike and how the litigants reflected uncertainty 
regarding the DCC dogma). 
51 Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 209 (1894).  To the 
extent a matter permits concurrent jurisdiction, it is only until Congress expresses its will 
and supersedes any inconsistent state efforts.  Id. at 212.  See, e.g., Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 
(5 Wheat.) 1, 75–76 (1820) (finding a federal exercise of authority precluded state 
prosecution under state militia act). 
52 See Covington, 154 U.S. at 222 (holding that the statute in question was one that was 
exclusively in Congress’ control).  Randy Barnett’s review of contemporary materials 
suggests that commerce is limited to economic exchanges.  Randy E. Barnett, The Original 
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 104 (2001).  Robert Natelson’s 
examination confirms Barnett’s review of the prevailing rhetoric surrounding “commerce,” 
circumscribing it to activities surrounding the law merchant.  Robert G. Natelson, The Legal 
Meaning of “Commerce” in the Commerce Clause, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 789, 799–800, 846 
(2006); Robert G. Natelson & David Kopel, Commentary, Commerce in the Commerce Clause:  
A Response to Jack Balkin, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55, 56 (2010), 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assests/fi/109/natelsonkopel.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6GNU-3MJ9 (finding that there is little question to what the meaning of 
“commerce” entails in the legal and everyday usage).  Unfortunately, Barnett and 
Natelson’s primary materials focus on legal sources rather than perhaps more broadly 
recognizing that the founders were well versed in moral and political philosophy when 
writers like Adam Smith, William Paley, and others addressed “commerce.”  Jack Balkin 
amply undermines Barnett’s cribbed analysis.  Balkin, supra note 29, at 15–19; see also 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Obamacare and the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause:  Identifying 
Historical Limits on Congress’s Powers, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1703, 1704–06, 1709–11 (2012) 
(responding, in part, to Balkin).  Compare Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 17, at 110 (stating 
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Promoting commerce undoubtedly fostered a belief during the new 
world of American exceptionalism—a nation destined toward progress 
in lieu of the cyclical history surrounding past civilizations.53  While 
some founding fathers, such as Benjamin Franklin, were familiar with 
Adam Smith,54 most of the contemporary discussion about the nature of 
the economy and the role of the Constitution focused on foreign 
commerce, imposts, and taxation.55  The framers’ paramount concerns 
                                                                                                             
that the concept includes all economic activity), with Richard A. Epstein, supra note 24, at 
1388–89 (arguing for narrow interpretation of “commerce”).  See generally STUART BRUCHEY, 
ENTERPRISE:  THE DYNAMIC ECONOMY OF A FREE PEOPLE 58–62 (1990) (providing a picture of 
the economy during the nation’s formative years); THOMAS C. COCHRAN, FRONTIERS OF 
CHANGE:  EARLY INDUSTRIALISM IN AMERICA 8 (1981) (discussing technological innovations 
that started the surge of industrialization); RONALD E. SEAVOY, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES FROM 1607 TO THE PRESENT 1–166 (2006) (exploring agriculture and 
economic development); CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION:  JACKSONIAN 
AMERICA, 1815–1846, at 4–5 (1991) (explaining the changing society of early America and its 
effect on the economy); Lawrence A. Harper, Mercantilism and the American Revolution, in 1 
PIVOTAL INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 76, 78–80 (Carl N. Degler ed., 1966) 
(discussing the early English tariffs and trade in America); James A. Henretta, The 
Transition to Capitalism in America, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY:  
SOCIETY, AUTHORITY, AND IDEOLOGY 218, 218–20 (James A. Henretta, Michael Kammen & 
Stanley N. Katz eds., 1991) (discussing America’s early economy and its move toward a 
more market-driven labor force). 
53 See RALPH LERNER, THE THINKING REVOLUTIONARY:  PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE IN THE 
NEW REPUBLIC 195–221 (1987) (suggesting that “commercial republicanism,” a belief in the 
power of equality in economic progress as expressed by A. Smith and others, animated 
aspects of the revolutionary dialogue); GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION:  A 
HISTORY 106–07 (2002) (stating that trade promoted harmony);  see also ROBERT NISBET, 
HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 184–236 (1980) (finding that this dialogue fostered 
American exceptionalism and favored progress); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 337–47 (1991) (discussing that commerce was occasionally tied 
to societal cohesion).  In her seminal work on the rise of the social sciences and the 
persistence of American exceptionalism, Dorothy Ross observes how “American 
exceptionalism implied a particular kind of political economy as well as a particular kind of 
historical stance.”  DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 26 (1991). 
54 See Thomas D. Eliot, The Relations Between Adam Smith and Benjamin Franklin Before 
1776, 39 POL. SCI. Q. 67, 67 (1924) (explaining that Franklin and Smith knew each other and 
were familiar with each other’s work, but the author questions assumption that they were 
friends).  Cf. ROBERT E. WRIGHT, ONE NATION UNDER DEBT:  HAMILTON, JEFFERSON, AND 
THE HISTORY OF WHAT WE OWE 39 (2008) (explaining that Adam Smith’s work was not 
widely read until later, but founders were “conversant” with his ideas).  See generally 
Samuel Fleischacker, Adam Smith’s Reception Among the American Founders, 1776–1790, 59 
WM. & MARY Q. 897 (2002) (“[T]here is good evidence that many of the founders, including 
Jefferson, Madison, and Wilson, were reading his work.”). 
55 James Madison, for instance, explained the importance of Congress’s authority over 
foreign commerce: 
The want of authority in Congress to regulate commerce had produced 
in foreign nations, particularly Great Britain, a monopolizing policy, 
injurious to the trade of the United States, and destructive to their 
navigation[.] . . . The same want of a general power over commerce led 
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were to ensure that only Congress could affect and promote foreign 
commerce, a principle that became embedded unambiguously in the 
Constitution, and to secure Congress’ authority to regulate interstate 
commerce.56  But the power of the purse, the ability to raise sufficient 
revenue, as well as establish credit and incur debt drove the framers’ 
                                                                                                             
to an exercise of the power, separately, by the states, which not only 
proved abortive, but engendered rival, conflicting, and angry 
regulations. 
5 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 115, 119 (2d 
ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]; see also DAVID WALTER BROWN, THE COMMERCIAL 
POWER OF CONGRESS:  CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF ITS ORIGIN:  THE ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, 
AND CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION, FROM THE NEW JERSEY REPRESENTATIONS, OF 1778, TO THE EMBARGO LAWS OF 
JEFFERSON’S SECOND ADMINISTRATION, IN 1809 1–152 (1910) (discussing the dialogue 
surrounding foreign trade and state tariffs, imposts, tonnages and duties). 
56 See Calvin H. Johnson, The Panda’s Thumb:  The Modest and Mercantilist Original 
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 1 (2004) (“All of the concrete 
programs intended to be forwarded by giving Congress the power to regulate commerce 
were restrictions on international trade . . . .”).  Unfortunately, discussions surrounding 
federal authority over commerce often occurred along with language about imposts, 
tonnage duties, tariffs and regulating foreign commerce—separate clauses in the 
Constitution.  See BROWN, supra note 55, at 40–41.  One example is the proposed 
amendment to the Articles of Confederation that would have given the Confederation the 
“sole and exclusive power” to regulate trade among the states and foreign governments, 
laying prohibitions and imposts and duties on imports/exports.  Id. at 41–42.  Pre-dating 
the federal convention, the Annapolis and Alexandria conferences explored interstate 
trade; the Annapolis conference, in particular, resolved squabbling between Virginia and 
Maryland over commerce along and use of the Chesapeake Bay and Potomac River.  
GERALD W. GAWALT, GEORGE MASON AND GEORGE WASHINGTON:  THE POWER OF PRINCIPLE 
58–60, 141 (2012); see also RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN:  THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 19 (2009) (extrapolating on how the Articles of Confederation did 
not have provisions for uniform regulations among the states and thus the states were in 
frequent competition with each other); Denning, supra note 20, at 59–66 (finding a 
description of the internecine activities before the Constitution).  In his essay The 
Continentalist, Alexander Hamilton championed the importance of affording a national 
government with superintending power over commerce, albeit adding a preference for 
“common direction.”  Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist, in THE WORKS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 243, 271 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904), available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1378&chapt
er=64156&layout=html&Itemid=27, archived at http://perma.cc/X2P3-M6V9; Barry 
Friedman & Daniel T. Deacon, A Course Unbroken:  The Constitutional Legitimacy of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 1877, 1884–96 (2011) (explaining that the Framers 
felt a need to adopt a uniform trade policy among the states).  But cf. Edmund W. Kitch, 
Regulation and the American Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE 7, 15–19 (A. Dan Tarlock ed. 1981) (exploring three issues under the Articles:  
Foreign trade; tariffs at ports; and—albeit discounting—trade among the states).  See 
generally Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism:  State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty 
Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1169–92 (2000) (explaining that the Committee was specifically 
precluded from transacting business with foreign ministers without the approval of 
Congress). 
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dialogue about commerce.57  They, too, undoubtedly recognized the 
possible need for uniform commercial intercourse.58  It was, after all, an 
era marked by the “release of energy,” in the words of James Willard 
Hurst, to facilitate the country’s transition from a mercantile/agrarian 
economy to the modern market economy.59  Yet, such sentiments do not 
necessarily establish that the commercial power is exclusive in Congress 
rather than concurrent between Congress and the states. 
The framers assuredly sought to establish a government capable of 
protecting interstate trade.60  They expected that the federal government 
would enjoy sufficient authority to address “injurious impediments to 
the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy . . . .”61  
James Madison explained how Congress needed this “superintending 
authority” to ensure harmonious imports, exports, and traffic among the 
                                                 
57 See generally E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE:  A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
PUBLIC FINANCE, 1776–1790, at xiv–xv (1961) (expounding on how the power of the purse 
was “a determinant of sovereignty”); THOMAS K. MCCRAW, THE FOUNDERS AND FINANCE:  
HOW HAMILTON, GALLATIN, AND OTHER IMMIGRANTS FORGED A NEW ECONOMY 1 (2012) 
(exhibiting how the United States, in its founding years, operated in almost bankruptcy); 
WRIGHT, supra note 54, at 237 (elaborating on how the early American funding system led 
the country to prosper). 
58 See ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 55, at 115 (“[C]onsider how far a uniform system in 
their commercial intercourse and regulations might be necessary to their common interest 
and permanent harmony[] . . . .”). 
59 See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 7, 22, 29 (1956) (discussing how the release of energy 
related to objective law measures).  Such juridical behavior, however, does not support a 
laissez faire approach to economic and social behavior.  WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S 
WELFARE:  LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 84–85 (1996); see 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, 31–35 (1977) 
(reflecting on the change the nineteenth century underwent from agrarian society to 
modern property laws); William J. Novak, Law, Capitalism, and the Liberal State:  The 
Historical Sociology of James Willard Hurst, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 124–25 (2000) (stressing 
that “law’s instrumental role in the allocation of scarce resources in nineteenth-century 
America should [not] be confused with a . . . laissez-faire approach”); Donald J. Pisani, 
Promotion and Regulation:  Constitutionalism and the American Economy, 74 J. AM. HIST. 740, 
741–42 (1987) (explaining how the Constitution provided a framework for the first phase of 
industrialization); Harry N. Scheiber, State Law and “Industrial Policy” in American 
Development, 1790–1987, 75 CAL. L. REV. 415, 418 (1987) (finding that laissez faire ideology 
did not stand in the way of state action). 
60 THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, at 89–91 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(elaborating on Hamilton’s thoughts on protecting trade between the states).  While in 
Federalist No. 11 Hamilton writes in terms of “unrestrained intercourse between the 
States[,]” context is critical.  Id. at 89.  Hamilton here is persuading the reader about the 
importance of a “unity of commercial” trade of an “American system,” primarily foreign, 
to ensure a continued “aggregate balance” of trade in products.  Id. at 90–91. 
61 Id. at 144–45. 
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states.62  But this intended grant of federal authority, however, does not 
implicitly suggest the converse.63  The framers, after all, purportedly 
resolved the dilemma of an imperium in imperio with a new form of 
government exercising legal authority dependent upon subject matter 
rather than territorial boundaries, and how this nascent arrangement 
would work was not likely fully explored.64  Federalist No. 32 provides a 
possible window into the framers’ approach toward distinguishing 
between concurrent federal/state jurisdiction and exclusive federal 
jurisdiction.  In this part of the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton 
suggested that states would enjoy aspects of sovereignty, except in areas 
the Constitution transferred to the United States.  He wrote that such a 
transfer would occur in one of three instances: 
[W]here the Constitution in express terms granted an 
exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one 
instance an authority to the Union, and in another 
prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; 
and where it granted an authority to the Union to which 
a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and 
totally contradictory and repugnant.65 
According to Hamilton, this last category omitted instances where 
concurrent jurisdiction might precipitate clashing policies.66  Hamilton’s 
                                                 
62 Id. at 268.  Madison favored Benjamin Franklin’s proposal to add to Congress’ power 
the express authority to create canals and federally charter internal improvement 
companies.  Id.  Madison had written to Thomas Jefferson about the importance of vesting 
the national government with “the positive power of regulating trade” and addressing 
issues where “uniformity is proper.”  To Thomas Jefferson (March 19, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON 317–18 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975) (relaying Madison’s 
correspondence to Jefferson regarding trade regulation). 
63 See Friedman & Deacon, supra note 56, at 1906, 1908 (finding that discussions at the 
Convention of the domestic commerce power supported exclusivity).  Friedman and 
Deacon suggest otherwise, but arguments for or against an intent toward exclusivity all 
rest on weak inferences.  Id. 
64 See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 172–73 
(2010) (describing how the federalists overcame the imperium imperio question); Alison 
LaCroix, Drawing and Redrawing the Line:  The Pre-Revolutionary Origins of Federal Ideas of 
Sovereignty, in TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY:  ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
PROFESSOR MORTON J. HORWITZ 58, 72 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009) 
(discussing how in the context of the 1773 debates, the Council made a delineation between 
superior and subordinate powers and moved beyond taxation to the theoretical problem of 
imperium in imperio). 
65 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 60, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton). 
66 Id. (clarifying that the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction may produce “occasional 
interferences in the policy of any branch of [an] administration, but would not imply [a] 
direct contradiction”).  In The Federalist No. 17, Hamilton explored how state governments 
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analysis suggests that, if the regulation of interstate commerce is 
exclusive, it is because state jurisdiction “would be absolutely and totally 
contradictory and repugnant.”67 
Exclusive jurisdiction appeared reserved for subjects the 
Constitution assigned to Congress and correspondingly expressly 
removed from state jurisdiction.  Hamilton, for example, referenced the 
power to tax in Article I, Section 8 Clause 1, as illustrating one subject 
where Congress’s power to levy and collect taxes and duties on imports 
and exports precluded similar state regulation—the Constitution barred 
state regulation because of the corollary clause in article I, section 10, 
limiting the states’ ability to impose any imposts or duties on imports or 
exports.68  Hamilton explained that “[t]his restriction implies an 
admission that if it were not inserted the States would possess the power 
it excludes; [and that in all other respects the States’ power is] 
undiminished.”69 
When over a century later scholars combed the constitutional period 
to justify and promote the progressive ideal of a new nationalism, they 
latched onto what few morsels they found.  A remarkable scholar of the 
period, therefore, observed “[i]t is impossible to read the correspondence 
of Madison, Hamilton, Mason, and others without perceiving the 
imperative necessity that they felt of committing the regulation of trade 
and commerce to a single national authority.”70  Some constitutional 
historians merely deploy Gibbons v. Ogden to support the claim that the 
framers looked at the Commerce Clause as an exclusive grant intended 
to negate certain state actions.71 
Courts and scholars, however, generally conflate the framers’ 
discussion about imposts and tonnage duties for foreign imports or 
exports with the more general category of commerce.  Addressing the 
                                                                                                             
more than Congress would likely encroach on the others’ interests, professing that 
Congress would be ill-disposed to address matters of mere local concern.  Id. at 118–19.  In 
doing so, while suggesting that the regulation of commerce resided in the “first instance” 
with Congress, he missed an obvious opportunity to emphasize exclusivity had he believed 
it applied.  Id. at 118. 
67 Id. at 198. 
68 Id. at 199 (describing the tax regulation found in the Constitution). 
69 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 60, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton).  Jack Rakove 
suggests that, while modern scholars overlook Federalist No. 32, it was “closely read” 
during the period.  JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 195 (1996). 
70 George L. Haskins, John Marshall and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 104 U. PA. 
L. REV. 23, 26 (1955). 
71 See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 47–49 (1993) 
(discussing how Marshall broadened the view of the Commerce Clause to include all 
economic intercourse). 
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concern that states might need to defray the costs of inspection before 
exporting products to foreign nations, James Madison suggested that 
states could explore ways of doing so and the check against any abuse 
“was the right in the general government to regulate trade between state 
and state.”72  Indeed, Madison originally suggested federal supremacy 
could be achieved by having potentially discriminatory state trade 
regulation subjected to a federal (the Senate) veto power.73  When a 
measure for state duties on tonnage was presented by Mr. M’Henry and 
Mr. Carroll, Madison apparently “was more and more convinced that 
the regulation of commerce was in its nature indivisible, and ought to be 
wholly under one authority.”74  And then, replying to the proffer that 
Congress would need exclusive jurisdiction over commerce, Mr. 
Sherman observed “[t]he power of the United States to regulate trade, 
being supreme, can control interferences of the state regulations, when 
such interferences happen; so that there is no danger to be apprehended 
from a concurrent jurisdiction.”75  Over a century later, the Court in 
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin used these exchanges to support a 
DCC.76 
Also, considerable attention often focuses on an overly generous 
interpretation of correspondence between James Madison and Joseph C. 
Cabell, roughly forty years after the Constitution.77  While the Court 
affords weight to the views of those contemporary with the 
Constitution’s formation, this correspondence alone provides a weak 
                                                 
72 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 55, at 539. 
73 See Alison L. LaCroix, What if Madison Had Won? Imagining a Constitutional World of 
Legislative Supremacy, 45 IND. L. REV. 41, 44, 52 (2011) (explaining how Madison insisted that 
Congress have the power to veto state laws).  Modern readers should be wary of ascribing 
too much significance to such sentiments, without first appreciating that preemption 
principles and the doctrine of judicial review and supremacy had yet to evolve.  These 
doctrines eventually obviated the need for Madison’s “negative.”  Id. at 44–45, 48–49; see 
also Alison L. LaCroix, The Authority for Federalism:  Madison’s Negative and the Origins of 
Federal Ideology, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 451, 483–84 (2010) (discussing how Madison’s federal 
negative was defeated). 
74 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 55, at 548. 
75 Id. 
76 See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 419 n.17 (1946) (quoting statements 
of Madison and Sherman debating the commerce clause). 
77 See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994) (citing a letter 
from Madison to Cabell regarding the commerce clause); Balkin, supra note 29, at 14 n.43 
(examining a letter from Madison to Cabell, in which Madison expressed his belief that the 
scope of commerce should be construed differently depending on its purpose); Collins, 
supra note 17, at 55 (suggesting that “Madison’s statement that the commerce power was 
‘intended as a negative’ is direct support for the substance of a dormant commerce power 
doctrine”). 
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foundation for building an entire doctrine. 78  A few years before his 
death, James Madison wrote Cabell and suggested that regulating 
“commerce” was entrusted exclusively to the federal domain; these 
letters led Albert Abel to infer that view on the delegates during the 
convention.79  Abel’s 1941 article became widely accepted during a 
period when scholars and jurists perceived the necessity of justifying an 
expansive approach toward federal regulation of commerce.80  But an 
overly broad reading of Madison’s 1829 letter ignores its context.81  Later 
in life, Madison believed that the country’s economy could not succeed 
on the basis of an agrarian society alone, because overproduction had led 
to depressed land prices and insufficient domestic and even foreign 
markets.82  As such, he recognized the constitutionality of tariffs and 
opposed aspects of doctrinaire Jacksonianism.83  This is when Madison 
justified national power to encourage manufacturing and create jobs for 
an exploding population unable to sustain itself on productivity from the 
land.84  His letters were intended to achieve the particular objective of 
securing Congress’ ability to promote manufacturing.85  To suggest, 
                                                 
78 See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 886 (2012) (considering the views of early 
contemporaries of the Constitution). 
79 See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in 
Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 469, 492 (1941) (examining Madison’s opinion 
that the clause was designed as “merely ‘a negative and preventative’ function” and thus in 
federal control). 
80 See infra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the nineteenth 
century dual federalism paradigm on twentieth century economy). 
81 See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 197–98 n.108 
(1995) (suggesting that Madison’s correspondence reflects an appreciation for Congress’s 
supremacy under the Commerce Clause rather than exclusivity or acceptance of DCC). 
82 See DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS:  JAMES MADISON AND THE 
REPUBLICAN LEGACY 176–85 (1989) (examining Madison’s theories regarding agrarianism 
and the economy). 
83 See id. at 123–26 (stating that Madison believed “the constitutional assault on the tariff 
[to be] absurd”). 
84 See id. at 127 (explaining that Madison thought Congress should be involved in 
manufacturing).  Madison used broad strokes to express his point, but implicit in his 
discussions was the need for federal power, not necessarily a restriction on state domestic 
authority.  Id. at 133.  For instance, in 1831 he wrote: 
A review of the state of our commerce and navigation; of the abortive 
efforts and conflicting regulations among the states, of the distracted 
condition of affairs at home, and the utter want of respect abroad, 
during the period between the peace of 1783 and the convention of 
1787, could not fail to open the eyes of many who have been misled, 
and to cherish in all a love for a constitution which has brought such a 
happy order out of so gloomy a chaos. 
Id. (quoting a letter from Madison to Everett, dated Nov. 14, 1831). 
85 See id. at 127–28. (demonstrating that Madison wanted to encourage manufacturers).  
Madison further suggested that continued acquiescence to Congress’ authority to regulate 
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therefore, that this correspondence supports a DCC ignores historical 
context, as well as the unsettled debate surrounding the role of the 
judiciary in securing supremacy of federal laws and eventually 
developing doctrines of preemption.86 
B. The Court’s Early Struggle 
The Supreme Court’s early forays into the negative component of the 
Commerce Clause similarly resolves neither the concurrency/exclusivity 
dilemma nor supports a modern DCC.  Chief Justice Marshall accepted 
that the Constitution necessarily entrusts certain matters to Congress’s 
exclusive jurisdiction.87  Justice Story initially limited exclusivity to 
matters removed from state jurisdiction or involving “a direct 
repugnancy or incompatibility” in a concurrent exercise of power, 
although he later endorsed Marshall’s treatment of the Commerce 
Clause as exclusive.88 
In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Chief Justice held that New York’s grant of 
monopoly rights for the operation of a steamboat conflicted with the 
                                                                                                             
manufacturing since 1787 suggested the need for stability in that view, to avoid societal 
disruption.  See MCCOY, supra note 82, at 127–28.  This is evident when reading Madison’s 
Sept. 18, 1828 letter to Cabell, in its entirety.  Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell 
(Sept. 18, 1828), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_3_ 
commerces18.htl, archived at http://perma.cc/PU5F-XZ7Q; see also Letter from James 
Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/ 
founders/documents/a1_8_3_commerces19.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TF3-GYHX 
(stating curtly that the clause was “intended as a negative and preventive provision[,]” 
with no real elaboration). 
86 See generally RAKOVE, supra note 69, at 176 (quoting letter from Madison to Jefferson 
about judicial authority). 
87 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 248–49 (1833) (suggesting simultaneously 
that the Constitution did not restrain the states absent express constitutional restrictions on 
the exercise of that power, while the Constitution assigned some matters to Congress when 
“the people of all the states feel an interest”); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
122, 193 (1819) (explaining that when Congress has jurisdiction, state governments cannot 
interfere). 
88 See Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 48–49 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting) 
(revealing that powers are not exclusive unless specifically granted in the Constitution).  
Story’s opinion suggests he would admit state power unless concurrent powers would be 
“repugnant” or “incompatible,” allowing Congress the ability to exercise and preempt state 
legislation if it chooses to exercise its power.  Id. at 49–52; see also 1 & 2 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES; WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION §§ 515–18, 669 (1833) (referring to the power as exclusive).  See generally 
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Debating the Transformation of American Law:  James Kent, Joseph Story, 
and the Legacy of the Revolution, in TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 1, 4–6 
(2009) (noting that both Justice Story and Chancellor Kent supported a national economic 
market, although they disagreed about whether commerce power was concurrent). 
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federal Coasting License Act of 1793.89  Arguing for the appellant, Daniel 
Webster rejected the concept of concurrent powers, and urged an 
expansive view of the Commerce Clause.90  Responding, Marshall 
reasoned that Congress exercises capacious power under the Commerce 
Clause, embracing all aspects of commercial intercourse, including 
navigation.91  Appreciating the framers’ division of sovereignty, he 
necessarily noted that jurisdictional lines could not be defined merely by 
geographic limits but instead, rather, operated “within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the several States.”92  Marshall further distinguished 
between two spheres of jurisdiction, the commercial power delegated to 
the federal government and that reserved to the states under the 
Constitution.93  States retained their power to regulate police or trade 
“which does not extend to or affect other States[,]” and which is 
completely within a state.94  Responding to the threat that state 
quarantine and inspection laws would become unconstitutional, 
Marshall admitted that, while such laws affect interstate commerce, 
states may exercise “that immense mass of legislation, which embraces 
every thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general 
government[.]”95  Marshall indicated that if the object of the state law is 
permissible, then the means chosen would be acceptable even if 
resembling those that could be employed by the federal government 
under the commercial power.96  The Chief Justice arguably misread 
(possibly deliberately) the federal statute as superseding state law, deftly 
avoiding the principle issue in the case—the DCC, but he nevertheless 
left little doubt that he believed that the Commerce Clause vested 
exclusive authority in Congress.97  But, as Herbert Johnson cogently 
                                                 
89 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 221 (1824). 
90 See generally HERBERT A. JOHNSON, GIBBONS V. OGDEN:  JOHN MARSHALL, STEAMBOATS, 
AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 73–74 (2010) (discussing Webster’s arguments regarding state 
power under the Commerce Clause); Haskins, supra note 70, at 25 (explaining that the 
Commerce Clause created a uniform law). 
91 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189–94. 
92 Id. at 196. 
93 Id. at 123–24. 
94 Id. at 194.  The eminent jurist Chancellor Kent held below that Congress’ commerce 
power was concurrent.  “Not only was it not designated to be exclusive,” he believed, “but 
it was also arguably concurrent by virtue of the fact that the states were prohibited from 
imposing duties or taxes on exported goods.”  JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 33. 
95 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 203. 
96 Id. at 204. 
97 See Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1399, 1414–17 (2004) 
(evaluating the progression of Marshall’s discourse on the DCC).  Williams suggests that 
Marshall’s discussion of the DCC ultimately mirrored what Chief Justice Taney later 
adopted.  Id. at 1401–02.  This is because, while Marshall purportedly endorsed exclusive 
federal power, he eschewed vesting the Court with the superintending power of judicial 
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notes, “virtually all of its lasting material was merely dictum, well 
beyond relevance to the narrow ruling of the case.”98 
For the next several decades, the Court’s sensitivity toward slavery, 
internal improvements, and temperance inhibited consensus among the 
Justices over whether the commercial power was concurrent or 
exclusive.99  According to Owen Fiss, Chief Justice Marshall first 
announced—through dicta—in Brown v. Maryland the concept of a 
DCC.100  But two years later, the Chief Justice accepted William Wirt’s 
argument that a state could authorize a dam to promote the public 
welfare and safety, unless superseded by congressional action.101  Yet the 
Justices disagreed over whether Congress or the states could promote 
internal improvements.102  In cases implicating temperance and slavery, 
the Court similarly failed to resolve how to approach the allocation of 
                                                                                                             
review to implement the DCC.  Id. at 1460.  Here, Williams chronicles the events 
surrounding a seamen act and slavery in South Carolina, illustrating the difficulty of any 
DCC holding, particularly in light of the pending legislative proposals affecting the Court’s 
ability to engage in judicial review.  Id. at 1467–69, 1471.  Although issues surrounding 
slavery, temperance, and internal improvements chilled a willingness on some of the 
Justices to render potentially sweeping decisions, it does not necessarily translate into a 
belief by Justices about the proper role of the Court or Congress for the DCC.  But 
Williams’ thorough treatment of Gibbons underscores the importance of appreciating 
contextualism.  Id. at 1478–82; see Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall 
Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1127–34 (2001) (underlining the unimportance of 
McCulloch and Gibbons on national issues); see also JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 35 (“Neither 
Kent nor Marshall after him was willing to accept the broad modern recognition of a [DCC] 
power existing independently from an actual congressional enactment.”); Charles W. 
McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the Large Corporation, 1875–1890, 38 J. 
ECON. HIST. 631, 635 (1978) (observing that Marshall avoided the issue).  Cf. FELIX 
FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 24–26 (1937) 
(noting that Marshall neither employed his exclusive jurisdiction theory nor adopted 
Webster’s selective exclusiveness, possibly recognizing the need for incremental decision-
making). 
98 JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 159. 
99 See generally id. at 50 (noting issue during Marshall’s tenure); Kalen, Reawakening the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, supra note 23, at 429–38 (discussing that various social problems 
hampered the Court’s efforts in determining the scope of the Commerce Clause). 
100 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 448 (1827); 8 OWEN M. FISS, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 
DEVISE:  HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF 
THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at 267 (1993) (“Marshall must have read the Commerce 
Clause to have a preemptive power that would nullify state laws regulating interstate 
commerce.”). 
101 See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829) (explaining 
that if Congress expressly regulates something, then a conflicting state law would be void); 
see also FISS, supra note 100, at 267–68 (“Marshall must have read the Commerce Clause to 
have a preemptive power that would nullify state laws regulating interstate commerce.”); 
JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 155–58 (discussing Willson). 
102 See Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 180 (1845) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (denying 
power to Congress); STORY, supra note 88, at § 150 (affirming Congress’s power). 
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state and federal power.  In the License Cases, for instance, the Justices 
rejected exclusivity but without any majority opinion.103  When the 
debate shifted to state programs affecting the movement of people, 
potentially implicating jurisdiction over slavery, the opinions became 
even less clear.104  In Mayor of New York v. Miln, for example, a majority 
appeared willing to accept certain state efforts, while Justice Story 
promoted exclusiveness couched in dual federalism rhetoric.105  
Additionally when the issue surfaced again in the Passenger Cases, the 
Court issued separate opinions that “were so diverse that attempts to 
summarize could only confuse.”106 
Consequently, the simplistic exclusive paradigm sponsored by the 
Federalists appeared doomed from the outset, and when tested in the 
realm of internal improvements proved untenable.  Internal 
improvements critical for economic growth and territorial expansion 
often could not await Congress, and generally depended upon state 
                                                 
103 Pierce v. New Hampshire, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 504–05 (1847) (providing separate 
opinions of each Justice). 
104 See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S (16 Pet.) 539, 609 (1842) (reviewing the cooperation 
between states).  Additionally, interstate tensions underscored the consideration of the 
Fugitive Slave Clause to such a degree that Justice Story commented on the “friendly and 
courteous spirit” surrounding the two states effort to procure Court review.  Id.  See 
generally DAVID L. LIGHTNER, SLAVERY AND THE COMMERCE POWER:  HOW THE STRUGGLE 
AGAINST THE INTERSTATE SLAVE TRADE LED TO THE CIVIL WAR 66–67 (2006) (acknowledging 
the strained relationship between Chief Justice Marshall and Judge Johnson).  Lightner, for 
instance, describes how Chief Justice Marshall, during the steamboat controversy, was 
quite aware of Justice Johnson’s lower court decision invalidating South Carolina’s pro-
slavery seamen act.  Id.  In 1841, the Court avoided deciding the constitutionality of a 
Mississippi statute, although various opinions addressed the application of the commerce 
power.  Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 510–13 (1841).  See generally PAUL 
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION:  SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 266–71 (1981) 
(discussing the effect of Groves on state and federal laws regarding the transport of slaves).  
Additionally, when addressing whether the power was exclusive or concurrent, Justice 
Story parroted Chief Justice Marshall’s focus on the nature and object of the power 
afforded Congress, particularly over a matter warranting uniformity and whose origin and 
establishment occurred with the Constitution rather than pre-dated it.  Prigg, 41 U.S. at 
622–25.  He further remarked that a state’s police power is distinguishable from Congress 
power, suggesting that the states’ power would continue to apply but could not “interfere 
with, or . . . obstruct the just rights” constitutionally guaranteed to slave owners.  Id. at 625.  
Chief Justice Taney objected to Story’s allegedly unnecessary discussion of exclusivity.  Id. 
at 626–27 (Taney, C.J., concurring). 
105 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 153, 157–58 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting) (stating that if the subject 
is regulated by Congress, then the state’s act could be unconstitutional).  See generally R. 
KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY:  STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 
208–09, 221–24 (1985) (noting that Story may have assisted in drafting Gibbons, and 
ultimately favored strong exclusivism). 
106 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 430–35 (1849); 5 CARL B. SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 
DEVISE:  HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836–
1864, at 388 (1974). 
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chartered—often at the time single purpose—corporations.107  While 
undoubtedly Henry Clay’s American System tilted toward ordered 
economic progress at the national level, his opponent President Jackson 
too favored some federal support.108  Yet sectional interests and 
jealousies dominated the debate.109  When vetoing the Maysville Road 
internal improvement project, President Jackson acknowledged 
Congress’ past internal improvement measures and yet expressed 
reservation about their constitutionality, proclaiming instead that such 
projects, in the words historian Daniel Walker Howe, “were better left to 
private enterprise and the states.”110  Both then and later, Jackson offered 
a distinction between subjects national in scope, and those that are local, 
with the latter entrusted to the states.111 
This moderating economic and political solution then morphed into 
legal doctrine, with the Court in Cooley settling on what later nineteenth 
century writers would call a middle ground of partly exclusive and 
partly concurrent jurisdiction.112  It was here that Chief Justice Taney, 
who had unsuccessfully argued the case for Maryland in Brown v. 
Maryland, could attempt to entrench his lost effort.113  And it was in 
                                                 
107 See, e.g., Perrine v. Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co., 50 U.S. (9 How.) 172, 183–84, 
192 (1850) (considering whether a corporation has the right to charge a toll to passengers or 
vessels who pass through the canal).  The Court often construed charters narrowly, even 
when states jointly worked together with corresponding charters to promote commerce 
between their jurisdictions.  Id.  See generally STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE 
DESTRUCTION:  THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE 146 (1971) (summarizing that the Court 
tried to account for public good and economic needs). 
108 See generally DANIEL WALKER HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN 
WHIGS 123–49 (1979) (expanding upon Clay’s debates and relationships with various 
members of the Supreme Court and government). 
109 Congress, for instance, rejected the former Federalist Joseph Hemphill’s proposed 
national highway, while passing a more localized Maysville Road improvement project; see 
SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:  JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 327–28 (2005) 
(explaining Hemphill’s difficulty in achieving a national highway because of the political 
climate in deciding which entity had power to regulate). 
110 DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 358, 557–59 (2007).  Sean Wilentz posits that Martin Van Buren and 
a young James K. Polk assisted drafting this moderate message.  WILENTZ, supra note 109, 
at 328. 
111 See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, Dec. 6, 1832, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=67040, archived at 
http://perma.cc/N665-2N9U (explaining that President Jackson vetoed the act because the 
Federal Government would be given too much power over a state issue). 
112 Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319–21 (1851) (describing the 
methods Congress used to determine jurisdiction).  See, e.g., Louis M. Greeley, What is the 
Test of a Regulation of Foreign or Interstate Commerce?, 1 HARV. L. REV. 159, 174 (1887) 
(ascertaining the differences and similarities between exclusivity and concurrency). 
113 See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575–76 (1840) (clarifying that power must 
belong to either Congress or the states).  Chief Justice Taney reviewed how to examine 
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Cooley where the Court would attempt to craft rules for highly charged 
transportation disputes such as the construction of the Wheeling 
Bridge.114  Justice Benjamin R. Curtis accepted what has become known 
as the concept of “selective exclusiveness.”  Pennsylvania required 
vessels without a pilot and weighing over seventy-five tons entering any 
port other than on the Delaware River pay a pilotage fee.  Curtis 
admitted that the state pilotage statute regulated commerce, but upheld 
the law by reasoning that Congress’ power was not exclusive over 
subjects local in character; rather, only when regulation demands 
national uniformity is Congress’ power exclusive.115 
Curtis reasoned that, because pilotage laws are a valid subject for 
congressional action, indeed a matter upon which Congress had 
legislated, such laws must be regulations of commerce.116  Yet Curtis 
posited that if one treats Congress' power over commerce as exclusive, 
then arguably Congress could not re-convey that power to the states by 
authorizing future state legislation.117  This dilemma is critical to Curtis’ 
opinion, because, in 1789, Congress approved state pilotage laws.118  
Such was the problem of an exclusivity assumption Justice Story and 
others generated—either the power is not exclusive or Congress could 
not authorize states to legislate on local matters.119  The latter conclusion 
                                                                                                             
concurrent jurisdiction where he reflected the prevailing sentiment for distinguishing 
between powers expressly conferred on Congress and equally expressly denied to states, 
and those powers granted to Congress but not specifically denied to states.  Id.; see FISS, 
supra note 100, at 267–68 (stating that Taney, among others, denied that Congress had 
preemptive power).  The former he held were exclusive in Congress, while the latter were 
only so if “similar authority in the states would be absolutely and totally contradictory and 
repugnant[.]”  Holmes, 39 U.S. at 574.  Similar language appeared in Justice Story’s opinion 
in Houston v. Moore.  See 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1820) (reemphasizing that sometimes 
Congress does not have to overrule a state’s law).  Taney’s moderating approach toward 
federal authority corresponds with his willingness to expand federal admiralty jurisdiction.  
See SWISHER, supra note 106, at 444–45, 455 (evaluating Taney’s reasoning behind the 
Court’s decision). 
114 See Cooley, 53 U.S. at 311 (holding that the complainant’s rights were exempted from 
payment because the law conflicted with the Constitution); ELIZABETH BRAND MONROE, 
THE WHEELING BRIDGE CASE:  ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 128–
30 (1992) (explaining the Court’s jurisdiction for crafting rules on waterways and Chief 
Justice Taney’s opposition to the reasoning); SWISHER, supra note 106, at 408–417 
(discussing the Cooley case and the reasoning behind the Court’s decision). 
115 See Cooley, 53 U.S. at 316–17.  Elsewhere in the opinion, Justice Curtis suggested that 
such laws “rest upon the propriety of securing lives and property exposed to the perils of a 
dangerous navigation, by taking on board a person peculiarly skilled to encounter or avoid 
them[.]”  Id. at 312. 
116 Id. at 325. 
117 Id. at 318. 
118 Id. at 302. 
119 Id. at 319. 
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would have required invalidating the 1789 statute.120  Curtis escaped this 
box by concluding that it was necessary to examine the nature of the 
power, which he treated as synonymous with the subject being 
regulated.121  “If they are excluded,” he wrote, “it must be because the 
nature of the power, thus granted to Congress, requires that a similar 
authority should not exist in the States.”122  Here, Curtis's reasoning 
follows Hamilton’s Federalist No. 32, suggesting that only when a 
uniform, nationwide rule is required would the nature of the power 
demand that it be within the exclusive domain of Congress.123  And 
Congress’ 1789 statue illustrated that the matter was susceptible to local 
rather than uniform regulation.124 
By the end of the century, a leading Commerce Clause monograph 
proclaimed that Cooley reflected the “most satisfactory solution” to the 
issue and had “been followed in every case in the Supreme Court upon 
this subject.”125  Many of the Court's opinions followed Curtis's 
reasoning in Cooley.126  These opinions suggested that the critical factor 
for assessing state or federal regulations was whether the character of the 
regulated object was local or national, with states capable regulating only 
the former.127  Yet the allure of Cooley began to wane later in the century, 
                                                 
120 Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319–20. 
121 Id. at 320. 
122 Id. at 318. 
123 Id. 
124 See id. at 319–20 (reaffirming the importance of considering local influence on 
legislation).  Justices McLean and Wayne dissented, with McLean taking the position that 
Congress’ power is exclusive.  Id. at 324–25 (McLean, J., dissenting).  Justice Daniel 
concurred, treating the law as matter inherent in state sovereignty and not a commercial 
regulation.  Cooley, 53 U.S. at 325–26 (Daniel, J., concurring). 
125 E. PARMALEE PRENTICE & JOHN G. EGAN, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 28 (1898). 
126 See, e.g., Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 721–22 (1865) (adopting the 
Cooley rationale). Gilman involved the construction of a bridge over a navigable river when 
the bridge threatened to interfere with the navigation of vessels over a certain size that 
travelled under the arches.  Id. at 715.  For a divided Court, Justice Swayne observed that 
municipalities must consider the convenience of their citizens and the passage from one 
state to another across the river.  Id. at 722.  He then declared that states exercise concurrent 
jurisdiction over commerce local in character, while the federal commercial power extends 
only to those subjects calling for uniform rules and national legislation.  Id. at 726–27, 729–
30; see also Ex parte McNiel, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236, 239–40 (1871) (upholding state pilotage 
law even though it was a regulation of commerce); Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 
450, 460, 463 (1864) (establishing the need for a uniform law to protect the public); The 
Albany Bridge Case, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 403, 403 (1864) (discussing, in the Court’s four-to-four 
decision, state’s power to pass a law authorizing the erection of bridges over navigable 
rivers). 
127 See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. James, 162 U.S. 650, 655 (1896) (affirming that 
Congress has jurisdiction over national matters and the state over state matters); Pittsburgh 
& S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577, 587–88 (1895) (stating that states may regulate where 
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with a changing economy and the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and accompanying rise of rights jurisprudence. 
III.  THE NASCENT DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
A. A New Economy and Federal Right to Engage in Interstate Commerce 
Throughout the post-civil-war era until roughly the 1920s, states, 
Congress, and the courts all explored how federalism could or should 
respond to the newly evolving national economy.  The economy changed 
radically during this period, as Ray Ginger explains: 
From 1877 to 1892 the United States grew—in 
population, in wealth, in output per man-hour, in the 
value of real estate.  In these years the economy became 
industrial.  The society became urban.  Vast corporate 
                                                                                                             
Congress does not); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 212 
(1894) (providing that “laws, instead of being of a local nature and not affecting interstate 
commerce but incidentally, are national in their character, the non-action of Congress 
indicates its will that such commerce shall be free and untrammeled”); Hamilton v. 
Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 280, 282 (1886) (favoring local input in 
transportation matters); Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 548–49 (1886) (explaining that even 
though the state must act for the public good, those decisions are usually subject to 
congressional oversight); Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 
464–65 (1886) (establishing that until Congress acts, state laws are valid); Gloucester Ferry 
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 217 (1885) (holding that states cannot interfere with 
waterways); Cardwell v. Am. Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205, 208 (1885) (describing that states can 
regulate actions related to internal police power); Parkersburg & Ohio River Transp. Co. v. 
Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691, 700–01 (1883) (stating that wharf law should be determined by 
local law until overruled nationally); Escanaba & Lake Mich. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 
U.S. 678, 687–88 (1883) (expounding that the state may regulate until Congress decides to 
act); Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. 559, 564–65 (1881) (deciding that a municipality 
may erect wharves and forbid landing elsewhere); Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U.S. 572, 575 
(1880) (upholding state pilotage law because of congressional affirmance, although part of 
general commercial law); Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 351 (1880) (finding that issues 
national in nature should be within Congress’ exclusive jurisdiction); Lord v. Steamship 
Co., 102 U.S. 541, 543–44 (1880) (defining Congress’ jurisdiction over commerce as having 
to do with nationwide commerce); Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U.S. 379, 386–87 (1877) 
(asserting that Congress may regulate harbor improvements and preempt state laws, but 
not exercise exclusive jurisdiction); Pound v. Turck, 95 U.S. 459, 464 (1877) (confining the 
actions of the state to matters that only affect internal issues); Case of the State Freight Tax, 
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 279–80 (1872) (finding transportation of merchandise or passengers 
to be of a national nature, thus requiring exclusive legislation by Congress); Cushing v. 
Owners of the John Fraser, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 184, 187–88 (1858) (holding that states may 
regulate ships lying in the harbor); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 
U.S. (18 How.) 421, 444 (1856) (reasoning that allowing local jurisdiction on a national issue 
will disrupt uniformity in all ports). Cf. Newport & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. United States, 
105 U.S. 470, 492 (1881) (holding that Congress can exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the 
subject). 
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bureaucracies were forged.  Power was caught up into 
the hands of a few men as never before in this country.128 
But with it a new bureaucratic middle class emerged, facilitating the 
growth toward the twentieth century consumer economy.129  This was an 
economy fueled by a marketing revolution that transferred marketing 
from merchants to manufacturers.130  And with these changes, disparity 
in the distribution of wealth and bargaining power changed 
dramatically.131  Morton Keller, in his seminal work on the late 
nineteenth century, reviews how these changes pushed the need not only 
to regulate the economy but also to facilitate it.132  This precipitated what 
William Novak describes as forging a new relationship between law and 
business—and modern capitalism.133 
The Court as an institution responded cautiously to legislative 
measures targeting the vicissitudes of societal changes.134  Under the 
                                                 
128 RAY GINGER, AGE OF EXCESS:  THE UNITED STATES FROM 1877 TO 1914, at 36 (1965).  The 
late 1800s witnessed rapid urbanization.  See HAROLD U. FAULKNER, POLITICS, REFORM AND 
EXPANSION 1890–1900, at 10 (1959) (stating that between only 1880 and 1900, population in 
towns over 8000 was one fifth of the nation).  By 1915, urban residents outnumbered their 
rural counterparts, and the railroad system ensured that the bulk of rurally grown 
agricultural products would be “consumed in U.S. cities.”  SEAVOY, supra note 52, at 187. 
129 GINGER, supra note 128, at 46–47, 49 (explaining that economies of scale pushed 
industry consolidation, concentration and vertical integration, and ultimately led to the 
growth of the trusts and monopolies).  A new managerial (professional worker) class 
emerged, and wholesale merchants transitioned to jobbers—and ultimately to large scale 
retail chains like J.C. Penny, Woolworths, Wanamaker, and Sears.  SEAVOY, supra note 52, at 
245. 
130 See GLENN PORTER & HAROLD C. LIVESAY, MERCHANTS AND MANUFACTURERS:  STUDIES 
IN THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY MARKETING 131–53 (1971) 
(explaining the transfer from the old marketing network to independent groups with 
manufacturer-owned distribution facilities.).  Alfred Chandler chronicles how the modern 
corporation, principally with its organizational and manufacturing structure, distribution 
and marketing systems, along with its purchasing power, emerged between 1880s and the 
early 1900s.  See generally Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Beginnings of “Big Business” in 
American History, in 2 PIVOTAL INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 107, 132 (Carl N. 
Degler, ed. 1966); see also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND:  THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 484–500 (1977) (tracing the broader development of the 
modern business enterprise from the 1840s to World War II). 
131 See FAULKNER, supra note 128, at 72–93 (discussing the increase in poverty that 
accompanied the progress of the late 1800s). 
132 MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE:  PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
AMERICA 171–81 (1977). 
133 See William J. Novak, Law and the Social Control of American Capitalism, 60 EMORY L.J. 
377, 390–91 (2010) (detailing the combination of law and business in modern capitalism). 
134 See KELLER, supra note 132, at 289 (explaining that the period is often characterized by 
traumatic forces propelling societal change clashing with entrenched ideas pushing 
backward).  This clash produced an era, in the words of the title of a work by historian 
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rubric of “political economy,” scholars began to champion and expand 
on Adam Smith’s theories and promote political economy as a science.135  
The legal bar before the Civil War undoubtedly was aware of the 
principles of “political economy,” but many pre-war judges believed that 
“economic” issues—often in the context of taxation, were better 
entrusted to legislative judgments.136  But after the war the issues became 
exceedingly complex.  General incorporation laws for the first time 
allowed an increasing number of foreign corporations to engage in 
business outside their incorporating state, facilitating trade in the newly 
minted industrial revolution.137  The economy witnessed new corporate 
organizational structures accompanying the rise of a more robust 
manufacturing sector, facilitating a changing labor force, and an ever 
increasing diversity in wealth and concentration of money.  Classicists 
believed in competitive markets and free trade.  Embedded in their 
theory was the idea that free trade—that is, unfettered by legislative 
intrusion—reflected natural law and any interference with the natural 
law conflicted with “our traditions and inherited rights of security.”138 
This paradigmatic shift became more pronounced during Chief 
Justice Fuller’s tenure than during the Waite Court years.139  The Fuller 
                                                                                                             
Robert Wiebe, “searching for order.”  ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877–1920, 
at 1–10 (1967). 
135 See generally SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE:  A STUDY 
OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865–1901, at 203–08 (1956) (discussing the “New 
Political Economy”); Justin Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 
387, 398–443 (2012) (describing economic history). 
136 The eminent Ohio Judge, Frederick Grimke, suggested that the “science of political 
economy” was relevant to legislatures, not courts.  See Perry v. Torrence, 8 Ohio 521, 522 
(1838) (reviewing taxation of steamboats); see also Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137, 143 (1841) 
(stating that “enlightened views of political economy . . . must be addressed to the 
legislative department” when reviewing limit on price of bread). 
137 See KELLER, supra note 132, at 431–33 (detailing the expansion of businesses due to 
lessened restrictions on interstate trade).  Keller explains how, later, the Court’s treatment 
of foreign corporations assisted in averting the need for a general federal incorporation 
law.  Id. at 588–90. 
138 Joseph S. Auerbach, The Legal Aspect of “Trusts,” 169 N. AM. REV. 375, 376–77 (1899); 
see also GEORGE E. MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, 1900–1912, at 16–37 (1958) 
(describing the rise of laissez faire thought).  See generally FINE, supra note 135, at 29–31 
(giving a brief overview of the rise of the laissez faire economic doctrine); KELLER, supra 
note 132, at 182 (noting that “[m]ost educated men of the time believed that natural laws 
controlled the market, the flow of money, and the cost of labor”). 
139 See generally PAUL KENS, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MORRISON R. WAITE, 1874–1888, 
at 15–31 (2010) (analyzing the stance that the Supreme Court took on federalism while 
Morrison Waite was Chief Justice).  The Waite Court followed a traditionalist federalism 
paradigm.  See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF 
RECONSTRUCTION 15–16 (2011) (tracing the nuances in the Waite Court’s approach to the 
Reconstruction amendments); Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism:  Reconstruction 
and the Waite Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 53–56 (1978) (noting the effect of the Waite 
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Court, sitting near the epicenter of the country’s “experiencing sweeping 
social and economic change,” began protecting vested property interests 
against both federal and state legislative efforts.140  Although aggregately 
the Court’s decisions do not necessarily reflect a laissez faire Court, the 
judicial rhetoric employed by some Justices facilitated aspects of a free 
trade economy.141  This became evident in certain Justices’ nationalist 
tendencies.  The Court, after all, had federalized the law of commercial 
contracts in an effort to facilitate a national economy.142  A late 
nineteenth century observer echoed this sentiment, when he wrote that 
diversity is: 
[I]ntolerable, in a commercial age, when it affects the 
laws of trade and commerce in communities bound to 
each other by railroads and telegraph wires, and 
depending on one another by the daily exchange of 
articles of food and wear, of machinery and raw 
material, and dealing together without regard to state 
lines, past or present.143 
And the classical legal doctrine corresponded with the Court’s approach 
toward liberty of contract, with the Court invalidating some programs 
that “arbitrarily interfere[d] with private business, or impose[d] unusual 
and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.”144  Some Justices 
                                                                                                             
Court’s “dual federalism” in upholding much state legislation).  That Court, after all, 
upheld the Granger Laws, with Justice Field dissenting.  Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135–
36 (1876).  Also, Chief Justice Waite echoed Chief Justice Marshall’s broad construction of 
the commerce power, concluding it is not only Congress’ power but “duty . . . to see to it 
that intercourse among the States and the transmission of intelligence are not obstructed or 
unnecessarily encumbered by State legislation.”  Pensacola Tel Co. v. Western Union Tel 
Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1877). 
140 JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888–1910, at 57, 70–
71 (1995) (demonstrating the Court’s interest in defending vested property rights from any 
legislative interference).  Owen Fiss observes that the Fuller Court decisions “embod[ied] 
principles of economic nationalism and . . . a mandate to keep the commercial arties of the 
nation free and open.”  FISS, supra note 100, at 266 (footnote omitted). 
141 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 20 (1842) (“It is for the benefit and convenience of the 
commercial world, to give as wide an extent as practicable to the credit and circulation of 
negotiable paper, that it may pass not only as security for new purchases and 
advances . . . but also in payment of and as security for, pre-existing debts.”).  See generally 
LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 150 (1999) 
(explaining that the Court was not laissez faire). 
142 See Swift, 41 U.S. at 18–19 (determining that the opinion of local tribunals is not 
conclusive with regard to commercial law). 
143 Lewis N. Dembitz, Uniformity of State Laws, 168 N. AM. REV. 84, 84 (1899). 
144 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).  Christopher Tiedeman’s treatise, Limitations 
of Police Power, often epitomizes laissez faire constitutionalism.  ARNOLD M. PAUL, 
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avowedly believed that “the liberty of pursuit—the right to follow any of 
the ordinary callings of life—is one of the privileges of a citizen of the 
United States.”145  Justice Field, often associated with laissez faire 
constitutionalism, echoed the sentiment of those who distrusted the 
legislative process and opposed special privileges or perceived class 
legislation.146  And later Chief Justice Taft would write that “[f]reedom is 
the general rule” and only “exceptional circumstances” warranted their 
abridgement.147 
Yet, how past constitutional dogma would accommodate 
corresponding centripetal and centrifugal forces favoring federalization 
and an escalating need for state police power regulation, respectively, 
eventually became untenable under the prevailing paradigm of dual 
federalism.  “[C]onstitutional issues [after all,] pervaded the discussion 
of nearly all matters of public policy during the Gilded Age—issues such 
as regulating railroads, suppressing unsafe or fraudulent products, labor 
issues, counteracting monopolies and trusts[.] . . . ”148  Republicans 
favored strong national government and governmental intervention, 
                                                                                                             
CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW:  ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887–1895, at 
16–17 (1969).  David Mayer explains how Tiedeman “separated law from popular will” and 
believed judges could discern legal principles from a “prevalent sense of right.”  David N. 
Mayer, The Jurisprudence of Christopher G. Tiedeman:  A Study in the Failure of Laissez-Faire 
Constitutionalism, 55 MO. L. REV. 93, 119–20 (1990).  Less doctrinaire was Thomas M. 
Cooley’s, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of 
the States.  See generally KELLER, supra note 132, at 345 (calling Cooley’s treatise “[t]he most 
influential” of its kind); FINE, supra note 135, at 142–44 (praising Cooley’s treatise); TWISS 
supra note 8, at 18–19 (discussing Cooley’s intentions in writing the treatise). 
145 Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-
Stock & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 764 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring); see also 
ROBERT B. HIGHSAW, EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE:  DEFENDER OF THE CONSERVATIVE FAITH 
101–118 (1981) (discussing White’s embrace of dual federalism in commerce clause 
context). 
146 See Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of 
American Corporation Law, 1869–1903, 53 BUS. HIST. REV. 304, 310–11 (1979) (analyzing the 
Court’s break from precedent and explaining their belief that the “commercial power [of 
Congress] continues until the commodity has ceased to be the subject of discriminatory 
legislation by reason of its foreign character”); Wallace Mendelson, Mr. Justice Field and 
Laissez-Faire, 36 VA. L. REV. 45, 48 (1950) (noting Field’s resolute opposition to 
“communism” and the Granger cases).  Field, according to Kens, “seriously distrusted” the 
legislative process.  PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD:  SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD 
RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 164, 216 (1997). 
147 Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas, 262 U.S. 522, 534 (1923) 
(reviewing whether business affected by a public interest).  For Taft’s nationalist approach 
toward the Commerce Clause as a mechanism for facilitating a national market, see Stanley 
I. Kutler, Chief Justice Taft, National Regulation, and the Commerce Power, 51 J. AM. HIST. 651, 
652 (1965). 
148 Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional Politics in the Gilded Age, 9 J. GILDED AGE & 
PROGRESSIVE ERA 7, 12 (January 2010). 
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while the Democrats resisted federal intervention or federal power.149  In 
some areas, states appeared reluctant to regulate a particular sector 
fearing that the industry would relocate to more forgiving neighboring 
states—what we now often call “race to the bottom” or “degenerative 
competition.”150  And often the progressive interest in reform at the 
federal level merged with industry support for federal regulation in lieu 
of local efforts that might thwart a more rational or stable national 
market.151  While notable decisions invalidated some state efforts, the 
Court concomitantly occasionally limited federal regulation as well.152  
David Currie, therefore, cautions against suggesting that the Court 
during the 1888 through 1910 period was “hostile to either state or 
federal authority.”153  Instead, modern scholarship posits that the Court 
                                                 
149 Id. at 14–16. 
150 David A. Moss, Kindling a Flame Under Federalism:  Progressive Reformers, Corporate 
Elites, and the Phosphorus Match Campaign of 1909–1912, 68 BUS. HIST. REV. 244, 247 n.5 (1994) 
(employing the term “degenerative competition” to describe what occurred). 
151 Herbert Hovenkamp makes this point when exploring railroad rate regulation, and 
David Moss finds the same scenario occurring for the prohibitory tax on phosphorous 
matches.  Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age:  Federalism and the 
Railroad Problem, 97 Yale L.J. 1017, 1020 (1988); Moss, supra note 150, at 274 n.69. 
152 See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (holding that, while the power 
to regulate interstate commerce is broad, it does not supersede fundamental rights); see also 
Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 588 (1898) (concluding that live-stock commission 
merchants are not engaged in interstate commerce, despite the fact that live-stock travels 
between states during a transaction, because their business is buying and selling live-stock 
consigned to them in various locations); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 
modified on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) (exempting federal income tax from interstate 
commerce); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895) (finding that 
manufacturing is not commerce). 
153 David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court:  The Protection of Economic 
Interests, 1889–1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 324, 325 (1985).  The Court remarkably upheld the 
federal injunctive power in In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 600 (1895), even absent an explicit 
authorizing federal law.  Currie, supra, at 344; see also KERMIT L. HALL & PETER KARSTEN, 
THE MAGIC MIRROR:  LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 252 (2009) (“Of the 217 state laws struck 
down by the Court from its start in 1920, [forty-eight] were voided in the peak decade of 
the 1880s, and the justices, while displaying deference to Congress, still struck down 
[thirty-two] federal acts between the Civil War and 1937.  That being said, the fact is that 
the Court upheld state and federal enactments overwhelmingly.” (footnote omitted)); 
KELLER, supra note 132, at 176 (“[T]he Court joined the other sectors of the postwar polity in 
affirming the principle that government might act concretely, positively, [and] indeed 
aggressively in the realm of economic policy.”); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, The Lost World of 
Classical Legal Thought:  Law and Ideology in America, 1886–1937, at 135 (1998) (noting that 
after 1898 Court ushered in new era of activism).  The Court’s response to the Granger 
Movement, in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), incidentally involving a commerce clause 
challenge, illustrates its willingness to affirm particular state economic initiatives.  See 7 
CHARLES FAIRMAN, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE:  HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864–1888, PART TWO 353–55 (1987) 
(discussing Munn v. Illinois, allowing state regulation of grain elevators).  See generally 
GEORGE H. MILLER, RAILROADS AND THE GRANGER LAWS 59–96 (1971) (discussing the Munn 
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appeared more interested in protecting economic individualism by 
applying classical notions of vested liberty and property interests.154 
But how the Court distinguished between a state’s permissible 
exercise of its police power, Congress’ legitimate exercise of its 
commerce power, or a matter entrusted solely to either state or federal 
power entails appreciating more than a mere clash of economic interests:  
it requires an appreciation of the unique interplay of the changing 
society, economic theory, and the prevailing yet fading paradigm of dual 
federalism.  This complex dynamic generated three dominant themes 
from this era. 
To begin with, the Court’s conservatives facilitated interstate 
corporate expansion by creating a federal constitutional right to engage in 
interstate commerce—a right that only Congress could hinder.155  Absent 
congressional action, citizens enjoyed a “perfect freedom of trade.”156  
Arguably conflating due process and Commerce Clause rhetoric, the 
Court’s dicta hinted that Congress itself could only intercede with this 
                                                                                                             
v. Illinois decision); Edmund W. Kitch & Clara Ann Bowler, The Facts of Munn v. Illinois, 
1978 SUP. CT. REV. 313, 313–20 (providing the facts of Munn v. Illinois); Harry Scheiber, The 
Road to Munn:  Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, in LAW 
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 329, 329–402 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn, eds. 1971) 
(discussing the implications of Munn v. Illinois). 
154 See ELY, supra note 140, at 79–81 (discussing the Court’s use of traditional vested and 
liberty property rights to protect economic individualism); see also JOHN E. SEMONCHE, 
CHARTING THE FUTURE:  THE SUPREME RESPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890–1920, at 
419–34 (1978) (reviewing the Court’s docket during this period, and concluding that the 
Court generally accommodated societal change by upholding most federal and state 
programs). 
155 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 21 (1910) (“[I]t is a right which every 
citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the Constitution[.]”).  
Commentators too employed “rights” language when discussing interstate commerce.  
E.g., Frederick H. Cooke, The Right to Engage in Interstate Transportation, etc., 21 YALE L.J. 
207, 207 (1912); E. Parmalee Prentice, The Origin of the Right to Engage in Interstate Commerce, 
17 HARV. L. REV. 20, 20 (1903). 
156 Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 633 (1885) (“It cannot be seriously contended, at least 
in the absence of any congressional legislation to the contrary, that all goods which are the 
product of other States are to be free from taxation in the State to which they may be 
carried for use or sale.”).  When a prohibition targeted selling products entering a state, the 
Court treated its application to out-of-state companies as “violat[ing] . . . the rights of 
citizens of other States arising under the commerce clause[.]”  Schollenberger v. 
Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 16 (1898).  Conversely, in Kidd v. Pearson, the Court explored 
whether a prohibition could affect exporting commerce; and, while recognizing the 
difficulty of drawing the line separating commerce from the police power, the Court 
echoed the prevailing refrain that Congress enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over interstate 
commerce and the states enjoy jurisdiction over “purely internal domestic commerce.”  128 
U.S. 1, 17–18, 26 (1888). 
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right upon “adequate justification.”157  This corresponded well with the 
conservative philosophy promoting economic and legal individualism.  
The right operated as a legal conduit:  permitting foreign corporations to 
carry out business throughout the country by protecting viable interstate 
markets in goods and products, while retaining a sphere for state and 
local regulation.158  That retained sphere excluded what the Court 
considered as interstate commerce.159  And this approach reflected the 
persuasiveness of the conservative bar championing the cause of the new 
corporate structure.160  Singer Manufacturing Co. was one of the 
companies at the forefront.161  In Welton v. Missouri, for instance, the 
Court held that a license tax imposed on the selling of sewing machines 
manufactured outside of the state impermissibly taxed foreign goods 
before they had become part of the general mass of state property.162  “In 
holding such discriminatory legislation unconstitutional, Welton became 
the leading case.”163  It was followed a decade later by Robbins v. Taxing 
District of Shelby County, where the Court held that Tennessee could not 
require that drummers for out of state companies obtain a license and 
pay a fee before plying their trade.164 
If activities associated with interstate commerce involved the 
exercise of a federal right, then only Congress could regulate that 
right.165  Optically, at least, this approach seemed consistent with both 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Brown and Chief Justice Taney’s 
decision in Cooley.  States could regulate local matters, including local 
activities indirectly affecting commerce, consistent with Cooley; but the 
                                                 
157 Thomas R. Powell, The Police Power in American Constitutional Law, 1 J. COMP. LEG. & 
INT’L. L. 160, 166 (1919). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 See also TWISS, supra note 8, at 214, 218–19 (explaining the Court’s transition to dual 
federalism, which gave way to the new corporate structure); PAUL, supra note 144, at 22–23 
(noting “the role of the bar as a balancing factor in the tension between populism and 
conservatism”).  See generally McCurdy, supra note 97, at 637–43 (describing how the Court 
acted without the weight of precedent). 
161 McCurdy, supra note 97, at 642. 
162 91 U.S. 275, 281–83 (1875); see also McCurdy, supra note 146, at 310–11 (analyzing the 
Court’s break from precedent in the Welton v. Missouri decision). 
163 FAIRMAN, supra note 153, at 665. 
164 120 U.S. 489, 492–94 (1887). 
165 E.g., Hall v De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 487 (1877) (“There can be no doubt but that exclusive 
power has been conferred upon Congress in respect to the regulation of commerce among 
the several States.”).  It later became axiomatic for the Court to assert “the elementary and 
long-settled doctrine . . . that there can be no divided authority over interstate 
commerce[.]”  Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co., 226 
U.S. 426, 435 (1913).  But cf. Norman R. Williams, The Commerce Clause and the Myth of Dual 
Federalism, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1847, 1847 (2007) (analyzing the impact of dual federalism, 
although arguably without addressing the nuances identified in this Article). 
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Constitution assigned matters requiring national uniformity exclusively 
to Congress—consistent with Chief Justice Marshall’s opinions.166  Justice 
Field illustrated this sentiment in County of Mobile v. Kimball.167  And 
Justice Fuller, in Leisy v. Hardin, similarly pronounced the exclusive 
nature of Congress’ authority over matters purportedly demanding 
uniformity.168  Justice Fuller, in particular, exhibited his bias toward a 
strong national economic marketplace, and he successfully persuaded 
his colleagues to incorporate Marshall’s original package doctrine for 
foreign imports into commerce clause jurisprudence.169  Explicitly 
rejecting the concurrent theory embraced by Chief Justice Taney, Justice 
Fuller allocated power between federal and states by deciding when a 
matter constituted interstate commerce.170  An expanded notion of 
commerce, assuming exclusivity, necessarily meant circumscribing state 
authority.171 
This became evident in the now infamous United States v. E.C. Knight 
Co.172  There, Congress sought to regulate combinations in restraint of 
                                                 
166 William R. Howland, The Police Power and Inter-State Commerce, 4 HARV. L. REV. 221, 
223 (1890) (“The commercial powers of Congress are not in terms exclusive; but it is now 
settled that they are exclusive where the subject-matter is national in character, and admits 
of and requires a uniform rule.”). 
167 102 U.S. 691, 696–707 (1880). 
168 135 U.S. 100, 119 (1890); WILLARD L. KING, MELVILLE WESTON FULLER:  CHIEF JUSTICE 
OF THE UNITED STATES 1888–1910, at 167 (1950). 
169 See KING, supra note 168, at 167–69.  King’s generous treatment of Fuller suggests that 
Fuller tried to “unshackle the future from the past[,]” and yet the Court undermined his 
approach only four years later, in Plumley v. Massachusetts.  Id. at 238–39.  Justice Harlan 
recognized the unmanageability of Fuller’s embrace of the original package doctrine:  
“It . . . would encourage American merchants and traders seeking to avoid state and local 
taxation, to import from abroad all the merchandise and commodities which they would 
need in their business.”  F. May & Co. v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496, 503 (1900); see also 
Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 350 (1900) (providing the cigarettes and original package 
doctrine). 
170 ELY, supra note 140, at 127.  After “conceding the weight” to be afforded to the 
“eminent jurist,” Fuller was: 
[C]onstrained to say that the distinction between subjects in respect of 
which there can be of necessity only one system or plan of regulation 
for the whole country, and subjects local in their nature, and, so far as 
relating to commerce, mere aids, rather than regulations, does not 
appear to us to have been sufficiently recognized by him in arriving at 
the conclusions announced. 
Leisy, 135 U.S. at 118; see also id. at 119 (“the power to regulate commerce . . . is exclusive”). 
171 Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 655 (1895) (“If the power to regulate interstate 
commerce applied to all the incidents to which such commerce might give rise . . . that 
power would embrace the entire sphere of mercantile activity in any way . . . and would 
exclude state control over [domestic matters.]”). 
172 156 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1895).  Fuller’s opinion omitted referencing earlier dicta (in case 
where he dissented) that manufacturing corporations engaged in local or domestic business 
were outside of interstate commerce.  Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 58 (1891). 
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trade for activities that included manufacturing.173  For the Court, Justice 
Fuller explained how states traditionally had protected against unlawful 
restraints upon commerce within their borders, and that Congress had 
exceeded its bounds when it intruded upon that authority.174  Had he 
ruled otherwise, he likely believed that, absent federal legislation, state 
regulation of domestic corporations or even foreign corporations doing 
business within another state would violate the DCC—after all, an 
exclusive paradigm would not tolerate allowing state regulation of 
“commerce.”175  And so he drew the problematic distinction between 
manufacturing and commerce. 
The incipient federal constitutional right to engage interstate 
commerce precipitated the ancillary principle that states may not 
discriminate against interstate commerce.  The Court’s language in 
Walling v. Michigan, involving a state-imposed tax on the business of 
selling liquor into the state from out-of-state manufacturers, is 
illustrative.176  When Michigan convicted an agent for a Chicago 
manufacturer of refusing to pay the tax, the State Supreme Court upheld 
the tax, concluding that the tax applied equally to all sellers and did not 
discriminate against non-residents.177  The Supreme Court had earlier 
signaled the need to address discrimination when it held that: 
[N]o State can, consistently with the Federal 
Constitution, impose upon the products of other States, 
brought therein for sale or use, or upon citizens because 
engaged in the sale therein, or the transportation thereto, 
of the products of other States, more onerous public 
burdens or taxes than it imposes upon the like products 
of its own territory.178 
                                                 
173 Knight, 156 U.S. at 6–8. 
174 Id. at 15–16; see McCurdy, supra note 146 at 336 (discussing history of state 
government freely deciding on matters of commerce without considering interstate 
commerce ramifications). 
175 See McCurdy, supra note 146, at 335 (explaining that the court’s concerns that states 
could lose control over right to regulate foreign corporations if a monopolization standard 
was adopted). 
176 See Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 456–57 (1886) (discussing that Congress 
regulates commerce between states and cites to judicial history regarding federal control 
over interstate commerce to support its decision). 
177 People v. Walling, 18 N.W. 807, 810 (Mich. 1884). 
178 Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 439 (1879).  The Court suggested that this rule was 
necessary to avoid annul[ing] Congress’ power to regulate interstate and foreign 
commerce.  Id. at 439–40. 
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The Michigan statute undoubtedly had a discriminatory motive:  an 
earlier version of the statute, after all, discriminated on its face against 
non-residents.179  The Court, therefore, concluded that as a 
discriminatory measure it operated as a regulation of interstate 
commerce within Congress’ exclusive domain.180 
Finally, the Court assumed responsibility for ensuring that states 
could not, through subterfuge, interfere with the federal right to engage 
in interstate commerce and Congress’ corresponding exclusive power 
over it.181  The Court assessed whether a state’s purported exercise of the 
police power appeared rational or rather served as a ruse limiting market 
entry.182  Decisions often teetered on the Court’s perception about 
whether a particular state measure “appears” to have had a sufficiently 
reliable motivation other than class or economic protectionist.183  When 
the Court became convinced that a state measure was little more than 
class legislation or an effort to protect a local market, the DCC became an 
easy foil to strike down the measure.184  Many of the late nineteenth 
century cases, therefore, turned on whether the Court became convinced 
that the state had acted legitimately—or reasonably—when purporting 
to regulate for public health, welfare, or safety.185  This inquiry 
occasionally fused the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth 
                                                 
179 Walling, 116 U.S. at 449.  The Court also explained how the tax effectively targeted 
drummers for out-of-state liquor manufacturers.  Id. at 459. 
180 See id. at 455–456 (discussing the necessity of a national system to regulate certain 
classes of interstate trade); see also Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 99–101 (1897) (invalidating 
tax for inspection program effectively discriminating against out of state products); Voight 
v. Wright, 141 U.S. 62, 66 (1891) (invalidated Virginia flour inspection program). 
181 Walling, 116 U.S. at 460. 
182 Id.  See, e.g., Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 303–04 (1896) (whether a “real or 
substantial relation to [health or safety] objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured 
by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge”). 
183 See Walling, 116 U.S. at 456–58 (discussing the motivation for the state law). 
184 See id. at 458–61 (finding the state act to be a violation of the commerce clause). 
185 E.g., Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 399 (1894) (protection of 
property interest warrants inquiring into “the reasonableness and justice of the rates”).  The 
Court played comfortably in a “reasonableness” sandbox, examining, for instance, the 
reasonableness of rate regulation under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Smyth v. Ames, 
169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898) (examining the reasonableness and fairness of return for the value 
of property as compared to what the public was entitled to demand); Chicago & G. T. Ry. 
Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 344 (1892) (stating that the legislature has the power to fix 
railroad rates, but the judiciary may intercede if the rates are unreasonable); Chicago, M. & 
St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890) (explaining that the element of 
reasonableness is a question for judicial investigation, which requires “due process of law 
for its determination”).  Even in liberty of contract cases, “the Fuller Court was prepared to 
recognize major exceptions . . . when a state could demonstrate the reasonableness of its 
regulations[]”—such as in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 418–23 (1908).  ELY, supra note 
140, at 101. 
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Amendment principles.186  Barry Cushman highlights this “cross 
pollination” when portraying the New Deal Court.187 
This “cross pollination” surfaces particularly in Justice John Marshall 
Harlan’s Commerce Clause opinions.  Several of his prominent police 
power opinions upheld state regulation of economic transactions.188  And 
these opinions often examined whether the state acted arbitrarily or in a 
hostile manner against interstate commerce.189  In Minnesota v. Barber, the 
Court examined the “natural and reasonable effect” of the regulation and 
whether a sufficient relationship existed between the means and the 
ends.190  Legitimate railroad safety measures survived scrutiny when the 
Court perceived the measure was rationally related to a legitimate state 
police power purpose.191  Yet, if a measure appeared unrelated to 
                                                 
186 See PAUL, supra note 144, at 42–45 (explaining the judicial review of reasonableness); 
see also BERNARD C. GAVIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
24 (1932) (discussing the suggestion of a reasonableness test in cases).  “[T]he language of 
some of the cases has consciously or unconsciously employed the idioms of the ‘due 
process’ cases.”  Id.; see also id. at 49–50, 79–81 (treating due process and Commerce Clause 
together); id. at 372 (noting that there is not difference in the result whether a property tax 
is tested by the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment). 
187 See CUSHMAN, supra note at 43, 107–12 (examining the change in the judicial 
interpretation of the due process clause and the commerce clause); see also Barry Cushman, 
Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (2000) 
(analyzing the developments in commerce clause jurisprudence in relation to substantive 
due process and the dormant commerce clause doctrine). 
188 See PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 141, at 149–50 (citing Justice Harlan’s noticeable 
inclusion of state police power considerations in his decisions).  Conversely, Justice Harlan 
also affirmed Congress’ power to regulate the interstate traffic of lotteries.  Champion v. 
Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 355 (1903). 
189 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 543–44 (1896) (dissenting, Justice Harlan explained 
that Connecticut acted arbitrarily and “inconsistent with the liberty belonging to every 
man,” and violated the Commerce Clause by denying citizens the ability to sell lawfully 
obtained game into the interstate market).  Congress responded by passing the Lacey Act, 
prohibiting the interstate sale of dead wild animals or birds killed or shipped in violation 
of state law.  Lacey Act, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900). 
190 Minnesota v Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 320–26, 328–29 (1890) (invalidating state meat 
inspection statute).  A searching means/end inquiry reflected the Court’s general approach 
toward police power measures.  See FISS, supra note 100, at 162 (Lochner reflected 
means/ends inquiry); see also id. at 165 (noting that even when dissenting in Lochner, Justice 
Harlan articulated the same approach, permitting sufficiently established health objectives 
but not economic class legislation). 
191 New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628, 632 (1897); see Wabash, St. 
Louis, and Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 573 (1886) (holding that it would hinder the 
transportation of goods and chattels if every state on the train route could impose 
regulations concerning price, compensation, or taxation).  Railroad rate regulation, 
conversely, highlighted the difficulty with dual markets, such that by 1886, the issue 
reached its crescendo when the Court touted the “freedom” of interstate commerce in 
holding that states could not regulate the rates for interstate railroad transportation.  Id.  
Contra Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142, 154 (1896) (declining to uphold train stop 
measure that would require a fast-mail train to go seven miles out its way creating 
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traditional “police power” aims, Harlan had little trouble invoking the 
Commerce Clause.  In Brimmer v. Rebman, for instance, Justice Harlan 
invalidated Virginia’s meat inspection statute, reasoning that the 
constitutional right to send wholesome meat into Virginia could not be 
inhibited by a statute that denied equality in markets.192  Because the 
Court found inescapable the conclusion that the statute was not 
legitimately aimed at health, the inspection program necessarily 
targeted—and, therefore, illegitimately directly burdened—interstate 
commerce.193  The same concern over hostile state efforts led Harlan to 
question Kansas’ effort to extract roughly $20,000 for its school fund 
from Western Union’s ability to do intrastate business.194  This prodded 
Harlan to champion the need to ensure “the freedom of interstate 
commerce against hostile state or local action,” but allow local 
regulations “established in good faith” to apply to those engaged in 
commerce and only incidentally affecting, and not obstructing or 
conflicting, with the “substantial rights of those engaged in interstate 
commerce.”195  Indeed, several of Harlan’s opinions illustrate how 
ostensible health and welfare measures became embroiled in the tension 
between ineffective state regulation and coalescing forces favoring 
                                                                                                             
significant delays to passengers and cargo).  The Court believed the stop was an 
unconstitutional hindrance and an obstruction of interstate commerce.  Id.  See generally 
Hovenkamp, supra note 151, at 1017 (discussing federal regulations within context of public 
interest); THOMAS K, MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION:  CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS 
D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 61 (1984) (describing the power of the 
railroads).  “Ultimately, the railroads grew so powerful and so vital to the national 
economy that continued reliance on state regulation alone became futile[,]” particularly 
after Wabash.  Id. 
192 138 U.S. 78, 81–83 (1891) (holding that the Virginia tax discriminated against products 
from other states); see also Voight v. Wright, 141 U.S. 62, 67 (1891) (denying equality in a 
state’s market directly burdens interstate commerce). 
193 Brimmer, 138 U.S. at 83; see PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 141, at 154 (noting Harlan did 
not respond to allegations by the state attorneys that moneyed interests were challenging 
state sovereignty).  Linda Prezybyszewski writes that Harlan considered the state’s health 
justification a “ruse.”  Id.  Congress responded by passing the Animal Industry Act, ch. 60, 
23 Stat. 31 (1884), a recognition of state power to effect quarantines for foreign vessels at 
state ports, Act of Feb. 15, 1893 (National Quarantine Act), ch. 114, 27 Stat. 449–452 (1893), 
the Meat Inspection Act, ch. 555, 26 Stat. 1089 (1891), and in 1906 it mandated inspecting 
meat traveling in interstate commerce, Pure-Food Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 384, 34 Stat. 768 
(1906). 
194 See Western Union Tel. Co. v. State of Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 7, 34–36 
(1910) (stating that a state may impose conditions so long as those conditions do not offend 
the Constitution or United States laws). 
195 Id. at 26. 
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federal regulation—forces arguably at odds with the Court’s approach 
toward exclusivity.196 
B. The Genesis of DCC Balancing 
These tensions eventually became too problematic under the Court’s 
prevailing jurisprudence.  With the new century, the Court struggled to 
maintain its dialogue with the past, or its precedent, and to respond to 
the challenges confronting a dramatically changing society.  “The 
twentieth century began amid a remarkable structural transformation of 
the economy.  Since the 1870s, a constellation of circumstances—a 
nationwide railway network, abundant raw materials, emerging 
technologies, available finance capital, [and] favorable government 
policies—had produced a new kind of industrial firm.”197  The necessity 
of addressing growing class inequality associated with the concentration 
of wealth and power in big businesses undermined the loci of 
individualism dominating the second of the nineteenth century.  The 
illusion of classical economic theory and its corresponding focus on 
individualism, to the extent practiced, became transparent.  It 
succumbed to the widely touted need to address health and safety 
threats posed by the new economy.198  And classical economic theory 
                                                 
196 See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 686 (1888) (providing the classic illustration 
of the dairy industry’s battle against oleomargarine, and Justice Harlan’s initial decision 
upholding state legislation); see also McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 58–64 (1904) 
(stating that the judiciary does not hold the power to hold a legislative act unconstitutional 
if it reasonably relates to public health); Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U.S 30, 33–34 
(1898) (noting a New Hampshire statute’s arbitrary oleomargarine color requirement when 
selling the product, the court held the statute to be invalid as a prohibitory law).  Cf. 
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 14–25 (1898) (invalidating law).  See generally 
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED:  THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA 
POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 75 (1993) (describing how some perceived Powell as 
embodying class legislation); Benedict, supra note 148, at 17 (discussing prominence of fight 
over oleomargarine); Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State:  
The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 83, 108–18 (1989) (discussing the causes 
of state antimargarine laws and the subsequent judicial invalidation based on their 
prohibitory nature). 
197 MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT:  THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE 
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1920, at 150 (2003).  See generally MORTON KELLER, 
REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY:  PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900–
1933, 78 (1990) (describing the events and changes around the turn of the century that 
influenced public opinion and policy); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION 
OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890–1916:  THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND POLITICS 4 (1988) 
(exploring the transition from competitive to corporate capitalism). 
198 See Russell Nye, Progressivism:  Anti-Business Reform, in CONFLICT OR CONSENSUS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 304, 304–05 (Allen F. Davis & Harold D. Woodman eds., 1966) 
(discussing the change in the American political and social perspective on the influence of 
wealth in government and the subsequent relationship to injustice in the political system). 
Kalen: Dormant Commerce Clause's Aging Burden
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
764 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
effectively yielded to the emerging consumer economy.199  The soon to 
be President Herbert Hoover even rejected laissez faire doctrine when 
promoting regulation as mechanism for ensuring equal opportunity.200  
By the 1930s, therefore, a “widespread popular conviction” existed “that 
the free market was hopelessly flawed.”201 
Progressives and subsequently New Dealers embraced the role of 
government, and corresponding the belief that through scientific 
management experts could resolve economic and social problems.202  
Historian David Kennedy explained how progressives touted the need 
for “[a]ctive governmental guidance” to “superintend the phenomenal 
economic and social power that modern industrialism” had concentrated 
“into fewer and fewer hands.”203  Steeped in pragmatism, they rejected 
classical formalism and elevated facts over abstractions.204  This surfaced 
in the legal arena, in particular, with recognition by historical 
                                                 
199 SEAVOY, supra note 52, at 213; see also FINE, supra note 135, at 206, 242 (explaining the 
rejection of classical economics for one based on the complexities of consumption).  See, e.g., 
WILLIAM LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE:  MERCHANTS, POWER, AND THE RISE OF A NEW AMERICAN 
CULTURE 7 (1993) (examining the rise of the consumer economy and its impact on society). 
200 See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR:  THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION 
AND WAR, 1929–1945, at 11–13, 46–47, 54–55 (1999); AMITY SHALES, THE FORGOTTEN MAN:  A 
NEW HISTORY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 34–35 (2007) (discussing Hoover’s belief that 
“America must move toward regulation”); see also LEACH, supra note 199, at 354 (noting his 
rejection of laissez-faire capitalism). 
201 MCCRAW, supra note 191, at 210. 
202 See HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 265–70 (1909) (championing 
democratic nationalism).  The New Republic’s founder, Herbert Croly, published Promise of 
American Life, where he rejected liberal individualism and extoled the virtues of 
democratic nationalism and strong governmental intervention.  Id.  Early participants with 
the New Republic included Judge Learned Hand and Felix Frankfurter.  CHARLES FORCEY, 
THE CROSSROADS OF LIBERALISM:  CROLY, WEYL, LIPPMANN AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 
1900–1925, at 181 (1961).  Frankfurter reportedly even served as a conduit for Justice 
Brandeis, with the former publishing in the journal some of Brandeis’ views.  See MELVIN I. 
UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION 165 (1981) (discussing 
Brandeis’ beliefs). 
203 KENNEDY, supra note 200, at 32–33.  Cf. WIECEK, supra note 153, at 255–59 (discussing 
the efficacy of progressive label and ability to synthesize accepted progressive principles).  
See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:  SCIENTIFIC 
NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 26–27 (1973) (indicating the trend toward the 
political involvement of social scientists to exert some means of objective control). 
204 See generally GARY J. JACOBSOHN, PRAGMATISM, STATESMANSHIP, AND THE SUPREME 
COURT 52–57 (1977) (discussing the shift away from legal formalism in favor of pragmatic 
approach); HENRY F. MAY, THE END OF AMERICAN INNOCENCE:  A STUDY OF THE FIRST YEARS 
OF OUR TIME 1912–1917, at 20–23 (1959) (noting the influence of progressive movement); 
ROSS, supra note 53, at 144, 154–157 (examining the influence of the sciences upon the 
progressive thought); WHITE, supra note 40, at 11–15 (explaining the campaign against legal 
formalism); MORTON WHITE, PRAGMATISM AND THE AMERICAN MIND:  ESSAYS AND REVIEWS 
IN PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 41–43 (1973) (noting that the rejection of 
formalism was a result of the increased emphasis on social thought). 
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jurisprudes, sociological jurisprudes, and legal realists that juridical rules 
were a product of time, culture, place, and circumstances, rather than a 
priori pre-ordained principles, and as such could be molded.205  As 
governmental actors occasionally clashing over attitudes toward big 
business, they generally opposed concentrated wealth and favored 
government programs promoting equality of health, welfare, and 
economic opportunity—all within the citadel of capitalism.206  With the 
emerging consumer economy, their belief in expert management 
corresponded with the perceived underlying problem with the economy, 
of matching production to consumption, and overseeing 
labor/management relations to ensure appropriate wages. 
                                                 
205 See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 35 (1995) (discussing “The 
Metaphysical Club”).  The legal realists, including even historical and sociological 
jurisprudes, comprised an eclectic and idiosyncratic group, although many arguably 
seemed bound together by a Kantian faith in rational, empirical, scientific processes.  See 
also JAMES E. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870–1970:  A HISTORY 1–5 (1990) 
(discussing the changes in legal thought); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927–
1960, at 67 (1986) (noting the realists influenced legal education in encouraging teaching 
methods that students could apply to factual situations thereby fusing law with the social 
sciences); WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE:  THE ORIGIN OF MODERN 
AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 110–13 (1994) (examining  the goals of a fact based approach 
to law); PURCELL, supra note at 203, 74–94, 140–42 (explaining the similar characteristics and 
motivations of the realists); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND 
EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 1520 (1995) (discussing the rejection of legal formalism and the 
trend in legal education to embrace the social sciences); G. EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF 
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 99–100 (1978) (examining the influence of political, social, 
intellectual history upon jurisprudential modes and social movements).  Arthur Schlesinger 
aptly captured their focus, observing: 
The new jurisprudence found a host of persuasive teachers—notably, 
perhaps, Felix Frankfurter and Thomas Reed Powell of Harvard and 
Edward S. Corwin of Princeton.  Under their influence, a new 
generation of lawyers and political scientists abandoned the notion 
that judicial pronouncements were delivered by the stork.  They tried 
instead to reconstruct the various carnal factors—economic, political, 
psychological, as well as legal—which so evidently entered into every 
decision.  In due course this effort produced an even more radical 
school. 
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT:  THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 486 
(1960). 
206 See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDIES:  A LIFE 300 (2009) (explaining Brandeis’s 
influence in the debate concerning government control over business interests).  “Perhaps 
more than any other reformer of his time, Louis Brandeis stood as the opponent of big 
business and monopoly.”  Id.  Some scholars accepted concentration as natural, favoring 
“commensurately powerful public controls.”  KENNEDY, supra note 200, at 121.  See generally 
SAMUEL P. HAYES, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM, 1885–1914, at 166–73 (1995) (discussing 
the progressives’ push to increase government funding to aid various public interests, 
while also curbing the amount of mergers and monopolies); SCHLESINGER, supra note 205, 
at 69–207, 271. 
Kalen: Dormant Commerce Clause's Aging Burden
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
766 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
Heralding an engaged federal government capable of readjusting 
economic relationships, progressives challenged the judiciary’s 
willingness to scrutinize legislative judgments.  Charles Beard, after all, 
had accused the Court of interpreting the Constitution to protect 
predominate economic interests.207  Justice Brandeis echoed the emergent 
progressive sentiment in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins when, in 
overruling Swift v. Tyson, he elevated legislative supremacy and 
democratic decision-making over unnecessary judicial intrusion into 
areas constitutionally assigned to a legislature.208 
Another aspect of progressivism, however, became pronounced. 
Progressive lawyers embraced facts, not legal masks—those formulaic or 
talismanic constitutional tests shrouding reality.  And the era’s 
progressive icon Justice Brandeis brought “[p]rogressivism . . . to the 
Court.”209  Justice Brandeis famously introduced the concept of a 
Brandeis brief, marshaling facts to persuade a court, but the corollary is 
often overlooked—that a court would agree to examine and respond to 
an advocate’s factual arguments.210  This promoted judicial examination 
of the “effect” of particular measures, instead of relying on illusory or 
                                                 
207 See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 162–63 & n.1 (1986) (noting that the effect of judicial control upon Congress 
was not the original intent of the framers). 
208 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (holding that the doctrine of Swift 
v. Tyson was an unconstitutional assumption of judicial power); Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 
Pet.) 1, 18–23 (1842) (holding that the federal courts had the authority to create federal 
common law when deciding matters not yet addressed by that state legislature).  See 
generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 172–73 
(2000) (discussing Brandeis’ opinion addressing Swift in the Erie decision).  “Brandeis as 
much as any progressive valued expertise; that had made him a champion of scientific 
management.  But unlike some reformers, he believed in democratic decision making, and 
the fact that the people could sometimes choose poorly did not trouble him.”  UROFSKY, 
supra note 206, at 349. 
209 WALTER F. PRATT, JR., THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE, 1910–
1921, at 142 (1999). 
210 Id. at 168 (noting that Justice Holmes, Harold Laski, and Roscoe Pound urged that 
Brandeis avoid this brief writing style as a Justice).  Factual inquiries often dictated the 
Court’s assessment of businesses affected with a public interest.  In Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 
U.S. 286, 289 (1924), Justice Brandeis accepted the judgment in Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. 
Court of Indus. Relations of Kansas.  Id.  In Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations of 
Kansas, 262 U.S. at 522, 536 (1923), the Court rejected relying on a legislative declaration 
that the business was so affected.  Conversely, in O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257–58 (1931), Justice Brandeis upheld a statute limiting an agent’s 
commission for the sale of fire insurance, reasoning that no facts adduced or judicially 
known warranted overturning the legislative judgment about the evils warranting 
correction.  Id.  In O’Gorman, Brandeis generally referenced Henry W. Biklé’s article.  Id. at 
258 n.3; see Henry Wolf Biklé, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the 
Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6, 1011 (1925) (noting, under the 
Cooley DCC test, the question is necessarily a factually-based practical judgment). 
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malleable legal tests.  It meant, for instance, that a court could reach 
beyond the legislative realm, beyond a statute or its legislative history, 
and measure a statute’s constitutionality based on extrinsic facts as 
presented or judicially known.211  This became evident in the Court’s 
treatment of both DCC and intergovernmental immunity cases.  In 
Metcalf v. Mitchell, for example, Justice Stone—a follower of Justice 
Brandeis—emphasized practicality and effects.212  Of course, elevating 
the criticality of facts rendered constitutional distinctions subservient to 
post-hoc factual judgments.213 
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter aptly observed that Brandeis’ penchant 
for empirical rather than hypothetical evidence prompted him to 
examine each case separately, as if the Court could effectively determine 
whether the state legislature had over (unreasonably) regulated 
interstate commerce.214  This, after all, characterizes much of 1920s 
                                                 
211 See Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 359–63 (1928) (noting Justice Stone’s dissent).  For 
example, Justice Stone employed a methodology that first presumed a measure’s 
constitutionality, and then “indulged” an assumption that a state legislature appreciated 
local conditions necessitating regulation, with the Court capable of taking judicial notice of 
Brandeis brief type facts warranting—in this case, involving employment agency fees—
state regulation.  Id. 
212 269 U.S. 514, 523–24 (1926); see Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (noting that 
in a due process case, Stone implicitly examined and sub silentio accepted the state’s factual 
argument about need to order the removal of ornamental red cedar trees).  In Tyson v. 
Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 451 (1927), Justice Stone chastised the majority’s invocation of illusory 
tests or phrases such as business affected with a public interest.  Even though he assented 
to the majority opinion in Lochner, Justice McKenna earlier opined that “[l]egislation cannot 
be judged by theoretical standards [but] must be tested by the concrete conditions which 
induced it[.]”  Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225, 233 (1911).  Other Justices too 
began employing more fact-suggestive language when discussing an activity’s relationship 
to commerce.  See, e.g., Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U.S. 177, 
180 (1916) (noting that Justice Hughes used “so closely related” along with “direct” 
relationship to interstate commerce); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 360 
(1916) (examining “influence and effect” in upholding state program); Shanks v. Del., 
Lackawanna, & W. R.R. Co., 239 U.S. 556, 558, 560 (1916) (noting that Justice Van Devanter 
that federal employer liability act refers to interstate commerce in a practical, not legal 
sense, and whether activity “so closely related” to interstate transportation, concluding in 
the case that activity “too remote”); Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 
U.S. 1, 47, 50 (1912) (recognizing that Justice Van Devanter that federal employer liability 
act applies to activities with “real or substantial relation” to interstate commerce). 
213 See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Harold, 241 U.S. 371, 375–76 (1916) 
(examining actual movement of product in interstate commerce).  Post hoc factual inquires 
under a “rule of reason” became the sine qua non of antitrust law.  KELLER, supra note 132, at 
32. 
214 See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, 45 HARV. L. REV. 33, 77 
(1931) (stating that state action interstate commerce analysis should be determined on a 
case by case basis, without hypotheticals).  See, e.g., Davis v. Farmers’ Co-Op. Equity Co., 
262 U.S. 312, 315–17 (1923) (taking judicial notice that an undue burden on commerce, and 
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progressivism.215  In Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, for instance, Justice 
Butler regaled his colleagues about what he had learned about bread 
making to establish that the majority had improperly assumed that 
Nebraska had acted arbitrarily when it exercised its police power and 
adopted standards for bread being sold at retail.216  The Court held that 
the State’s measure was “not necessary” under the Court’s assessment of 
the evidence, and as such violated the Fourteenth Amendment.217  
Brandeis responded caustically that “[t]o decide, as a fact, that the 
prohibition . . . is not necessary . . . is, in my opinion, an exercise of the 
powers of a super-Legislature—not the performance of the constitutional 
function of judicial review.”218  But Justice Brandeis’ deference to 
legislative expertise became overshadowed by his style of reasoning and 
marshaling facts to discredit the majority, and Justice Stone 
unfortunately conflated the two—and in so doing ultimately stalled the 
DCC’s development. 
In DCC domain, after all, insuperable problems emerged as the 
constitutionality of programs teetered on past formulaic or talismanic 
tests.  The decaying, yet still hovering nineteenth century dual 
federalism paradigm, posed a catch-twenty-two for the twentieth 
century economy and the Court’s response.219  States could regulate local 
activities only incidentally or indirectly affecting commerce, yet were 
barred from burdening or directly regulating commerce regardless of the 
                                                                                                             
making his own assessment that the burden was so high that it “unreasonably” and 
“unduly” burdened commerce). 
215 See Henry F. May, Shifting Perspectives on the 1920’s, in 2 PIVOTAL INTERPRETATIONS OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY 210, 213 (Carl N. Degler, ed. 1966) (“The typical economic thought of 
the twenties, while it avoided Utopian extremes, shared with the other social sciences an 
unlimited confidence in the present possibilities of fact-finding and saw in the collection 
and use of statistics much of the promise and meaning of the era.”). 
216 264 U.S. 504, 514–16 (1924). 
217 Id. at 517. 
218 Id. at 534; see Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460, 467–70 (1929) (examining 
Justice Brandeis’ dissenting opinion); Pub. Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. 
Co., 273 U.S. 83, 91–92 (1927) (presenting Justice Brandeis’ dissent); Adams v. Tanner, 244 
U.S. 590, 597–616 (1917) (dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis).  This occurred also with 
state regulation of ice manufacturers.  See UROFSKY, supra note 206, at 578–80 (discussing 
Justice Brandeis’s dissenting style and philosophy); see also Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 42–54 (1928) (examining Justice Brandeis dissenting opinion); N.Y. 
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 154–70 (1917) (dissenting opinion of Justice 
Brandeis). 
219 EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT:  A HISTORY OF OUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 20 (1934) (presenting a colorful metaphor how the Court had 
ensured an open and expansive highway extending throughout the country, with neither 
the states nor Congress capable of placing needed stop signs). 
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state’s purpose.220  If, therefore, E.C. Knight remained, the regulatory 
vacuum would mirror the forces producing the dynamic confronting 
health and safety reformers—leaving only a federal prohibitory tax as 
the possible solution.  But the Court later removed that option when it 
explored the purpose behind the tax and concluded that only revenue 
infused purposes would suffice.221  The challenge to the 1921 Grain 
Future Trading Act, primarily affecting transactions on Chicago’s Board 
of Trade, presented the classic problem.222  As a prohibitory tax whose 
“manifest purpose” was other than revenue, the Court rejected it; it also 
refused to sanction the Act under the Commerce Clause, not only 
ostensibly because Congress did not include evidence of its relationship 
to interstate commerce,223 but also because the Court itself could not 
discern how futures contracts for delivering grain might directly impede 
interstate commerce.224  If, conversely, the Court overturned E.C. Knight 
but left intact its tests for analyzing the constitutionality of state 
regulation, then potentially only Congress could protect against health 
                                                 
220 See Shafer v. Farmers’ Grain Co. of Embden, 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925) (suggesting that 
this approach prevailed yet acknowledging the tenuous line between acceptable and 
impermissible state legislation).  Citizens, Justice Van Devanter intimated, enjoyed a 
“common right” to engage in legitimate interstate activities subject only to Congress’ 
superintending power.  Id.  Earlier, he noted Congress’ exclusive charge over interstate 
commerce, when extending the concept of commerce to include purchasing along with 
transportation.  See Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 290–91 (1921) 
(discussing that the right to buy shipment does not come from state laws); see also 
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596 (1923) (noting importance of maintaining 
uniformity in the commercial intercourse of natural gas, as a “single nation”). 
221 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 55, 57–59 (1936) (highlighting the reasoning for 
taxes); see also Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 22–23 (1925) (upholding application of the 
Narcotic Law, but noting caveat about other motives); United States v. Constantine, 296 
U.S. 287, 295–96 (1935) (concluding that federal penalty tax imposed for violating state 
liquor law invaded state’s police power).  Butler’s focus on the taxing power was likely a 
product of a hasty conference.  SCHLESINGER, supra note 205, at 470–71.  In Bailey v. Drexel 
Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922), the majority indicated that “[o]ut 
of respect for the acts of a co-ordinate branch of the government, this court has gone far to 
sustain taxing acts as such, even though there has been ground for suspecting, from the 
weight of the tax, it was intended to destroy its subject.”  Id.  The Court later upheld taxes 
likely intended to affect behavior.  See Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 512–14 
(1937) (noting the power and deference given to Congress to impose taxes). 
222 See Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68 (1922) (examining whether the regulation is 
constitutional under the Commerce Clause). 
223 Id. at 66–69. 
224 See Id. at 69 (stating that sales from future deliveries are not interstate commerce).  The 
Court distinguished United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 535–36, 543 (1913), where it 
upheld a conspiracy conviction against traders on the New York Cotton Exchange that 
allegedly were running a corner on the available supply of cotton, artificially driving up 
the price.  Id.  In Patten, the Court seemed convinced that the transactions themselves 
created “artificial conditions” burdening interstate commerce—it “restrict[ed] the common 
liberty to engage” in such commerce.  Id. at 541. 
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and safety threats.  This would occur because the Court imbued only 
Congress with exclusive authority over “commerce.”225 
Neither scenario seemed plausible.  The Court’s rubric left activities 
indirectly yet substantially affecting interstate commerce, as well as 
activities directly yet minimally affecting interstate commerce, without 
ostensible legislative oversight.226  If the Court found sufficient evidence 
that the transaction being regulated directly burdened interstate 
commerce, then it upheld the exercise of federal power.227   Once Justice 
Holmes’ stream of commerce decision nudged the law forward, both his 
and other opinions involving the Sherman Antitrust Act demonstrated 
the relationship between local transactions and interstate commerce.228  
In Stafford v. Wallace, for instance, Chief Justice Taft employed Chief 
Justice Marshall’s rhetoric for broad national power when upholding the 
Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, affording Congress considerable 
latitude to regulate monopolies affecting the interstate trade in livestock, 
while conversely issuing another opinion “on the Federal taxing power 
[that] would have made the Great Nationalist turn over in his grave.”229  
The Court also upheld the Interstate Commerce Commission’s 
regulation of intrastate (local) rates for railroads when necessary to avoid 
the disparity between interstate and intrastate rates.230  In 1914, Justice 
                                                 
225 See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 21 (1888) (noting that if commerce were interpreted 
broadly it would exclude states from regulating agriculture, fishing, horticulture, stock-
raising, or almost “every branch of human industry”). 
226 Hill, 259 U.S. at 69. 
227 Id. 
228 See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 399 (1905) (noting that a burden that 
obstructs interstate trade is not permitted).  Before Swift, the Court already limited E.C. 
Knight to situations bearing “no distinct relation[ship] to commerce between the states[.]”  
United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 313 (1897).  In Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 
US. 274, 297 (1908), the Court limited E.C. Knight to situations where the object and 
intention was not to obstruct or restrain commerce.  Id; see Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 
42–43 (1939) (holding that it is illegal to obstruct and burden interstate commerce); Bd. of 
Trade of City of Chi. v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 40 (1923) (finding that the manipulation of the 
market for futures obstructs and burdens interstate commerce); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 
U.S. 495, 499–500 (1922) (noting that the conspiracy violated the Anti-Trust Act); United 
States v, Ferger, 250 U.S. 199, 203 (1919) (finding that a congressional exercise of authority 
over counterfeiting upheld absent any evidence of intent to ship in interstate commerce, 
because of “relation to and influence upon” commerce); see also Barry Cushman, A Stream of 
Legal Consciousness:  The Current of Commerce Doctrine from Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 
FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 114 (1993) (tracing the development and implications of the 
doctrine).  But cf. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 67–68 (1922) (invalidating the Grain Future 
Trading Tax). 
229 258 U.S. 495, 512, 528 (1922) (holding that the Sherman Antitrust applies to the 
“practices and obstructions” that burden interstate commerce); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, 
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT:  CHIEF JUSTICE 244 (1964). 
230 See R.R. Comm’n of Wis. v. Chi, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 588 (1922) (“interstate 
and intrastate commerce are ordinarily subject to regulation by different sovereignties, yet 
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Hughes in the Shreveport Rate Cases established that federal power was 
necessary for the security of the traffic as a consequence of the “close and 
substantial” relationship between instate and interstate traffic.231  The 
years of labor unrest equally demonstrated how commerce and local 
wage transactions became inseparable, and yet economic biases seemed 
to dictate which sovereign could regulate strikes.232 
Also, lingering ubiquitous language about exclusive federal 
jurisdiction for areas demanding uniformity posed an analytical 
problem.  The Court’s language suggested two distinct spheres of 
jurisdiction.233  Either juridical lines would block passage from one 
sphere to another, or the Court would need to justify decisions on some 
other ex ante basis.234  This became evident in the liquor cases.  In Clark 
Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railroad Co., the Court deftly avoiding 
confronting the argument.235  The Court previously held that interstate 
transport of liquor demanded uniformity—subject to Congress’ exclusive 
                                                                                                             
when they are so mingled together that the supreme authority, the Nation, cannot exercise 
complete effective control over interstate commerce without incidental regulation of 
intrastate commerce”); see also Am. Express Co. v. S.D., 244 U.S. 617, 629 (1917) (finding 
that the government, under the authority of the Commerce clause, can standardize 
monopolies that have a direct impact on commerce). 
231 Houston, E. & W. Tex. R.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914). 
232 See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters’ Ass’n of N. Am., 274 U.S. 37, 
47–49 (1927) (treating local strikes as conspiracies ultimately designed to affect a company’s 
ability to sell products into the interstate market, forcing unionization).  Because strikers’ 
intent is to affect the flow of products outside of a state, the Court held strikes are (and de 
facto could be) regulated under the antitrust laws.  Id.  The Court noted that the means 
chosen would “directly and substantially curtail[], or threaten[] thus to curtail, the natural 
flow in interstate commerce[.]”  Id. at 54.  “Congress,” according to the Court, “with the 
right to control the field of interstate commerce, has so legislated as to prevent resort to 
practices which unduly restrain competition or unduly obstruct the free flow of such 
commerce, and private choice of means must yield to the national authority thus exerted.”  
Eastern States Lumber Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 613 (1914); see also Coronado 
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 268 U.S. 295, 309–10 (1925) (holding that 
interstate trade and commerce cannot be restricted); Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 
478 (1921) (granting an injunction restraining actions that interfere with interstate 
commerce); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 308–09 (1908) (overturning a lower court’s 
dismissal of a case for damages arising from restrictions on interstate commerce); United 
States v. Brims, 272 U.S 549, 553 (1926) (“The crime of restraining interstate commerce 
through combination is not condoned by the inclusion of intrastate commerce as well.”).  
The Court’s approach toward strikes elicited one of Brandeis’ most stinging dissents.  See 
PURCELL, supra note 208, at 146–47 (discussing Justice Brandeis’s opinions and dissents 
regarding labor injunctions). 
233 See Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 327 (1917) (reasoning that 
interstate commerce is divided into two classes). 
234 Id. at 327–29. 
235 See id. at 331–32 (finding that state prohibitions cannot attach to intoxicant 
movements). 
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control.236  When Congress thereafter sought to sanction state regulation, 
first in the Wilson Act and then in the Webb-Kenyon Act, the question 
naturally arose in Clark Distilling Co. how Congress could authorize 
disparate (non-uniform) regulation over matters within its exclusive 
sphere (because it was a matter demanding uniformity)?  With baffling 
reasoning, the Court responded: 
[T]hat because Congress, in adopting a regulation, had 
considered the nature and character of our dual system 
of government, state and nation, and . . . so conformed 
its regulation as to produce co-operation between the 
local and national forces of government to the end of 
preserving the rights of all, it had thereby transcended 
the complete and perfect power of regulation conferred 
by the Constitution.237 
Even the nation’s leading constitutional scholars could not easily explain 
how this could be so, if the power over interstate commerce is, indeed, 
exclusive.238 
Conversely, in Lemke v. Farmers’ Grain Co. of Embden, North Dakota, 
the Court invalidated North Dakota’s Grain Grading and Inspection 
Act.239  The Act addressed a cooperative association’s marketing of 
North Dakota produced grain into the Minnesota market.240  The 
majority treated the Act as a regulation affecting and burdening 
interstate commerce.241  The Court rejected North Dakota’s pitch that the 
law was a valid police power measure, until superseded by a federal 
statute, by merely claiming that it “passe[d] beyond the exercise of its 
legitimate authority” when it deprived the association of its “privilege” 
to engage in commerce by burdening commerce.242  The Court arguably 
accepted the legitimacy of the State’s effort to protect against fraud, but 
held that the State could not “encroach” upon a “field . . . under federal 
control.”243  Dissenting, Justice Brandeis retorted that, as a legitimate 
                                                 
236 See id. at 326–27 (discussing uniformity). 
237 Id. at 331. 
238 See Thomas Reed Powell, The Validity of State Legislation Under the Webb-Kenyon Law, 2 
SO. L. Q. 112, 127 (1917) (noting the power to regulate commerce is given to Congress by 
the Constitution); see also Dowling, infra note 303, at 17 (discussing Professor Noel 
Dowling’s analysis). 
239 258 U.S. 50, 61 (1922) (holding the act invalid because it goes beyond the state’s police 
power). 
240 Id. at 53–54. 
241 Id. at 52. 
242 Id. at 59. 
243 Id. at 61. 
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police power measure, the statute would only be unconstitutional if 
Congress had so legislated or the law “directly” burdened interstate 
commerce.244 
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania perhaps best illustrates an emerging Zeitgeist 
and the desire to fit precedent within it.245  Pennsylvania’s statute 
required a license for selling steamship tickets for foreign commerce, as 
well as a bond to ensure against fraud or misrepresentation and proof of 
good moral character.246  In one short paragraph of analysis, Justice 
Butler’s majority opinion merely concluded that the statute directly 
burdened foreign commerce and, therefore, was unconstitutional.247  
Butler’s analysis primarily rests on McCall v. California, which was 
nothing more than an extension of County of Mobile v. Kimball and 
Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District.248  And those cases all held that states 
could not impose a requirement on the federal right to engage in 
interstate commerce.249  Justice Brandeis issued a caustic dissent, joined 
by Justice Holmes.250  He began by exhorting the majority’s failure to 
recognize the threat animating the state’s exercise of its police power, a 
threat recognized by other states as well.251  With surgical skill he 
methodically undermined the majority’s assumptions, but demonstrated 
less alacrity in conceptualizing how to escape the rhetoric of the past.252  
On the one hand, he suggested possibly overruling McCall, while on the 
other, employed the Court’s precedent to suggest how cases rest on 
factual judgments about whether a particular statute obstructs, directly 
burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce.253 
Separately dissenting in Di Santo, joined by Justices Holmes and 
Brandeis, Justice Stone suggested that the pre-existing formulations were 
unnecessary terms capable of being distilled into a principled factual 
                                                 
244 Id. at 64. 
245 See Di Santo v. Pa., 273 U.S. 34, 37 (1927) (noting that the majority did not depart or 
expand precedent). 
246 Id. at 35–36. 
247 See id. at 37 (stating that a state statute is invalid if it interferes or burdens interstate 
commerce, regardless of the intended purpose of the statute). 
248 See McCall v. Cal., 136 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1890) (holding that the legislature cannot tax, 
license, or condition so that interstate commerce is obstructed). 
249 See supra note 228 and accompanying text (stating that Congress has the police power 
to regulate interstate trade). 
250 Di Santo, 273 U.S. at 37–43. 
251 Id. at 37–39. 
252 Id. at 37–38. 
253 See id. at 39, 41 (illustrating that Brandeis rejected state measures designed to 
discriminate against interstate commerce, treating them as impermissibly directly 
burdening interstate commerce); see also Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1925) 
(distinguished an instance where the indirect burden on interstate commerce was not 
“unreasonable”). 
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inquiry.254  He opined that labels such as “direct” and “indirect” are “too 
mechanical,” and that instead the Court should examine the array of 
facts:  did the program discriminate against or create an obstacle or 
barrier to the free flow of commerce, considering “all the facts and 
circumstances, such as the nature of the regulation, its function, the 
character of the business involved and the actual effect on the flow of 
commerce[?]”255  He equally argued that a court could legitimately assess 
factually whether the regulation was one of a “local concern” or 
infringed a “national interest in maintaining the freedom of commerce 
across state lines.”256  Not coincidentally, Justice Stone’s dissent occurred 
a year after he emphasized the importance of examining facts and actual 
effects in the context of an intergovernmental immunity claim.257 
Justice Cardozo’s struggle with New York’s milk pricing laws 
similarly presented the emblematic problem.  G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. 
purchased milk from Vermont sellers at prices below the allowed 
minimum purchase price under New York law, and New York therefore 
denied the company’s license to sell that milk into the New York 
market.258  “The New York Milk Control Law was enacted in an attempt 
to relieve the depressed condition of dairy farmers and to stabilize the 
chaotic marketing and distribution structure.”259  Cardozo began by 
observing that states could not erect barriers against commerce, joining 
together constitutional provisions about imposts, duties, and 
commerce.260  From there, he noted how the Commerce Clause operated 
                                                 
254 See Di Santo, 273 U.S. at 43–45 (taking note of Justice Stone’s dissenting opinion).  
Holmes had earlier suggested that he would find discriminatory regulations for natural 
resources acceptable, and that a state could regulate resources prior to entering the stream 
of commerce.  See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia & Ohio, 262 U.S. 553, 600–01 (1923) 
(“products of a State until they are actually started to a point outside it may be regulated by 
the State” (citing Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923))).  In 1922, Justice 
Holmes also concluded fairly simplistically that America’s past-time, major league 
baseball, fell outside of commerce.  See Fed. Base Ball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l 
Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200. 208–09 (1922) (holding baseball is state regulated). 
255 Di Santo, 273 U.S. at 44. 
256 Id. at 44–45 (taking special note of key words “local concern[,]” “local character,” 
“more than local in character[,]” and “peculiarly local”). 
257 See Noel T. Dowling et al., Mr. Justice Stone and the Constitution, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 351, 
354–58 (1936) (taking note of Justice Stone’s dissenting opinions). 
258 See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 520 (1935) (holding that a license will 
not be issued to a milk creamery that sells at prices lower than the established minimum 
threshold). 
259 Comment, Milk Regulation in New York, 46 YALE L.J. 1359, 1360 (1937) (footnote 
omitted). 
260 See Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521–22 (discussing the constitution in conjunction with other 
economic ramifications).  A year earlier the Court examined whether New York acted 
arbitrarily or discriminatorily in enacting New York’s milk price control law.  Nebbia v. 
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536–37 (1934); see also Borden’s Farm Prods. Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 
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to prevent interstate competition and jealousies.261  “National solidarity” 
and the idea that all U.S. citizens should “sink or swim together” 
undergird his analysis.262  And here, the State’s interest was “too remote 
and indirect” to justify the direct burden on interstate commerce.263  Yet, 
Cardozo’s decision in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. upheld Washington 
State’s compensating use tax, which accomplished essentially the same 
result as in Seelig.264  Even Cardozo’s biographer suggests that Cardozo 
poorly explained the distinction between the two cases.265 
Judges and scholars uniformly recognized the idiosyncratic nature of 
the Court’s opinions.266  One observer, for instance, lamented that the 
                                                                                                             
U.S. 251, 261 (1936) (reviewing the prices based on trade names); Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. 
Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 274–78 (1936) (noting Justice Cardozo’s dissenting opinion 
observing no distinction in this case invalidating distinction based on whether well-
advertised trade names and other Ten Eyck case); Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 
U.S. 163, 172 (1934) (upholding New York order fixing minimum producer and resale 
prices). 
261 Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 522–23. 
262 Id. at 523, 527 (illustrating that an “economic barrier” is an “unreasonable clog upon 
the mobility of commerce”). 
263 See id. at 524 (noting the type of interstate commerce obstruction that is not allowed).  
Cardozo acknowledged the line between permissible and impermissible regulation was 
one of “degree[,]” suggesting the inquiry turns on whether the object of the regulation is 
normally associated with commerce and whether the effect on commerce is drastic.  Id. at 
525–26.  He also accepted the original package doctrine as an “illustration of principle.”  Id. 
at 526–27. 
264 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583–84 (1937). 
265 See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 531–32 (1998) (taking note of the fact there was 
not a clear distinction drawn between the two cases).  Cardozo wrote Justice Hughes 
suggesting a willingness to examine both the legislative justification and necessity for 
national legislation.  Id. at 519–20.  Kaufman suggests that Cardozo examined “whether the 
impact of the activity was predominantly local or not.”  Id. at 521.  Frankfurter, however, 
cautions that Cardozo adhered to “classic doctrines for constitutional adjudication” and 
seemingly justifies Cardozo’s opinion in Seelig as an area less important to Cardozo and 
decided based on prevailing precedent.  Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public 
Law, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 88, 117–18 (1939). 
266 See generally James M. Beck, Nullification by Indirection, 23 HARV. L. REV. 441, 454–55 
(1910) (analyzing the impact of Supreme Court decisions); Henry Wolf. Biklé, The Silence of 
Congress, 41 HARV. L. REV. 200, 220–24 (1927) (considering various Supreme Court decisions 
in conjunction “with the doctrine that Congress has exclusive power to regulate commerce 
among the states”); Robert Eugene Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution, 3 MINN. L. REV. 289, 381, 452, 482–83 (1919) (discussing the scope 
of the national police power); Bernard C. Gavit, Jurisdiction over Causes of Action Against 
Interstate Carriers, 3 IND. L.J. 130, 130–38 (1928) (examining the jurisdiction of state courts 
over interstate carriers and related causes of action); Thurlow M. Gordon, The Child Labor 
Law Case, 32 HARV. L. REV. 45, 51–52 (1918) (exploring the Court’s decision in the Child 
Labor Law Case); Charles W. Needham, The Exclusive Power of Congress over Interstate 
Commerce, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 251, 260 (1911) (explaining when a conflict of law arises); 
Clarence G. Shenton, Interstate Commerce During the Silence of Congress, 23 DICK. L. REV. 78, 
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decisions reflected the Court’s judgment about the level of confusion 
attendant with particular state efforts.267  Irving Brandt’s widely read 
Storm over the Constitution suggested that the Court ignored the framers 
by defending a plutocracy’s aversion to strong nationalism.268  The 
Court’s imponderable dilemma became pronounced.  Against a 
backdrop of treatises and articles on the police power generally, 
attention shifted to the Commerce Clause specifically. 269  In 1928, George 
Reynolds published a text on the regulation of interstate carriers, 
chronicling the rise of federal authority and concomitantly chaotic 
aspects of precedent.270  His analysis generally portrayed how the 
Court’s decisions could not be grouped according to economic effects on 
commerce.271  Four years later, Bernard Gavit published a 
comprehensive analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence, observing the 
“utter confusion[]” of “[t]he language of the cases” and “repeated 
expressions of self-evident contradictions.”272  In 1933, Professor Corwin 
attributed the Court’s difficulty to the doctrine of dual federalism.273  
Then, in 1934, he published The Twilight of the Supreme Court, and two 
years later The Commerce Power Versus States Rights, where he advanced 
powerful arguments supporting Congress’ broad Commerce Clause 
power.274  Also in 1936, Corwin explained how the direct/indirect 
                                                                                                             
139, 160–64 (1918) (concluding that “considerable uncertainty prevails” regarding the 
validity of state regulations affecting interstate commerce). 
267 See Shenton, supra note 266, at 107, 139 (discussing state regulation of packages by 
statute). 
268 IRVING BRANT, STORM OVER THE CONSTITUTION 242–43 (1936); see also DREW PEARSON 
& ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 17 (1936) (portraying judges as political actors, 
thwarting progress). 
269 E.g., ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER:  PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
66 (1904); THOMAS REED POWELL, THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE POLICE POWER, 1922–
1930, at 40–41 (1932). 
270 See GEORGE G. REYNOLDS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER TO REGULATE INTERSTATE 
CARRIERS BETWEEN THE NATION AND THE STATES 117 (1928) (noting expansion of federal 
control). 
271 Id. 
272 GAVIT, supra note 186, at 3 (1932); see also JANE PERRY CLARK, THE RISE OF A NEW 
FEDERALISM:  FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1938) (discussing the 
lack of predictability in the interpretation of the Constitution); JOSEPH E. KALLENBACH, 
FEDERAL COOPERATION WITH THE STATES UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 10 (1942) 
(examining whether the framers intended to confer exclusive power on Congress); F.D.G. 
RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OVER COMMERCE 9–10 (1937) (discussing the 
interpretation of the commerce clause); John B. Sholley, The Negative Implications of the 
Commerce Clause, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 559 (1936) (contrasting the exclusive and concurrent 
theories in defining the sphere of state power). 
273 Edward S. Corwin, Congress’s Power to Prohibit Commerce:  A Crucial Constitutional 
Issue, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 477, 481 (1933). 
274 CORWIN, supra note 219, at xxvii; EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS 
STATES RIGHTS 17–19 (1936). 
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phrases served as linguistic devices, originally intended to free the states 
from an otherwise restrictive view of exclusive authority in Congress, 
which then were improperly transplanted into E.C. Knight and Congress’ 
power.275  In 1937, Dean Alfange wrote that E.C. Knight reflected the 
Court’s power of legislating by unbridled interpretation of the 
Constitution, and that it allowed big business to play the states against 
the Federal Government, or vice versa, whenever it suited their needs.276  
Further, Felix Frankfurter published his classic The Commerce Clause 
Under Marshall, Taney and Waite, chronically how the early Chief Justices 
addressed the issue of exclusivity.277 
The early New Deal Court fueled the debate by invalidating aspects 
of President Roosevelt’s program, particularly the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (“NIRA”).  In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
the Court invalidated (nine to zero) the fair practice and wage and hour 
provisions of the Live Poultry Code established by Roosevelt.278  Chief 
Justice Hughes warned that, if Congress’ commerce power extends to 
such matters of domestic or local concern, then states would be at the 
sufferance of Congress.279  Hughes employed direct/indirect rhetoric 
and rejected sanctioning federal power when merely indirect effects 
were present, and he further recounted how the law focused on local 
activities—“building is as essentially local as mining, manufacturing or 
growing crops[.]”280  The opinion’s rhetoric also reached back to Chief 
Justice Marshall’s opinion in Brown, suggesting that the chickens had 
come to rest in New York and ceased to be in interstate commerce—and 
conversely were subject to regulation by the state.281  But the holding 
seemed predictable.  After all, the able jurist Judge Learned Hand 
thought it unconstitutional and Felix Frankfurter feared having this test 
case go to the Court.282  Justice Brandeis afterward exhorted his friends 
                                                 
275 E. S Corwin, The Schechter Case—Landmark, or What?, 13 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 151, 161–62 
(1936). 
276 DEAN ALFANGE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NATIONAL WILL 147, 149 (1937). 
277 FRANKFURTER, supra note 97, at 1, 7. 
278 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (invalidating the fair, wage, and hour provisions of the Live 
Poultry Code). 
279 Id. at 544. 
280 Id. at 547.  Concurring, Justice Cardozo (joined by Stone) could not sanction 
congressional regulation of wages and hours for intrastate transactions, employing 
language from Judge Hand’s lower court opinion.  Id. at 554 (Cardozo, J., concurring).  
Finding directness here he feared would render the test conceptually unbounded.  Id. 
281 See FISS, supra note 100, at 267 (stating Chief Justice Marshall’s dictum of DCC in 
Brown v. Maryland). 
282 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 205, at 278 (stating the Court removed a federal 
prohibitory tax when it explored the purpose behind the tax and concluded that only 
revenue infused purposes would suffice); Cushman, supra note 228, at 132 (noting 
reluctance about the case); see also Ralph F. Fuchs, A Postscript—The Schechter Case, 20 ST. 
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on how the President had gone too far in attempting to centralize 
virtually everything.283 
A perturbed FDR responded with his famous horse and buggy press 
conference.284  He suggested that the interstate commerce discussion 
brought the country back to the E.C. Knight days, ignoring how the 
country had evolved from “the horse-and-buggy age when that clause 
was written” and when “[t]here [was not] much interstate commerce at 
all—probably [eighty or ninety percent] of the human beings in the 
thirteen original States were completely self-supporting within their own 
communities.”285  Since that time, he continued, the country and 
commerce changed radically; it had become “inter-dependent” with 
goods and products from the states tied together, necessitating the need 
for congressional authority over matters indirectly affecting 
commerce.286 
The ensuing clamor urging that the Court revisit its approach to the 
Commerce Clause could not be divorced from ostensible reciprocal 
limitations under the DCC.  After all, the rhetoric for one necessarily 
influenced the other.  And for activities untethered to interstate 
commerce directly, the dilemma became accentuated when, in 1936, the 
Court also held that liberty of contract prevented New York from 
prescribing minimum wages for women working in New York 
                                                                                                             
LOUIS L. REV. 297, 299, 301–03 (1935) (noting that Schechter was a difficult case to argue, and 
that the government’s brief, along the lines of a Brandies brief, tried to present economic 
facts).  New Deal advocate Robert Jackson admitted how the N.I.R.A. was a bold 
experiment, with the Recovery Administration perhaps too unfocused and “[t]he 
[Schechter] case was far from ideal as a test case.”  ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR 
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY:  A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 113 (1949). 
283 JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER:  FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 136–37 
(2010); see SHALES, supra note 200, at 243 (stating President Herbert Hoover rejected laissez 
faire doctrine when promoting regulation as mechanism for ensuring equal opportunity).  
Earlier, progressive journalist Walter Lippmann expressed a similar sentiment.  See 
KENNEDY, supra note 200, at 186 (discussing the need for government guidance in modern 
industrialism).  In his 1937 congressional testimony, Professor Corwin later testified that he 
too had problems with the Act, not necessarily its constitutionality.  2 CORWIN ON THE 
CONSTITUTION:  THE JUDICIARY 257–58 (Richard Loss ed., 1987).  Later, in Carter v. Carter 
Coal, the Court rebuffed the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, expressing the truism that 
the national legislative and state police powers could not invade the others’ turf.  298 U.S. 
238, 323 (1936). 
284 See KENNEDY, supra note 200, at 328 (quoting Roosevelt’s speech). 
285 4 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT:  THE COURT DISAPPROVES 209 (1938) (citing Franklin D. Roosevelt, Horse & 
Buggy Speech); see also SHESOL, supra note 283, at 147–50 (discussing Justice Brandeis’ 
opinion that the President had gone too far in attempting to centralize everything). 
286 SHESOL, supra note 283, at 149–50. 
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laundries.287  Justice Stone wrote his sister that “[s]ince the Court last 
week said that this could not be done by the national government, as the 
matter was local, and now it is said that it cannot be done by local 
governments even though it is local, we seem to have tied Uncle Sam up 
in a hard knot.”288  An open dialogue about the DCC then surfaced 
among the Justices. 
Whether or not one considers 1937 a watershed constitutional 
moment, it serves as a convenient loci for exploring how the DCC began 
its final journey to its modern pedestal.289  It was 1937 when the Court 
purportedly abandoned a dual federalism paradigm that distinguished 
between local intrastate and national interstate activities, by affirming 
Congress’ power to address local intrastate activities with a “close and 
substantial relation” to commerce.290  Commensurately, a year later the 
                                                 
287 Morehead v. N.Y. ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 610–11 (1936).  The Court principally 
relied on Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Id. at 604.  Dissenting, Chief 
Justice Hughes emphasized the legislative findings and the considerable factual material 
presented to the Court justifying the measure.  Id. at 625–27 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).  
Also dissenting, Justice Stone added that “[i]t is difficult to imagine any grounds, other 
than our own personal economic predilections,” for objecting to such a legislative effort.  Id. 
at 633 (Stone, J., dissenting).  Tipaldo, of course, became fleeting.  See West Coast Hotel Co. 
v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 401 (1937) (relying on Adkins, the court “fled” away from the Tipaldo 
opinion). 
288 See Kennedy, supra note 200, at 329 (quoting Stone’s private letter). 
289 See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 213, 236 (1995) (examining what the author calls 
“The Constitutional Revolution of 1937”); PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS 
TIMES:  1918–1969, at 98–99, 127 (1972) (evaluating the changes in the Supreme Court 
between 1929 and 1937); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 40 (1993) 
(discussing “The Revolution of 1937”); WHITE, supra note 44, at 6 (2000) (evaluating The 
New Deal); Cushman, supra note 43, at 208–25 (stating that the justices struggled with 
jurisprudential continuity); see also Cushman, supra note 228, at 105 (discussing the effects 
of the New Deal); Barry Cushman, Lost Fidelities, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 95–96, 99–100 
(1999) (reviewing Justice Roberts’ opinions to explore constitutional change); Richard D. 
Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments:  The Hughes Court and 
Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1893–1894 (1994) (analyzing “the so-
called ‘switch in time’ of 1937[]” (footnote omitted)); David A. Pepper, Against Legalism:  
Rebutting an Anachronistic Account of 1937, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 63, 127–28 (1998) (supporting 
the argument for a constitutional revolution).  Of course, William Leuchtenburg notes that 
Justice Roberts’ votes in the minimum wage cases, first in Tipaldo and later in West Coast 
Parish, were not a product of the pending FDR court packing plan.  LEUCHTENBURG, supra 
at 289.  Indeed, Justice Frankfurter later reported that Roberts would have voted differently 
in Tipaldo and overruled Adkins had a majority of justices so agreed.  Felix Frankfurter, Mr. 
Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 313–14 (1955).  For a recent account of the infamous 
FDR court packing plan, see Barry Cushman, The Court-Packing Plan as Symptom, Casualty, 
and Cause of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2089, 2103 104 (2013). 
290 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937) (upholding National Labor 
Relations Act).  The Court abandoned the need to employ a “stream of commerce” theory, 
instead concluding that Congress exercises plenary power to protect interstate commerce.  
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Court held that states could regulate—albeit within limits—local 
activities that directly affect interstate commerce.  In South Carolina State 
Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers Inc., the Court, through Justice 
Stone, reviewed an injunction restraining South Carolina’s limit on the 
weight and width of motor vehicles permitted on its highways.291  The 
plaintiffs claimed the measure violated the Fourteenth Amendment, was 
superseded by the 1935 Federal Motor Carriers Act, was arbitrary and 
unreasonable in light of the federal aid supporting the highway system, 
and impermissibly directly and substantially burdened interstate 
commerce.292  The Court already had held that absent discrimination or 
federal legislation, states could prescribe uniform regulations to promote 
safety on interstate highway systems.293 
Justice Stone responded by emphasizing that states enjoy 
considerable leeway in regulating matters of “local concern” even 
though a regulation may affect interstate commerce.294  His opinion 
initially intimated that the boundary for impermissible state regulation 
would be breached when a measure discriminates against interstate 
commerce.295  The reason, he suggested, was a political process one:  if a 
state favored in-state over out-of-state economic interests, the “political 
restraints” that normally surround regulation would not be present.296  
                                                                                                             
Id. at 37.  “Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if 
they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is 
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress 
cannot be denied the power . . . .”  Id.  The “close and substantial relation” test surfaced 
earlier in the interstate carrier cases.  See, e.g. Houston, E. & W. Tex. R.R. Co. v. United 
States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (reasoning that Congress’ authority to regulate interstate 
carriers “necessarily embraces the right to control their operations in all matters having 
such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic[]”).  See generally Cushman, supra 
note 228, at 143–50 (describing the litigation in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel). 
291 303 U.S. 177, 178 (1938).  South Carolina had regulated traffic on its highways starting 
in the 1920s, and only two years earlier the Court had denied certiorari in a similar 
challenge to the South Carolina law.  South Carolina v. John P. Nutt Co., 185 S.E. 25 (1935), 
cert. denied, 297 U.S. 724, 724 (1936). 
292 Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 181. 
293 Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 143 (1927). 
294 Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 184–85; see also id. at 187 (“a state can . . . materially affect[]” 
interstate commerce); id. at 189 (“But so long as the state action does not discriminate, the 
burden is one which the Constitution permits . . . .”). 
295 Id. at 185 n.2.  Elsewhere he further emphasized that “[t]he commerce clause by its 
own force, prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce, whatever its form or 
method[.]”  Id. at 185; see also id. at 187 (equal treatment “a safeguard against [] abuse”); id. 
at 189 (“It may not, under the guise of regulation, discriminate against interstate 
commerce.”). 
296 Id. at 185 n.2. 
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He reiterated this point two years later in a DCC tax case.297  Echoing the 
sentiments of Justices Black, Frankfurter and Douglas, he noted that 
Congress could legislate when that body believes the burdens on 
commerce are too great—a judgment that necessarily “is a legislative, not 
a judicial, function[.]”298  Indeed, his opinion is almost annoyingly 
riddled with refrains that certain determinations are legislative, not 
judicial.  And strikingly absent from the opinion, however, is any 
suggestion that the Court should examine the nature or extent of any 
burden on interstate commerce.299 
Yet Stone’s attempt to weave a hundred years of cases into a 
coherent pattern, premised upon perceived long-standing doctrines, 
elicited throughout his opinion seemingly idiosyncratic language.300  
Stone variously asserted that states may “materially interfere with 
interstate commerce[]” when addressing local interests, but equally 
intimated that they must act within their “province” and that “the means 
of regulation chosen are reasonably adapted to the end sought[,]” that 
the Commerce Clause operated to prevent nominally “local” regulation 
from securing “local benefit[s] by throwing the attendant burdens on 
those without the state[,]” as “preclud[ing] the subordination of the 
efficiency and convenience of interstate traffic to local service 
requirements”—when, for instance, restrictions might be “unnecessarily 
harsh.”301  And he undoubtedly conflated his approach toward the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the DCC when he believed that a Court 
could examine whether a measure (the end) was truly local and if the 
means were sufficiently tailored to achieving the local objective.302  While 
                                                 
297 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45 n.2 (1940) (“[T]o the 
extent that the burden falls on economic interests without the state, it is not likely to be 
alleviated by those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it 
affects adversely interests within the state.”). 
298 Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 190; see also id. (“[C]ourts do not sit as Legislatures, either 
state or national.”).  “[F]airly debatable questions . . . are not for the determination of 
courts[.]”  Id. at 191.  “[C]ourts are not any the more entitled, because interstate commerce 
is affected, to substitute their own for the legislative judgment.”  Id. 
299 HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, & FUNDAMENTAL LAW 118 (1961) (extolling 
Stones’ approach and yet downplaying Barnwell’s emphasis).  Even so, Barnwell curiously is 
inserted in some textbooks under the heading for modern balancing.  KATHLEEN M. 
SULLIVAN, GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 222 (17th ed. 2010). 
300 Cushman, supra note 228, at 148 (observing how Chief Justice Hughes engaged in a 
similar effort in Jones & Laughlin Steel, while trying to preserve some semblance of dual 
federalism). 
301 Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 186 n. 4 & 186–90 (footnote omitted). 
302 Id. at 187.  In Buck v. Kuykendall, Justice Brandeis indicated that state highway 
measures that “indirect[ly] burden” interstate commerce must be reasonable.  267 U.S. 307, 
315 (1925).  He invoked Michigan Public Utilities Comm’n v. Duke, where the conservative 
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he sought to rest the DCC on discrimination, he nevertheless joined the 
Commerce Clause inquiry with his response to the Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge when examining whether the means the state 
choose were “without [a] rational basis.”303  As every student of 
constitutional history learns, this is precisely Stone’s contribution to 
equal protection jurisprudence in his famous footnote four of United 
States v. Carolene Products Co.304 
IV.  PROFESSOR THOMAS R. POWELL, COOLEY, AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
But seven years after Barnwell, when Justice Stone yet again battled 
DCC jurisprudence, he—whether deliberately or not—swerved the law 
slightly backward.305  By this time, the Court enjoyed a markedly 
different composition:  Hugo L. Black (1937), Stanley F. Reed (1938), Felix 
Frankfurter (1939), William O. Douglas (1939), Frank Murphy (1940), 
                                                                                                             
Justice Butler had indicated that state measures must be necessary, uniform and 
reasonable.  266 U.S. 570, 576–77 (1925). 
303 Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 192.  Supporting review, Justice Stone cited an equal 
protection case.  Id. (citing Borden’s Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251 (1936)) 
(involving an equal protection challenge to New York’s law on the sale of milk and 
distinguishing between those with well-advertised trade names and those without).  And 
while it appears that his inquiry into the merits relates to the Fourteenth Amendment 
claim, he did not clearly separate the analysis.  Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 190–96.  Samuel 
Konefsky’s biography of Stone illustrates Barnwell’s ambiguity, with Konefsky initially 
suggesting that Stone focused on whether the state measure discriminates against interstate 
commerce, and yet later suggesting that the test is whether it discriminates or “actually 
impede[s] the mobility of such commerce.”  SAMUEL J. KONEFSKY, CHIEF JUSTICE STONE AND 
THE SUPREME COURT 62, 65 (1946); see Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 
27 VA. L. REV. 1, 11–14 (1940) (reviewing Stone’s attitude toward multiple burdens in tax 
cases, and observing how Stone’s disagreement with some of his colleagues centered on 
whether discrimination in “effect” as well as “purpose” violated the DCC, with some 
justices opposing its expansion to “effects”).  Of course, exploring “purpose” mirrored the 
substantive due process inquiry of conservative Justices.  See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 
502, 539, 556 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (“we must inquire concerning its purpose 
and decide whether the means proposed have reasonable relation to something within 
legislative power”). 
304 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  The Chief Justice believed that the Court could examine 
legislative judgments to ensure protection for minority groups denied sufficient access to 
the democratic process.  Id.; see also Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940) 
(Stone, C.J., dissenting) (expressing support for the freedoms guaranteed to all under the 
Fourteenth Amendment); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 
96 YALE L.J. 943, 948–52, 966 (1987) (chronicling the rise of balancing, including in DCC 
context and noting relationship to due process analysis).  See generally Barry Cushman, 
Carolene Products and Constitutional Structure, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 54 (analyzing the role of 
due process in Commerce Clause analysis). 
305 S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783–84 (1945); see infra note 348 and accompanying 
text (stating that Stone endorsed an approach by Columbia Law Professor Noel T. Dowling 
and Harvard Law Professor Thomas Reed Powell in favor of the railroad industry). 
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Robert H. Jackson (1941), Wiley B. Rutledge (1943), and shortly thereafter 
Harold H. Burton (1945), Frederick M. Vinson (1946), Tom C. Clark 
(1949), and Sherman Minton (1949).306  The historic mechanical tests as 
applied to Congress’ Commerce Clause power had been abandoned in 
favor of a more expansive test in Wickard v. Filburn, and in the 
intergovernmental immunity context, the Court had eroded the notion of 
jurisdictional spheres endemic to dual federalism.307  The chasm left by 
the progressive attack on the Court’s earlier legal consciousness could 
not be more pronounced than in the DCC arena.  Once it became no 
longer tenable to distinguish between commerce and not commerce—the 
former funnel for channeling activities toward the federal or state 
spheres under an exclusivity paradigm, the Court lost its theory and 
accompanying test for classifying permissible and impermissible state 
and local regulation.  In other words, it threatened to lose its engagement 
and relationship with the past.  Post-World War II, however, demanded 
some theory.308  Hence, pernicious consequences seemed inevitable if the 
                                                 
306 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD:  THE SUPREME COURT UNDER STONE AND 
VINSON, 1941–1953, at 15–30 (1997). 
307 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that Congress could regulate local matters 
substantially affecting interstate commerce); see United States v. Rock Royal Co-Op, 307 
U.S. 533, 568 (1939) (“inextricably intermingled with and directly affects” product moving 
in interstate market).  “The authority of the Federal government over interstate commerce 
does not differ in extent or character from that retained by the states over intrastate 
commerce.”  Id. at 569–70; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941) (“so 
commingled with or related”); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942) 
(intrastate activities that “so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power” is 
necessary to achieve legitimate end; “in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct” 
Congress’ power; intrastate and interstate “inextricably commingled”); Edward S. Corwin, 
The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1950) (discussing the shift from a focus 
on constitutional rights to constitutional powers).  See generally Thomas R. Powell, The 
Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REV. 633, 633–34 (1945) 
(considering the state of intergovernmental tax immunity before and after the October 1937 
term of the Supreme Court); Thomas R. Powell, The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax 
Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757–58 (1945) (examining intergovernmental tax 
immunities after 1937). 
308 See generally DUXBURY, supra note 205, at 200–99 (analyzing the prevailing theories 
post World War II); STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM 
PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERISM:  AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 188–98 (2000) (examining 
the consequences of the postmodern period); PURCELL, supra note 203, at 95 (suggesting that 
new movements in law challenged “central assumptions of traditional theory”); WILLIAM 
M. WIECEK, 12 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE:  THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN 
CONSTITUTION, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941–1953, at 440–63 (2005) 
(evaluating American jurisprudence after the war); G. Edward White, The Evolution of 
Reasoned Elaboration:  Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 280–82 
(1973) (discussing the elements of Realism); G. Edward White, From Sociological 
Jurisprudence to Realism:  Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 
58 VA. L. REV. 999, 999–1000 (1972) (considering the struggle between Sociological 
Jurisprudes and Realists). 
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Court were to fall back on a pure concurrent theory—leaving state and 
local regulation unrestrained would prompt federal legislation and 
potentially greater centralization; it optically would untether the past 
without judicial rhetoric sufficient to provide reasoned justification; it 
would leave unchecked too many activities warranting scrutiny, ranging 
from taxing airplanes to racial discrimination on common carriers.309  
The only alternative would be for the Court to breath greater life into the 
privileges and immunities clause.310 
Reluctant to untether the Court’s rope to its past, the Justices began 
exploring how to employ rhetoric tying its past to present proclivities.311  
In 1941, Robert Jackson unabashedly wrote that “liberal-minded 
lawyers” needed to participate in the evolutionary process of 
interpreting the Constitution and responding to society’s challenges.312  
However, how the Court would accomplish this became muddled under 
a progressive paradigm that promoted nationalism, legislative 
democracy, and facts over legal fictions.  Several of the Justices 
                                                 
309 See Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 304 (1944) (observing that local 
taxes aggregated might balkanize and retard air travel, and that while older legal 
philosophy might have supported a state’s right to tax, this is “one of those cases where 
legal philosophy has to take account of the fact that the world does move.” (Jackson, J., 
concurring)).  Justice Black too concurred in Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion, 
suggesting the need for congressional action.  Id. at 301–02 (Black, J., concurring).  Chief 
Justice Stone dissented, believing Minnesota’s tax imposed an unconstitutional burden on 
interstate commerce, in light of the threatened multiple tax burdens facing the airline 
industry.  Id. at 308 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).  But Stone’s penchant for merging the Due 
Process and Commerce Clauses surfaced again, with the Justice observing “it has met the 
problem of burdensome multiple taxation by the several states through which such 
vehicles pass by recognizing that the due process clause or the commerce clause or both 
preclude each state from imposing on the interstate commerce involved an undue or 
inequitable share of the tax burden.”  Id. at 313–14; see Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 
(1946) (invalidating a Virginia statute that allowed segregation of passengers of public 
motor carriers).  See generally Thomas R. Powell, Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota:  State 
Taxation of Airplanes—Herein Also of Ships and Sealing Wax and Railroad Cars, 57 HARV. L. 
REV. 1097, 1097 (1944) (explaining that the problem in taxing airplanes and ships arises 
because they do not remain in a single state). 
310 See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 90–93 (1940) (explaining discriminatory ad 
valorem tax punishing out-of-state deposits is not a privilege of national citizenship, 
rejecting a privileges and immunities claim), overruling Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 
(1935).  Dissenting in Colgate, Justice Stone would have upheld a discriminatory tax, 
reasoning that the Court would need to find a “clear indication that the purpose or effect is 
a hostile or oppressive discrimination against particular persons or classes.”  Colgate, 296 
U.S. at 437 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
311 See UROFSKY, supra note 306, at 40–42 (emphasizing the justices’ different approaches). 
312 JACKSON, supra note 282, at xiv.  Justice Jackson later objected to a perceived 
extraterritorial operation of a state tax.  General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n of Iowa, 
322 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  “I can think of nothing in or out of the 
Constitution which warrants this effort to reach beyond the State’s own border[.]”  Id. at 
340. 
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individually explored different paths for achieving this result—albeit 
wary of precedent.  For instance, in Milk Control Board of Pennsylvania v. 
Eisenberg Farm Products, Justice Roberts, who later expressed uneasiness 
with his colleagues’ penchant for abandoning precedent, recognized that 
states could indirectly affect interstate commerce when controlling local 
conditions, and suggested that knowing when a measure is a legitimate 
effort to control local conditions is necessary as a consequence of “our 
dual form of government[]” and arises due to the “application in 
connection with the myriad variations in the methods and incidents of 
commercial intercourse.”313  He endorsed balancing by suggesting that 
the Court’s function would be to “weigh[] the nature of the respondent’s 
activities, and the propriety of local regulation of them, as disclosed by 
the record.”314  But Roberts’ perfunctory nod toward balancing would 
linger, while the Justices for the next decade plodded along until they 
could coalesce around an accepted rhetoric and theory. 
Barnwell’s almost exclusive focus on discrimination, averting post-hoc 
inquiries, appeared destined for consensus.315  Although diverging on 
policy, both Justices Douglas and Frankfurter appeared comfortable with 
a discrimination-laden test.316  Frankfurter suggested that, in the 
economic sphere where both the federal government and the states “may 
move,” the line between exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction “depends 
ultimately upon the philosophy of the Justices regarding our 
federalism.”317  But he equally wrote about the Commerce Clause 
                                                 
313 306 U.S. 346, 352 (1939); see Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96, 113 
(1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the majority disregards precedent). 
314 Id.  Commenting later, Roberts observed that the Court asked whether the state 
measure interfered with interstate commerce, by either taxing directly interstate commerce, 
obstructing commerce, or imposing burdensome regulations on interstate business.  See 
OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION:  THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 
LECTURES 39 (1951) (discussing the considerations of interstate commerce cases). 
315 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 44–45 & n.2 (1940) 
(rejecting “mechanical or artificial distinctions” and instead seemingly appearing to focus 
on whether the tax operated to disadvantage or prohibit—that is, discriminate—against 
interstate commerce).  Cf. Clark v. Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 595 (1939) (accepting state 
justification for treating in-state and interstate transportation of cars differently).  For the 
intricacies of the Berwind case, see Thomas R. Powell, Note, Sales and Use Taxes:  Collection 
from Absentee Vendors, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1092 (1944). 
316 See Int’l Harvester Co. v. Dep’t of Treas. of Ind., 322 U.S. 340, 345–49 (1944) 
(examining whether the state tax discriminated against interstate commerce); General 
Trading Co. v. Tax Comm’n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335, 338 (1944) (“obviously hostile or 
practically discriminatory toward interstate commerce”); see also Hale v. Bimco Trading, 
Inc. 306 U.S. 375, 379–81 (1939) (invalidating Florida’s unjustified discriminatory treatment 
of out-of-state cement). 
317 Frankfurter, supra note 214, at 68.  Endorsing his perceived understanding of Justice 
Brandeis, he wrote: 
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protecting free trade among the states and the inability of states to tax 
transactions outside their domain.318  Others too focused principally on 
discrimination.319  Conversely, Justice Black generally believed that 
“[t]he control of future conduct, the prevention of future injuries and the 
formulation of regulatory rules in the fields of commerce and taxation, 
all present legislative problems.”320  Jackson initially sided with Justices 
Frankfurter, Black, and Douglas in suggesting that the Court should 
avoid examining whether a state’s regulation interfered with some post 
hoc judicially perceived need for national uniformity—albeit later 
endorsing the Court’s role of averting economic balkanization.321 
Yet the progressive nationalist tendency and accompanying need for 
uniformity in some areas garnered considerable support.  Early 
progressives touted the need to distinguish between local matters and 
those demanding uniformity.322  The prominent Commerce Clause 
treatise in the late nineteenth century described as a well settled rule the 
formulae from Cooley distinguishing between “matters admitting 
                                                                                                             
“[Justice Brandeis] is keenly mindful that the Nation spans a continent 
and that, despite the unifying forces of technology, the States for many 
purposes remain distinctive communities.  As to matters not obviously 
of common national concern, thereby calling for a centralized system 
of control, the States have a localized knowledge of details, a 
concreteness of interest and varieties of social policy, which ought to 
be allowed tolerant scope.” 
Id. at 68; see also Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y. State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 777, 780 
(1947) (Frankfurter, J.) (“Since Congress can, if it chooses, entirely displace the States to the 
full extent of the far-reaching Commerce Clause, Congress needs no help from generous 
judicial implications to achieve the supersession of State authority.”).  Frankfurter 
described as “statecraft” the role of judges in accommodating changing conditions to “past 
utterances” when employing the Commerce Clause.  FRANKFURTER, supra note 97, at 21–22. 
318 See McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1944) (providing the background 
and purpose of the Commerce Clause).  Justice Frankfurter seemingly accepted the Court’s 
precedent, invoking cases such as Hall v. De Cuir to invalidate a state statute, and yet 
favored Congressional exercise of authority when necessary to achieve national uniformity.  
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 388 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
319 See Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 457 (1940) (Justice Reed) (focusing on 
discrimination due to the challenged statute).  “The commerce clause forbids 
discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious.”  Id. at 455. 
320 J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 328 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting). In 
Morgan, Justice Black again expressed dissatisfaction with the Court’s willingness to assess 
whether a regulation unduly burdened interstate commerce.  328 U.S. 373, 386–87 (1946) 
(Black, J. concurring). 
321 See JACKSON, supra note 282, at 290 (providing an excerpt from a dissent by Black, 
Frankfurter, and Douglas).  Justice Jackson, however, did not easily abandon old dogma.  
See UROFSKY, supra note 306, at 118–19, 124–25 (analyzing Justice Jackson’s position on 
interstate commerce and state regulation). 
322 PRENTICE & EGAN, supra note 125, at 27–28. 
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uniform regulation” and those of a “local nature.”323  Subsequent 
academic scholarship would coalesce around and build off Cooley.324  
Notions of national uniformity and discrimination permeated the 
Court’s continuing dialogue with itself in several facets of its effort to 
respond to an ever-changing society.325  Even the negative reactions to 
Justice Brandeis’ Erie opinion focused on promoting centralization and 
uniformity.326 
Of course, Cooley’s recrudescence in the post-New Deal era shrouded 
and, consequently, perpetuated the inherent aspect of dual federalism 
and exclusivity.  Reynolds’ 1928 treatise amply synthesized the Court’s 
precedent, observing how Cooley chartered a middle ground between 
Justice Taney’s concurrent jurisdiction approach in the License Cases and 
Justice Marshall’s ostensible federal exclusivity, with the Court 
examining the subject rather than the power being exercised.327  This 
merged with the progressive penchant for empirical facts and the realist 
acceptance of the role of the judiciary.  Reynolds acknowledged that the 
task of exploring economic facts associated with the need for national 
uniformity naturally involved a legislative type function, but saw no 
alternative to having the Court inquire into such economic facts until 
displaced by Congress.328  This is where Reynolds, perhaps laying the 
foundation, explained how the Court must naturally engage in 
balancing: 
But regardless of the formulae used, the Court 
frequently reaches its decision by a process of balancing 
                                                 
323 Id. 
324 See, e.g., Biklé, supra note 266, at 202 (stating that subsequent cases have affirmed 
Cooley v. Board of Wardens).  In 1928, George Reynolds suggested that, if Congress had not 
expressly or impliedly through specific legislation preempted state laws, the role of a court 
would be to examine whether it (a) regulates interstate commerce; (b) whether it regulates 
a matter requiring “a single uniform rule or plan of regulation,” and if not, and only then 
(c) whether it “burden[s] interstate commerce?”  REYNOLDS, supra note 270, at 365. 
325 See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75 (1938) (examining the relationship 
between discrimination and the challenged interstate commerce regulation); see also 
PURCELL, supra note 208, at 156–57 (discussing Brandeis’s criticism of diversity jurisdiction). 
326 See PURCELL, supra note 208, at 212–21 (focusing on centralization and uniformity); see 
also Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power—Revised Version, 47 COLUM. L. 
REV. 547, 559 (1947) (invoking Erie and a national common law equivalent to support 
Congress’s exclusive authority to regulate matters requiring uniformity).  In New State Ice, 
Brandeis extolled the virtues of diversity and state experimentation.  New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
327 See REYNOLDS, supra note 270, at 84–85 (comparing the different decisions and eras of 
the Court). 
328 See id. at 88, 410–11 (emphasizing the Court’s role in relation to Congressional 
deference). 
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the local need for state action against the interference 
with interstate commerce resulting therefrom, a process 
which cannot be performed intelligently without an 
accurate and detailed knowledge of economic facts.329 
And when the subject matter required uniformity, Reynolds indicated 
that it fell within Congress’ exclusive domain.330  Yet Barnard Gavit’s 
treatment of the Commerce Clause warned that Cooley’s doctrine “is 
unnecessary and results only in confusion,” possibly contributing to 
“incongruous result[s]” by establishing a “hybrid jurisdictional line[]”—
that is, resurrecting the politically palatable yet intellectually 
unsatisfying selective exclusiveness theory.331 
The struggle over how to modernize a Cooley-infused paradigm 
elicited different responses.  The competing approaches surfaced in 
McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, where, for example, Arkansas 
imposed a tax on vehicles entering the state carrying more than twenty 
gallons of gas in the tank or in an auxiliary tank, to offset the costs of 
ostensibly maintaining the state highways.332  The lower court had held 
that “[in]controvert[ably]” the tax directly burdened interstate 
commerce, and could only be sustained if the state affirmatively 
established a reasonable relationship between the tax and its purported 
purpose.333  McReynolds’ perfunctory majority opinion merely indicated 
that states could not directly burden interstate commerce—precedent 
simply dictated the outcome.334 
Justice Stone, however, was less sanguine about precedent and 
simple tests.  Writing a concurrence for himself and the Chief Justice, as 
well as Justices Roberts and Reed, he emphasized how the Court, when 
reviewing questionable state measures, must be satisfied that the state 
                                                 
329 Id. at 366, 411.  Others advocated a similar solution.  Sholley, supra note 272, at 592–94.  
As of 1936, Sholley observed how the Court had yet to resolve the concurrent/exclusive 
jurisdiction question.  Id. at 559. 
330 See REYNOLDS, supra note 270, at 91, 291, 408–09, 413 (expounding on Congress’ role to 
promote uniformity); see also id. at 373 (noting but not emphasizing discrimination). 
331 GAVIT, supra note 186, at 19–20. 
332 309 U.S. 176, 177 (1940). 
333 Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. McCarroll, 101 F.2d 572, 574 (8th Cir. 1939). 
334 In Interstate Transit v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 (1931), the Court concluded that, while 
states could not directly tax the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, they could 
impose a charge upon interstate traffic commensurate with the costs of maintaining or 
using the state highway.  Id. at 186.  A tax would “be sustained unless the taxpayer shows 
that it bears no reasonable relation to the privilege of using the highways or is 
discriminatory.”  Id.  Earlier cases suggested that, absent directly interfering or burdening 
interstate commerce, the regulation would have to be shown to be discriminatory.  See 
Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co., 273 U.S. 45, 50–51 (1927) (discussing use of 
precedent for interstate commerce cases). 
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measure (means) bears a sufficiently observable relationship to the ends 
(offset impacts to the highway).335  And if it does not, Stone suggested 
that it would be considered as discriminatory and invalidated.  Implicit 
in Justice Stone’s opinion is the assumption that the Court could examine 
the degree of interference with commerce to assess if the measure 
exceeded some un-predetermined line.336  Yet equally implicit is the 
converse:  the lack of any suggestion that cases could be decided by ex 
ante spheres of jurisdiction. 
This was problematic for Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas.  
They appreciated the difficulties attendant with apportioning financial 
responsibility for constructing and maintaining the modern interstate 
highway system, “involv[ing] incalculable variants and . . . beset with 
perplexities.”337  To these three Justices, however, that task belonged to 
legislatures, not courts.  The role of the judiciary, they believed, was 
limited to examining whether Congress has preempted the field or the 
state measure discriminates against interstate commerce.338  While 
recognizing that uniformity and thus federal legislation would be 
preferable, they resisted the temptation to perform essentially a 
legislative function.339 
Justice Stone’s moderating approach nevertheless appears trapped 
between two worlds—the realization of a fading nineteenth century 
paradigm and the impulse to maintain continuity with opinions grafted 
                                                 
335 McCarroll, 309 U.S. at 181 (“some fair relationship[,]” “apparent relationship[,]” “the 
relationship”); id at 182 (“relieve the state from the constitutional prohibition against the 
taxation of property moving in interstate commerce”).  In another tax (gross receipts) case, 
Stone accepted taxes for activities involved in interstate commerce, unless the state 
“discriminates against interstate commerce or undertakes to lay a privilege tax measured 
by gross receipts derived from activities in such commerce which extend beyond the 
territorial limits of the taxing state.”  Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 
438–39 (1939). 
336 In Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, for example, Stone wrote that “[t]he incidence of the 
particular state enactment must determine whether it has transgressed the power left to the 
States . . . although it is related to a phase of a more extensive commercial process.” 322 
U.S. 202, 210 (1944) 
337 McCarroll, 309 U.S. at 184. 
338 Id. at 184–85. 
339 Id. at 188–89 (“We would, therefore, leave the questions raised by the Arkansas tax for 
consideration of Congress in a nation-wide survey of the constantly increasing barriers to 
trade among the States.”).  Justice Black elsewhere dissented from a Justice Stone opinion, 
warning that the Court was engaged in too much conjecture about discrimination, and that 
“if national regulation to prevent ‘multiple taxation’ is within the constitutional power of 
this Court, it would seem to be time enough to consider it when appellant or some other 
taxpayer is actually subjected to ‘multiple taxation.’”  Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 
305 U.S. 434, 445 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting).  Black further repeated his plea that absent 
state discrimination, Congress, not the courts, should establish when and how commerce 
should be free.  Id. at 455. 
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from that paradigm.  Stone recognized the inherent flaws with dual 
federalism, and in taxing cases permitted the states sufficient leeway if 
the tax was apportioned to the local aspects of the interstate activity.340  
He rejected ill-suited “mechanical” tests and remained wedded toward 
the progressives’ reliance on facts and equally gravitated toward 
exclusive national authority when necessary to preserve a perceived 
need for uniformity.341  The Commerce Clause, he accepted, served as a 
“nationally unifying force.”342  And while he began invoking Cooley and 
Willson Bridge to justify distinguishing between local matters and 
subjects warranting uniformity, that distinction alone would not suffice 
without the Court first acknowledging and then incorporating the need 
for examining facts.343  This occurred when the Court accepted balancing 
as both a current flowing through past cases, allowing continued vitality 
to precedent, and as means to justify state regulation except in areas the 
Court concluded required uniformity. 
In Southern Pacific, Justice Stone ultimately endorsed an approach 
advanced by Columbia Law Professor Noel T. Dowling and Harvard 
Law Professor Thomas Reed Powell, the latter appearing on behalf of the 
railroad industry.344  Dowling, whom Chief Justice Stone corresponded 
with and would cite in Southern Pacific, appreciated the urgency of 
abandoning formulaic tests and theories of marginal utility, and yet in 
praising Justice Stone he remained captured by the past.345  He reviewed 
how the Justices debated the Court’s ability to invalidate state measures 
other than those involving purposeful discrimination, with Stone 
favoring the Court’s “role as mediator between state and nation.”346  
Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas thought otherwise.347  Dowling 
rejected Justice Black’s approach, but in doing so exhibited little 
                                                 
340 Gwin, 305 U.S. at 441; see also Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649, 651 
(1942) (permitting deference to states for taxes apportioned to local aspects of the interstate 
activity). 
341 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 360 (1943) (discussing the test to determine when 
interstate commerce begins and ends). 
342 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943). 
343 Parker, 317 U.S. at 360–62.  States, he accepted, could employ legitimate, non-
discriminatory means to achieve local objectives (matters peculiarly local and not likely to 
be addressed by Congress), and when those means affected interstate commerce the Court 
could accommodate the competing national and local interests by examining relevant 
factors—effectively balancing.  Id. at 362–63, 367. 
344 See generally Brief for the Association of American Railroads as Amicus Curiae, 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (No. 56) (listing Professor Powell on the 
brief). 
345 Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era:  Can it be Revived?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1534 
n.76, 1536 n.86 (2002) (referencing the Stone Papers). 
346 Dowling, supra note 303, at 16–17. 
347 Id. at 16. 
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tolerance for appreciating the Court’s evolving dialogue about the DCC 
and effectively relegated the importance of discrimination.348  Dowling 
advocated that, absent “affirmative consent a Congressional negative 
will be presumed in the courts against state action which in its effect 
upon interstate commerce constitutes an unreasonable interference with 
national interests[]”—a presumption capable of being rebutted by 
affirmative Congressional action.349 
Dowling’s analysis not only elevated Cooley, but it equally 
countenanced undoubtedly classic dual federalism decisions.350  Indeed, 
he noted elsewhere that only a constitutional amendment would permit 
states to regulate matters otherwise prohibited by the DCC, denying 
Congress the ability to sanction state action.351  And he expressly 
endorsed the Court’s ability to assess the “reasonableness” of a measure, 
and balance as a policy matter the national and local interests.352  “[T]he 
judicial sifting of the facts would have the manifest merit of sharpening 
the issues and facilitating legislative efforts in the event that Congress, 
dissatisfied with the judicial results, should desire to take corrective 
action of its own.”353  He capped his plea with a Justice Stone quote that 
                                                 
348 See Dowling, supra note 326, at 547 n.1 (reveling in his and Justice Stone’s approach 
prevailing over that of Justice Black in a subsequent article). 
349 Dowling, supra note 303, at 20.  Twice Dowling indicated that Stone clearly articulated 
the theory of congressional consent.  Id. at 17–18, 27.  Dowling never cites Henry Biklé’s 
earlier article echoing the same theme.  Biklé, supra note 266, at 200.  Gavit, conversely, 
suggested that the silence theory “says—nothing.”  GAVIT, supra note 186, at 7 (footnote 
omitted). 
350 See Dowling, supra note 303, at 20–21 & n.34 (referencing classic dual federalism 
cases). 
351 See Noel T. Dowling & F. Morse Hubbard, Divesting an Article of its Interstate Character:  
An Examination of the Doctrine Underlying the Webb-Kenyon Act, 5 MINN. L. REV. 100, 100–31, 
253–281, 117 (1921) (indicating that a constitutional amendment is needed to regulate).  
Dowling apparently believed the only mechanism for sanctioning state action would be if 
Congress could “divest” an article of commerce of its “interstate character.”  Id. at 122, 268–
69, 277–78, 280.  He nevertheless recognized that states enjoy reserved police power for 
matters within their domain.  Id. at 281; see also Dowling, supra note 326, at 556–58 
(questioning Congress’ ability to enact the McCarran Act allowing state regulation of 
insurance).  But Dowling overlooked that in James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland 
Railway Co. where the Court focused on both divesting an article of its interstate character 
and divesting individuals of their individual “right” to engage in interstate commerce.  242 
U.S. 311, 325, 330 (1917).  In Whitfield v. Ohio, the Court permitted congressional sanctioning 
of state regulation of convict made goods still in unbroken original packages.  297 U.S. 431, 
439–40 (1936). 
352 Dowling, supra note 303, at 21.  Dowling further suggested that the Court’s function 
simply extended a substantive due process inquiry into a statute’s reasonableness.  Id. at 
21–22. 
353 Id. at 23. 
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the Court’s Commerce Clause decisions “have united to bind the several 
states into a nation.”354 
Southern Pacific became a natural vehicle for Stone to explore 
Dowling’s approach.355  The case involved Arizona’s 1912 Train Limit 
Law, as subsequently codified and republished in 1939.356  Arizona’s 
statute prohibited trains larger than seventy freight cars (exclusive of 
caboose), or passenger trains larger than fourteen cars.357  The State 
initiated a test case, seeking to enforce the law against Southern Pacific 
once the railroad company admittedly ran trains exceeding the statutory 
limit—and became subject to a $500 fine.358  Arizona Superior Court 
Judge Levi S. Udall conducted a non-jury trial consisting of forty-six 
days of testimony, eighteen volumes of transcripts, seventy-three 
witnesses, and over 400 exhibits.359  Judge Udall firmly believed that 
certain matters fell within Congress’ exclusive domain, with freedom 
rather than restrain of commerce should the norm.360  Therefore, he 
found that train length requirements were national, not local matters that 
would have extra-territorial effects and required uniformity.361  He also 
combined Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and the DCC, when 
observing that, in areas of concurrent jurisdiction, states may not act 
unreasonably, arbitrarily, or in a manner that substantially or directly 
regulates, obstructs, impedes or burdens interstate commerce.362  And he 
concluded that the evidence established a heavy and unreasonable 
burden on interstate commerce, examining for himself whether the law 
promoted safety.363  The State Supreme Court then reversed—
precipitating the urgency for having the Court resolve its dialogue with 
its past.364 
                                                 
354 Id. at 28 (footnote omitted). 
355 See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768 (examining Dowling’s approach). 
356 Id. at 763. 
357 Id. 
358 See Brief for Appellant, Vol. I:  The Law at 8, S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) 
(No. 56) (stating that the case was a test case). 
359 Statement as to Jurisdiction at 22, 24–25, S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) 
(No. 56). 
360 See id. at 27 (establishing Judge Udall’s arguments of regulation). 
361 Brief for Appellant, supra note 358, at 50–51 (summarizing findings of fact number 
fifteen). 
362 Id. at 52. 
363 See id. at 29–30 (examining the safety of the Train Limit Law). 
364 State ex. rel. Conway v. S. Pac. Co., 145 P.2d 530, 536 (Ariz. 1943).  The court lamented 
that the parties cited approximately 325 cases.  Id. at 534.  A three-judge district court had 
invalidated Nevada’s train safety measure.  S. Pac. Co. v. Mashburn, 18 F. Supp. 393, 394 
(D. Nev. 1937), per curium.  Cf. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Williamson, 36 F. Supp. 607, 
616 (W.D. Okla. 1941) (upholding Oklahoma law). 
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In roughly 600 pages of legal arguments before the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the parties painstakingly reviewed prior cases absent any 
appreciation for the DCC’s dynamic character.  Southern Pacific’s brief 
on jurisdiction presented conflicting cases, untethered by temporality.365  
It referenced cases, for instance, extending back to Hall v. DeCuir that 
matters requiring national uniformity are entrusted exclusivity to 
Congress or that state statutes could not operate extra-territorially; it 
deployed pre-Barnwell cases suggesting that purported state police 
power measures could not “directly, substantially, and unreasonably 
obstruct[], burden[], and interfere[] with interstate commerce[.]”366  The 
railroad company further argued that prior cases concluded that the 
same or similar laws had been held to violate the Commerce Clause as 
well as the Fourteenth Amendment.367  Strikingly, however, the blurring 
of congressional preemption and exclusivity became apparent.  
Struggling with articulating what today we term field preemption, the 
company also claimed “states are powerless either to annul, augment, or 
supplement the congressional regulation.”368  Here, Southern Pacific 
invoked Erie, where the Court reasoned “that the police power of the 
state could only exist from the silence of Congress upon the subject, and 
ceased when Congress acted or manifested its purpose to call into play 
its exclusive power.”369  Yet, this continued persistence of exclusivity was 
inconsistent with the emerging paradigm:  Congress’ power is not 
“exclusive” but rather supreme once it acts.370 
Indeed, Southern Pacific’s principal brief cited together Brown, 
Cooley, Hall, Welton, the late nineteenth century cases, as well as 1930’s 
cases.371  The company primarily argued that Congress enjoys exclusive 
jurisdiction over matters national in character or demanding national 
uniformity.372  According to Southern Pacific, the subject matter and its 
                                                 
365 See Statement as to Jurisdiction, supra note 359, at 9–16 (comparing cases which had 
different rulings on train regulations). 
366 Id. at 10–11. 
367 See id. at 13–21 (explaining each case which violated the Commerce Clause or the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
368 Id. at 11; see also id. at 12–13 (suggesting that Congress had entered the field of train 
safety, the company invoked The Federal Safety Appliance Act and the Interstate 
Commerce Act). 
369 233 U.S. 671, 682 (1914). 
370 See id. at 682–83 (discussing Congress’s exclusive power). 
371 Brief for Appellant, supra note 358, at 55–56. 
372 See id. (explaining how the Train Law invades regulation).  In its reply brief, Southern 
Pacific reiterated Congress’ exclusive jurisdiction over matters requiring national 
uniformity, and the irrelevancy of the purpose of a state’s purported exercise of its police 
power.  Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3, S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (No. 56). 
Kalen: Dormant Commerce Clause's Aging Burden
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
794 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
effect on interstate commerce dictates whether something is national.373  
And courts must decide on “the basis of the facts developed by the 
record or judicially known to the Court, and in the light of applicable 
principles[]” whether “the subject-matter is of exclusive national 
concern[.]”374  The brief joined this argument with the veritable 
smorgasbord of pre-Barnwell tests, ranging from states’ inability to 
regulate extra-territorially, that states are prohibited from directly, 
materially, or substantially interfering with, or burdening or obstructing 
interstate commerce, that the law invaded a field occupied by Congress, 
and finally that Arizona’s statute was arbitrary, capricious and violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment.375 
Arizona responded somewhat simplistically, mixing late nineteenth 
century Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause jurisprudence.376  
It argued that, when reviewing a state’s exercise of its police power, the 
Court’s function is limited to examining whether the measure has a 
rational basis, and here Arizona explained why it believed the measure 
had such a basis.377  The State categorically denied the judiciary’s ability 
to examine the extent of the burden on interstate commerce when 
reviewing the measure’s reasonableness.378  Congress, it argued, could 
exercise that function when deciding whether regulatory measures 
affecting commerce warranted local or national regulation.379  Of course, 
the State had a problem with the lack of any articulated purpose for the 
state legislation, and the State responded that “[t]he necessary effect of 
the statute and not its stated purpose determines its validity.”380 
The stridency of the parties’ briefs was tempered by the amicus 
briefs.  The United States and the railroad industry amicus briefs 
presented the Court with a middle ground between the State and 
company’s positions.381  Both briefs emphasized how the judiciary must 
assess whether the challenged matter requires national uniformity and 
the practical effect of the measure on commerce when compared against 
                                                 
373 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 358, at 56–57 (“Such regulations, because of their 
inevitable extra-territorial effects, would create constant difficulty and embarrassment.”). 
374 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 372, at 4. 
375 Brief for Appellant, supra note 358, at 59–60, 62, 64. 
376 See Brief for Appellee at 79, S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (No. 56) (stating 
that the state treated the issues “together because in the final analysis each presents the 
identically same questions”); see also id. at 81 (stating that these are the same arguments 
“dressed in different clothes[]”); id. at 88 (explaining that there is no “logical” distinction). 
377 See id. at 80–118 (examining the rational basis analysis of the court). 
378 Id. at 18, 42. 
379 Id. at 33. 
380 Brief for Appellee, supra note 376, at 89. 
381 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15–16, S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 
761 (1945) (No. 56). 
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the local benefits.382  The United States principally argued that Congress 
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over national matters demanding 
uniformity.383  But the railroad industry brief joined by Professor Thomas 
Reed Powell presented what would prove the most persuasive or 
perhaps most prescient argument.384 
Powell arguably was “the pre-eminent teacher of his generation in 
constitutional law,” and his participation likely influenced Stone:  the 
two were friends, former colleagues, and corresponded occasionally 
even during the pendency of the case.385  As a progressive, Powell like 
other academics eschewed cloaking reason with linguistic covers,386 and 
yet occasionally appeared seemingly temperate in his public writing.387  
He had critiqued Corwin’s Twilight of the Supreme Court, for instance, by 
suggesting that it was too theoretical and skewed by Corwin’s motive of 
justifying stronger federal power and legislative activity.388  In 1932, 
Powell noted that “seldom does the Constitution clearly dictate a 
decision[]” and the Court exercises arbitrary (albeit not necessarily acting 
arbitrarily) power when rendering decisions, although the Court “does 
                                                 
382 See id. at 11 (explaining when a state law interacts with the commerce clause). 
383 Id. at 19. 
384 See generally Brief for the Ass’n of Am. R.R. as Amicus Curiae at 89, S. Pac. Co. v. 
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (No. 56) (providing that Powell was one of the three attorneys 
representing the Association of American Railroads). 
385 KAMMEN, supra note 5, at 315; see id. at 248–49 (describing Professor Powell); Alpheus 
Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone Assays Social Justice, 1912–1923, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 887, 894 
n.42 (1951) (noting 1935 correspondence and friendship).  They had corresponded before as 
well.  See Post, supra note 345, at 1535 n.83 (referencing the Stone Papers). 
386 See POWELL, supra note 269, at 3 (referencing “alien rubrics”).  Powell followed Holmes 
in treating the Constitution as a living document implemented by judges influenced by 
time and circumstances.  Thomas R. Powell, Current Conflicts Between the Commerce Clause 
and State Police Power 1922–1927, 12 MINN. L. REV. 321, 323 (1928) [hereinafter Powell, 
Current Conflicts]. 
387 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 205, at 457 (quoting Powell 1937 letter to J.N. Ulman 
deriding the conservative Four Horsemen).  He particularly chastised Justice Sutherlands’ 
opinion in the minimum wage case involving women.  GILLMAN, supra note 196, at 176–77. 
388 Thomas Reed Powell, Book Review, 48 HARV. L. REV. 879, 881 (1935) (reviewing 
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT).  Powell’s writings evince an 
acute sensitivity toward precision and respect for the Court.  Mastering subtlety, for 
instance, he wrote that most of the Court’s constitutional cases, referencing as examples 
Commerce Clause cases, “fit together nicely if you bend an intellectual corner here and 
there.”  Thomas Reed Powell, From Philadelphia to Philadelphia, 32 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 12 
(1938).  He was highly critical of Pearson and Allen’s The Nine Old Men.  See Thomas Reed 
Powell, Book Review, 46 YALE L.J. 561, 561 (1937) (reviewing DREW PEARSON & ROBERT S. 
ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN).  Nor was he charitable to Charles Warren’s historic Congress, 
The Constitution and the Supreme Court.  Thomas Reed Powell, Book Review, 49 HARV. L. 
REV. 514, 514–15 (1936) (reviewing CHARLES WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
THE SUPREME COURT).  Publically, he quite wittingly ridiculed a prominent book on the 
Constitution by James Beck.  KAMMEN, supra note 5, at 249. 
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what it prefers to do when it prefers to do as nearly as possible what it 
has done before.”389  Not surprisingly, therefore, he commented how in 
the DCC “we enter a realm where literary interpretation comes in at best 
only as an oracle whose voice is the voice of those who preside over the 
sanctuary.”390 
His writings on the police and commerce powers focused on facts 
and intermingling DCC and Fourteenth Amendment concepts.  For 
instance, he treated the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting a state 
from influencing conduct beyond its borders.391  Yet like Dowling, he 
also arguably wrote as if accepting relics of a dual federalism and 
corresponding exclusivity paradigm.392  While he lamented 
direct/indirect tests as a “framework of a compass without a needle[,]” 
he nevertheless maintained states could not directly regulate “marketing 
of products across state lines[.]”393  To him, states enjoyed sufficient 
latitude when exercising their police power, but the “general ordering” 
of industries necessitated federal not state power.394  If faithfully 
employed, however, the “tests” would leave some industries 
unregulated.395  Instead, he argued that courts could exercise practical 
judgment to protect against either state discrimination or a state 
regulating interstate commerce “too much.”396 
His Southern Pacific brief echoed these themes.397  The brief touted 
the importance of “practical considerations” in having the judiciary 
                                                 
389 CORWIN, supra note 283, at 221 (quoting Powell during 1937 congressional testimony). 
390 Powell, Current Conflicts, supra note 386, at 322. 
391 See Powell, supra note 2, at 194 (explaining the barriers against state action). 
392 Id. at 194, 207. 
393 Id.; see Powell, Current Conflicts, supra note 386, at 322–25 (exploring the definition of 
“regulate”). 
394 Id. at 196.  Powell rejected that states exercise concurrent power over commerce on 
matters requiring uniformity, and yet he justified allowing states to regulate such matters 
when congressionally sanctioned by simply calling the regulation an exercise of the police 
power not superseded by either a tacit or explicit congressional directive otherwise.  
Powell, supra note 238, at 135.  Powell also demonstrated his strong nationalist sentiment 
when eulogizing Chief Justice Marshall’s “supporting the exercise of wide national powers 
and in circumscribing the centrifugal propensities of the several States.”  Thomas Reed 
Powell, The Great Chief Justice:  His Leadership in Judicial Review, 2 WM. & MARY L. REV. 72, 92 
(1955). 
395 See Powell, supra note 2, at 232 (explaining the result of implementing federal power). 
396 Powell, Current Conflicts, supra note 386, at 491; see also Thomas Reed Powell, State 
Production Taxes and the Commerce Clause, 12 CALIF. L. REV. 17, 19 (1924) (“looking through 
Supreme Court doctrine to the practicalities of the Supreme Court adjustments”).  Practical 
judgment infused his scholarship, informing his view that courts could examine each case 
to decide whether a state acted reasonably.  See Thomas Reed Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric 
of Constitutional Law, 15 J. OF PHIL., PSYCHOL. & SCI. METHODS 645, 649 (1918) (stating the 
judgment of the court is practical). 
397 Brief for the Ass’n of Am. R.R. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 384, at 86. 
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protect the national commercial interest.398  Some subjects resided within 
Congress’ exclusive jurisdiction over commerce, while others, he 
suggested, arguably fit within “concurrent” jurisdiction—although he 
avoided distinguishing between the two by adroitly suggesting that, 
regardless, the Arizona law failed all tests.399  He argued that, for a 
century, Congress relied on having courts perform this function.  Courts, 
therefore, must examine practically the “burden” on interstate 
commerce.400  They do so to ensure that only Congress may regulate 
matters warranting national uniformity.401  And courts do so, he 
intimated, by exploring the efficacy of the purported local benefit and 
the corresponding burden on interstate commerce.402  This is what he 
advanced early in the brief and reflects the brief’s overall structure.403  It 
also is what he suggested that Chief Justice Stone had undertaken in his 
Di Santo dissent, and followed from the Justice’s observation about the 
importance of protecting out-of-state interests from being disadvantaged 
in the political process.404  Underscoring the somewhat sophomoric 
nature of the arguments, Powell even argued that Arizona’s law 
conflicted with existing federal law and therefore the Commerce 
Clause—when, in fact, his point was the statute had been preempted and 
violated the Supremacy Clause.405 
After quickly dispatching any pretense of preemption, the Court 
accepted Powell’s dominant argument—citing for good measure 
Professor Dowling’s law review article.406  With his penchant for 
employing string cites and suggesting temporal consistency in the 
                                                 
398 Id. at 7–8, 54, 85 (discussing the importance of considerations). 
399 Id. at 6.  “[I]t is Congress and not the states which has the power over interstate 
commerce[.]”  Id. at 67.  Indeed, the brief endorsed the inherent dual federalism concept of 
examining the “extraterritorial” effect of state regulations.  Id. at 41, 49, 64, 73–77. 
400 See id. at 86 (suggesting examining the burden is a necessary corollary to protecting 
against discriminatory state regulation). 
401 See Brief for the Ass’n of Am. R.R. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 384, at 48–49 (“The 
question is simply whether or not the subject to be regulated and the character of 
regulation are such as require, when tested by the standard of superior fitness and 
propriety, that diverse and possibly conflicting local commands be avoided in the national 
interest.”); see also id. at 50 (“uniform control by a single authority”); id. at 55 (citing Cooley). 
402 See id. at 8, 22, 35, 54 (explaining how courts review the benefit and burden on 
interstate commerce). 
403 Id. 
404 See id. at 59, 64–65 (reviewing the proposition presented by Chief Justice Stone and 
discussing out-of-state interests and disadvantages in the political process). 
405 See Brief for the Ass’n of Am. R.R. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 384, at 20–21 
(establishing the Arizona law was in conflict with the federal law and as such, in violation 
of the Commerce Clause). 
406 See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768 (1945) (noting the Court’s citation to 
Dowling’s law review article). 
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Court’s treatment of the DCC, Chief Justice Stone explained how the 
DCC served to ensure that matters requiring national uniformity would 
not be substantially interfered with by state or local regulations, unless 
otherwise permitted by Congress.  This was necessary to protect 
“national commerce.”  Here he could cite, as if all the seemingly random 
cases were reconcilable, Gibbons, Cooley, Leisy, De Cuir, and even 
Welton.407  But the Cooley formulae proved victorious, coupled now with 
Powell’s practical suggestion that difficult cases demanded that the 
Court examine the competing demands for local regulation against any 
national interest warranting uniformity.408  Only Justices Black and 
Douglas, in dissent, offered the last gasp for a discrimination-laden 
approach toward the DCC.409 
Of course, Justice Stone’s juridical style ignored tough issues.  He 
avoided sanctioning any “theory” animating the DCC, by instead relying 
on the progressive mantra of facts of what the Court had done since the 
early days.410  He emphasized the need for uniformity on important 
national matters, and yet simultaneously echoed the derided concept 
that states could not “materially restrict the free flow of commerce[.]”411  
He included a citation to Cooley when noting the absence of political 
restraints for state regulation affecting out-of-state activities, as if the 
dual federalism paradigm from the Cooley era had some relevance to the 
newly constructed political constraint argument.412  He later emphasized 
the practical necessity of uniform legislation when a multiplicity of states 
might be regulated similar conduct beyond their borders.413  And he 
quite willingly skirted the Arizona Supreme Court’s factual findings on 
the importance of the state regulation, by instead referencing the trial 
court findings and accepting the Court’s role of examining whether the 
asserted state regulatory purpose would achieve its purpose only 
“slight[ly]” or “problematical[ly].”414  The inquiry effectively 
transformed the progressive marshaling of facts justifying legislative 
                                                 
407 See id. at 767–69 (identifying citations to cases utilized in the Court’s decision). 
408 See id. at 769–70 (discussing the Court, not the state legislature, is the final adjudicator 
of demands of the state and national interests).  Stone added that Congress’ years of 
acquiescence implicitly sanctioned the Court’s ability to examine “relevant factual 
material” to avoid “destructive consequences to the commerce of the nation.”  Id. at 770. 
409 Id. at 784–96 (dissenting from the majority decision). 
410 Id. at 770. 
411 S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. at 770. 
412 See id. at 767 n.2 (examining the lack of political restraints articulated in Cooley with 
regard to the regulation of out-of-state activities). 
413 See id. at 775 (emphasizing the need for uniform legislation). 
414 Id. at 775–76, 779. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss3/9
2015] Aging Burden 799 
judgments into an implicit Fourteenth Amendment factual examination 
for possibly undermining those judgments.415 
V.  SOLIDIFYING BALANCING IN THE MOST UNFORTUNATE WAY 
Over the next quarter century, Chief Justice Stone’s constitutionalism 
would become institutionalized and seeming immune from critical 
examination.  By 1970, laissez faire dialogues and dual federalism had 
long since faded, and the Court accepted the inevitable—that the new 
economy left many state regulatory measures affecting interstate 
commerce.416  Justice Stone and the New Deal Court purportedly 
resolved that problem by allowing federal regulation on matters 
substantially affecting interstate commerce, and upholding state 
regulation on matters affecting interstate commerce—unless they 
discriminated against interstate commerce or involved an area 
warranting national uniformity.417  With these changes, the Court 
abandoned the concept of exclusivity.  Once it had done so, however, the 
Court failed to confront the obvious—it had once again created a line, 
this time a shifting one that would move according to the particular facts 
of a case, without ever asking why.  It did this in the name of protecting 
a free national market and averting state balkanization.418 
The lingering issues with the DCC became apparent in Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc.419  Pike has since become the “canonical source” for modern 
DCC balancing.420  There, a three-judge panel of the district court 
                                                 
415 Id. at 781 (concluding that the state had gone “too far”). 
416 WHITE, supra note 44, at 262 (explaining that by the late 1940s, “police power” as a 
category disappeared from the leading constitutional law textbooks, underscoring the 
demise of spheres of jurisdiction). 
417 See supra Parts III–IV (discussing The New Deal). 
418 See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1951) 
(discussing the potential consequences of an alternative decision); see also Hood & Sons v. 
DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) (establishing the protection of a free market). 
419 397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970) (discussing issues with DCC).  Articles specifically about Pike 
v. Bruce generally appear cryptic.  See, e.g., Catherine Gage O’Grady, Targeting State 
Protectionism Instead of Interstate Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 571, 612–15 (1997) (crediting Pike, inappropriately, with the emergence of the 
anti-discrimination component to the DCC); see also David S. Day, Revisiting Pike:  The 
Origins of the Nondiscrimination Tier of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 27 HAM. L. 
REV. 45, 46–47 (2004) (examining Pike and the Commerce Clause Doctrine). 
420 SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 299, at 217; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 437 (2006) (evaluating Pike as a source for 
the balance of DCC).  While Professor Chemerinsky suggests that Day examines the origins 
of Pike, Day’s article merely analyzes Pike without purporting to explain its origins.  See id. 
at 437 n.78 (suggesting Pike in the beginning was analyzed by Day); see also, e.g., Day supra 
note 419, at 46–60 (discussing the protection of a free national market as the purpose of the 
changes). 
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enjoined Arizona from enforcing the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable 
Standardization Act.421  Appellants informed the Court, “[a]lmost all 
states for whom the raising of fruits and vegetables constitutes an 
important industry have enacted some type of law prescribing minimum 
standards of quality and pack for produce shipped out of the state.”422  
Neither the lower court nor the parties recognized that the New Deal 
Court had begun the process of eroding defunct approaches.  Yet at least 
for Arizona, prior cases generally survived unless the state programs 
targeted out of state businesses.  The classic case involved Florida’s effort 
to protect its branding for citrus fruits, by prohibiting the sale of 
immature fruit or fruit otherwise unfit for consumption.423  The Court’s 
obvious results oriented opinion justified the measure as involving a 
reasonable means for securing a legitimate end, and as such represented 
an exercise of the state’s police power to address a local concern.424 
The Pike facts seemed destined to produce a problematic decision.  
Bruce Church, Inc. (“Bruce”) was a California corporation, engaged in all 
facets of producing, marketing, and transporting fruits and vegetables in 
Arizona and California for markets throughout the country.425  At the 
time of the lawsuit, the company had four processing or packing 
facilities in Arizona, where the crops were prepared for out-of-state 
shipment.426  It also had been engaged with the Department of the 
Interior and Colorado River Indian Tribes to develop operations on an 
Indian reservation, at Parker, Arizona.427  The year before, the company 
had shipped its cantaloupes grown at Parker to its processing plant in 
California, thirty-one miles away.428  The Arizona Fruit and Vegetable 
Standardization laws were in effect then, and the State was aware of and 
permitted these shipments as well as other companies’ out-of-state 
shipments—allegedly for years.429  California, where the cantaloupes 
                                                 
421 Pike, 397 U.S. at 146. 
422 Appellant’s Brief at 44, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (No. 301) 
(footnote omitted).  The parties further added to this list, after briefing, that the State of 
New York had amended its Agriculture and Markets Law to establish standards for the 
packing and grading of lettuce.  See Supplemental Brief of Appellee at 2–3, Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (No. 301) (adding additional information to the Appellee’s 
brief). 
423 See, e.g., S. J. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 62 (1915) (stating the delivery and 
shipment in interstate commerce of citrus fruits may be made a criminal offense). 
424 Id. at 59–60, 62 (holding that the fruit at issue was not an article of commerce, and 
further that the Court was merely reviewing the statue as applied, without facts about 
whether the fruit might have been a useful product outside the state). 




429 Complaint at 40, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (No. 301). 
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were being shipped, had “the same or very similar” standardization laws 
as Arizona, and nothing in the case suggests that Bruce would not 
comply with California’s laws.430  Any cantaloupes re-entering Arizona, 
therefore, would have been processed and packed in accordance with 
similar standardization requirements.431  Arizona even agreed that the 
inspections would be similar, and California inspectors provided Bruce 
with certificates that were then submitted to the Arizona inspectors.432  
Arizona further admitted that this procedure had been followed for two 
years without objection or complaint by the state.433 
But when Bruce planted its crop in 1968, Arizona informed the 
company that it would enforce its standardization laws, and it would 
continue to do so the next year to ensure that the case would not become 
moot.434  This naturally prompted Bruce to allege a constitutional 
violation, asserting a federal right “to engage in interstate transportation 
of its own products, free from undue or unreasonable restraints by the 
Defendants[.]”435  If the state prevented the company from shipping its 
product to its California processing facility expeditiously, the company 
claimed that it would lose approximately $700,000, and jeopardize its 
program with the Interior Department and Colorado River Tribes.436  
Within three weeks of the complaint being filed, the district court issued 
                                                 
430 Id. at 12. 
431 See id. (discussing transported crops would not be returned for marketing or sale in 
Arizona until they have been processed and packed).  Later in oral argument Rex Lee 
would equivocate on this point. 
432 Id. at 40. 
433 See Stipulation of Facts at 38, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (No. 301) 
(explaining similar procedures occurred in Arizona and California); see also id. at 40 (noting 
Arizona stipulated that others shipped products to California without complying with the 
standardization laws); id. at 42 (stating defendant was aware that others in Arizona had 
been shipping products into California for processing, packing and shipment to other 
states). 
434 Id. at 41, 48 (stating that Bruce planted its crop in January, for a June harvest, and 
Arizona issued its written notice in March).  Arizona’s insistence on testing the 
constitutionality of its standardization laws, particularly in this circumstance and given the 
history of its implementation, suggests much more than what the case’s official record 
reveals.  Arizona and Bruce fought over whether Bruce would build a processing plant at 
the Parker Ranch, with a proposed legislative amendment narrowly defeated that would 
have permitted Bruce to use the California facilities.  Appellant’s Brief, supra note 422, at 
10–11.  Cf. Appellee’s Brief at 22, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (No. 301) 
(questioning discussing legislation).  California’s border facility, however, apparently 
afforded the necessary economies of scale and strategic location for interstate shipping. Id. 
at 12, 15–16. 
435 Complaint, at 1; see also Complaint, at 9 (“constitute an unreasonable and undue 
burden upon, and obstruction of, interstate commerce[]”).  Bruce further alleged that the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, preempted the standardization law.  Id. at 10. 
436 See Stipulation of Facts supra note 433, at 45–46 (discussing the alleged aftermath 
should the state prevent shipping). 
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a preliminary injunction.  A trial occurred six months later, and within 
the next month the court issued its opinion enjoining the application of 
the statute.  The court discussed the merits of the case in a single short 
paragraph, simply stating that, under Foster Fountain Packing Co. v. 
Haydel, Johnson v. Haydel, Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., and Lemke v. Farmers 
Grain Co., the standardization law unlawfully burdened interstate 
commerce.437 
At oral argument, Arizona admitted that its purpose was to solidify 
its place as one of the top three cantaloupe producing states by ensuring 
that the packing occurs in state.438  Arizona further informed the Court 
that Bruce’s particular Parker cantaloupes were some of the highest 
quality produced in Arizona and the State naturally wanted them 
identified as Arizona cantaloupes.439  Its legal arguments were equally 
simplistic.  Arizona variously argued that commerce had not yet begun, 
that the standardization law did not “delay” any commerce and were the 
sort of program warranting diversity under Cooley, and that Arizona was 
not seeking to insulate itself or protect from competition its cantaloupe 
market.440  Its brief employed cases without any appreciation for 
changing constitutional dogma, or when cases were decided; and 
Barnwell, Arizona argued, collapsed the Commerce Clause and 
Fourteenth Amendment inquiries by asking whether the state had acted 
within its “province” and with reasonably adapted means to achieve the 
stated objective.441 
The company’s brief similarly deployed cases as if constitutional 
dogma remained stagnant.  It correctly observed that the law protects 
goods as soon as they enter the stream of commerce, here the 
harvesting.442  From there it argued historic tests—that states could not 
directly interfere with or burden interstate commerce, because to do so 
                                                 
437 Appendix at 62, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (No. 301). 
438 See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 422, at 43 (discussing the state’s reasoning). 
439 Id. 
440 Id. at 12–13.  Arizona dismissed Baldwin v. Seelig and similar cases as irrelevant 
because the State had not purposely sought to “isolate itself as an economic unit[.]”  Id. at 
34.  The State’s reply focused on arguing that economic objectives are legitimate as long as 
they do not insulate the state from competition.  See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, Pike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (No. 301) (reviewing the State’s reply). 
441 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 422 at 12.  At oral argument Arizona referred to the 
inquiry as one of substantive due process.  See Transcript of Record at 4, Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (No. 301), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-
1969/1969/1969_301, archived at http://perma.cc/43TN-V7PG (reviewing the record). The 
State relied principally on Barnwell and Cooley as establishing the governing principles.  
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 422, at 20. 
442 See Appellee’s Brief, supra note 434, at 44 (establishing goods are protected by the law 
upon entering commerce). 
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would be an unreasonable exercise of state power.443  It rejected applying 
the distinction between the need for uniformity versus diversity, 
although it added that the case obviously involved a matter warranting 
uniformity.444 
Justice Stewart’s short and unanimous opinion avoided any 
independent engagement with the cases, merely responding to the 
advocates.  The Court first agreed that state regulation of products 
destined for interstate markets triggered a DCC inquiry.445  It then 
invoked Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit as synthesizing the 
principle emerging from apparently stagnant constitutional doctrine 
“[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate 
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”446  
And then citing Southern Pacific, Stewart observed how a court could 
assess the legitimacy of the local interest, as well as its effect on 
commerce, and perhaps explore in Fourteenth Amendment parlance 
other less destructive means, occasionally doing this under a balancing 
approach.447  While the Court then accepted that Arizona could 
constitutionally seek to promote its economic interests by touting how 
Arizona produces superior cantaloupes, it nevertheless discounted the 
State’s motive—at one point referring to “the State’s tenuous interest.”448  
Indeed, when the Court ended its opinion by agreeing that the law 
violated the DCC, it observed that the State lacked any compelling 
interest and the Commerce Clause does not “permit a State to require a 
                                                 
443 See id. at 39–41, 57, 62 (determining a state’s interference is an unreasonable exercise of 
power).  The brief averred that states may not advance local economic interests when doing 
so burdens interstate commerce.  Id. at 79, 82; see also id. at 85 (stating that availability of 
non-discriminatory means underscores unreasonableness of state program). 
444 See id. at 69 (discussing uniformity).  Bruce agreed with the lower court about the 
propriety of relying upon Toomer, Haydel, Schafer, and Lemke, along with the Court’s 
admonition in Dean Milk that states may not erect “economic barrier[s].”  Id. at 74. 
445 Pike, 397 U.S. at 141–42 (establishing that state regulation of interstate market products 
warrants a DCC inquiry). 
446 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 
(1960).  In Huron, however, Justice Stewart reached back to nineteenth century cases to 
establish that even-handed state regulation could not unduly burden interstate 
commerce—by “materially affect[ing] interstate commerce in an area where uniformity of 
regulation is necessary.”  Id. at 444; see also id. at 448 (noting that no impermissible burden 
was placed on commerce). 
447 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (reviewing an alternative balancing approach). 
448 Id. at 143–45; see also id. at 146 (referring to the State’s “minimal” interest).  Stewart 
added, “the Court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business 
operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed 
elsewhere.”  Id. at 145. 
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person to go into a local packing business solely for the sake of 
enhancing the reputation of other producers within its borders”—said 
another way, it lacked a legitimate interest!449 
And with Pike, modern DCC dogma became solidified. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The negative aspect of the Commerce Clause is one of the few meta-
Constitutional principles reflecting a perceived higher law surrounding 
the adoption of the Constitution.  From the DCC’s very inception, courts 
struggled with the framers’ intent, and yet nineteenth century jurists 
consistently deployed the concept to promote a national economic 
marketplace.  The Court removed from state jurisdiction subjects 
warranting national uniformity, whether under an exclusivity paradigm, 
or later simply because the Court said so.  The difficulty today is that it is 
doing so under the guise of a balancing test that masks an implicit 
acceptance of Cooley’s political solution of only partially concurrent 
jurisdiction.  Partially concurrent, however, means exclusive on some 
things.  Absent facial, purposeful, or actual discrimination, that means 
also a post hoc judgment, whether a subject falls on one side or the other.   
But the charge to draw this particular line of demarcation through 
balancing developed despite the demise of dual federalism and the 
acknowledgement that defining “commerce” in the modern world will 
not work. 
The task emerged from the progressive push toward nationalism, 
reverence toward facts, and acquiescence toward governmental 
intervention.  Yet once the Court accepted an enlarged Commerce 
Clause, it no longer was necessary to embrace a Cooley-infused 
paradigm.  Nor could the Court thereafter gird its analysis in a 
historically consistent theory behind the Commerce Clause itself.  And 
even Professor Powell readily admitted that any judicially drawn line 
would be a product merely of the clash amongst advocates (implicitly 
questioning the Court’s competence perhaps).450  Charles Black, Jr., 
therefore, famously suggested that in lieu of such “Humpty-Dumpty 
textual manipulation,” the Court instead should honestly resort to the 
underlying theory of the Constitution to promote a unitary nation, and 
from there draw any necessary restraints on state or local action.451  
Unfortunately, the clause’s history has been less about an honest 
                                                 
449 Id. at 146. 
450 Current Conflicts, supra note 386, at 631–32. 
451 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 29 
(1969). 
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dialogue and more about grappling with discerning amorphous 
boundaries hidden in the clause itself.  Perhaps, therefore, the time is 
ripe to remove the shadow of DCC dogma. 
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